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Abstract 
Generative music, manifesting a perpetually new music which transcends the temporal 
limitations of both live and recorded music, presents us with continuously new 
possibilities and perspectives which in turn enable new modes of being. As specific 
compositional choices are automated, the sonic possibility space thus becomes the 
operative creative field. The new concern with structural possibilities as they come to 
presence yields a new listening ontology.  
Brian Eno’s specific manifestation of generative music has evolved along a distinctly 
technological trajectory of creativity. Through his own liminal position between 
popular and avant garde musical cultures, his ambient aesthetic has found a new 
mode of expression and materialization. The music is environmentally utilized as an 
absent presence rather than as an object of focus, and this position is preserved and 
mirrored textually in this inquiry; the music is not directly treated as an object of 
scrutiny but rather informs the text as a background, ambient presence.  
The experience of listening to generative music carries with it the possibility of 
transcending the duality of the subject–object relationship and its impedance of the 
transformative power of the aesthetic experience in its traditional aesthetic 
conception. Generative music thus inherently evades both traditional methods of 
analysis and traditional modes of aesthetic commentary. As the music foregrounds the 
moment in which reception occurs, while simultaneously existing as a background 
presence, it elicits a transformation in the way in which we perceive and conceptually 
order the sound, the environment, and our subsequent relation between the two. 
Generative music itself becomes a structure through which one can engage with a new 
way of being through listening, one in which we apprehend our creative capacity 
through being receptive to alterity.  
In this way, listening itself has an ontology, one which can only be revealed through 
new forms of textual engagement. Ontologically, Heidegger provides the language to 
explore a music that reorients us at the level of being. Phenomenologically, he 
examines and reveals the structures of being which manifest our earth and world, our 
very possibilities of and for being, and these structures are precisely those which are 
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technologically represented in generative music. Aesthetically, Heidegger views the 
artwork as almost a generative system in itself—one which sets truth to work as it 
manifests a dynamic between revealing and concealing. Art and technology, and thus 
poiesis and techne respectively, are examined as orientations of being which have an 
ideal configuration for Heidegger that manifests at the level of thought. Thus, 
Heidegger’s specific philosophic configuration which is pre-eminently concerned with 
ontological structures and coming to presence provides a structure through which 
generative music can emerge and find resonance.  
Heidegger’s philosophy evolves and unfolds in new generative iterations through his 
student Hans Georg Gadamer, who extends the hermeneutic nature of being to 
include the process of mediation. This enables an exploration of the temporality of the 
moment of the aesthetic encounter—a point of convergence at which the perceiver or 
listener undergoes self-transcendence through entering the unifying and structuring 
force of play. Play manifests sonically in generative music, during which the pre-
existing  temporal and subjective structures are reconfigured and transformed through 
technological mediation. 
Similarly, Emmanuel Levinas reveals new variations on Heidegger’s ontology as he 
explores notions of alterity and the ways in which these are formative of our 
subjectivity. As he delineates the moment of encounter with the Other, we recognize 
its constitutive elements as they play out technologically within the generative music 
listening encounter. As the notion of infinity is played out sonically through each 
passing generative iteration, it manifests a constant overflowing of itself in both 
thought and presence. This process arises through a dynamic movement between 
interiority and exteriority, in which an internal desire for the Other is ignited and 
perpetuated by the external, radical Other. This simultaneously internal and external 
encounter with alterity situates a fundamentally radical passivity, one which reflects 
our ontological situation which comes to be mirrored in the technological, generative 
manifestation of the same structural relations. 
The philosophical approach of the present inquiry is not a commentary on generative 
music; it is a demonstration of its genesis—embodying the generative motion between 
being and becoming which comprises generative music, rather than engaging with 
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traditional textual commentary about music. Between the textual presence and 
musical absence, a space arises in which music can emerge not as an object but as a 
way of being into which we enter. In this way, the subject–object structure of 
traditional aesthetics is transcended in a move toward a new aesthetic which 
encompasses the larger truth at issue—that the process of configuration, combination, 
juxtaposition and subsequent emergence is the very point of the genesis of meaning, 
or the origin of truth. Thus, generative music embodies not only a technological but 
also a textual path to this moment in which we engage with the origins of our own 
ontological possibilities. 
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Preface 
 
Perhaps a few prefatory remarks are required in order to explain what likely appears 
at first glance to be a strange conglomeration of characters in this thesis—Brian Eno 
and Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer and Emmanuel Levinas. What impulse 
and questions have motivated such an unexpected array of characters? What could 
they possibly have to say to one another on a topic which none hold in common? If 
our most elemental experiences with philosophy and art have yielded any consistent 
truth, it is that immediate correspondences are often only the most superficial of 
correlations and often mask an entire world which lies just below the surface. In 
other words, first glances aren’t always reliable; words and experiences sometimes 
fail to match up and thus a new language must be born, often arriving from a 
seemingly unrelated or surprising source. It is the unlikely combinations which point 
us toward thinking in new ways. 
My first glance at computer generated music proved to be one such instance of 
corresponding dismissal. It appeared somehow cold and inorganic with an 
automation which seemed tedious. At least that was my abstracted notion of it until 
Brian Eno led me into it, or into his version of it. At the time I began contemplating a 
subject for the present study, Brian Eno’s latest work was 77 Million Paintings, a 
generative based audio visual installation presented both in the gallery setting and 
on your home computer by way of a software DVD.1
It consisted of endless shapes, colours and sounds patterning themselves and 
converging at variably slow rates seemingly infinitely. My interest in Eno’s music and 
aesthetic philosophy meant that I would pursue some avenue of his work, and the 
trajectory of his work seemed to culminate at this generative music juncture. It 
seemed I had arrived at an object for my study. 
                                                                            
1 http://www.enoshop.co.uk/product/77-million-paintings-second-edition.html (15 September 
2014). 
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The trouble was that I simply didn’t use music that way—looking at a computer 
screen, hearing infinite variations on the same thing. In fact, it was Brian Eno himself 
who had accustomed me to using music ambiently, almost as an extension to film 
music whereby I read my environment differently through an added piece of aural 
scenery. Through his ambient music which could sustain attention but did not 
require it, I had begun to use music as a lens or tool rather than an object of focus. 
Its presence in the background somehow altered the foreground. I had ceased 
listening to music and was instead listening through it. Now here he was asking me 
to seemingly do just the opposite. I was now to sit down face to face with the work 
and give it my full attention. Somehow I had to mentally transport the gallery 
mindset into the space surrounding my laptop computer, and these worlds seemed 
to be separated by a great divide.  
To make matters more challenging, the aesthetic object of focus in this instance was 
not an object as such at all. Lacking any set beginning, ending or repetition 
throughout its never ending stream of notes sounding in succession, Eno’s 
generative music evaded focus in the traditional sense as it presented no 
determinate body to analyse or dissect. Consequently, I found myself increasingly 
focusing on this divide between the gallery experience and the home experience, 
and this somehow mirrored the experiential discrepancy between composed and 
indeterminate music: a space is left open somewhere as some structural feature of 
the work is designated to the listener rather than the composer and this somehow 
this gives us new cognitive and perceptual cues to think differently about not only 
the piece but how it fits into our world. The open space in the piece somehow 
adheres itself to the greater open of the world and draws attention to it.   
Once again, my prior thoughts about the experience and the actual experience itself 
proved to be two entirely different things. The focus required for appreciating 77 
Million Paintings was not the hard edged attention one usually brings to a typical film 
experience where the environment is blocked out and the conceptual world is 
reduced to the action on the screen. Instead, this was a softer, gentler focus during 
which the escape into my imagination did not involve going somewhere else or 
pretending that the images on the screen were anything other than what they were 
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in any given moment. I was somehow in the here and now and in an imaginative 
space at the same time. What struck me was that Eno had somehow achieved a 
reversal of the regular order of experience in a viewing and listening situation; the 
images, while engrossing, seemed to point to the music as the focal point rather than 
the other way around. Additionally, they seemed to visually map out or tell the story 
of what my mind was already doing as a result of the generative listening experience. 
The shapes and contours were on a path of exploration into possible ways of being, 
with each altered manifestation in turn transforming the overall world of the screen.  
The transformations of pitch, timbre and duration coupled with slowly evolving 
imagery were very subtle but their results were striking. Just as one could look away 
from the screen for moments and return to find that several almost imperceptible 
mutations had completely altered the visual disposition of the screen, so too could 
one hear the simultaneous and paradoxical familiarity and newness of the 
accompanying music. In fact, the music as a focal point could carry this 
transformation on its own, with the visual display merely acting as an illustrative aid. 
This became clear when I realised that I could somehow perform this shift in 
perception without sitting at the computer watching evolving shapes and colours. I 
could achieve it anywhere when I became both open and focused, or simultaneously 
aware and detached subjectively. The colours and shapes on the screen could easily 
blend into the varying shades and contours of rooms and views which accompanied 
my everyday vision. The shift whereby something which appears closed and fixed 
suddenly becomes one instance of an infinite realm of possibilities is an internal one; 
as the music blended into my thoughts, I stopped directing them and instead listened 
in to them. I received them as if from outside myself somewhere. As a result, I saw 
the world in a new way and I had new choices. I experienced myself not as an agent 
acting alone and moving in a world of objects but as an integral part of this world, a 
manifestation and co-creator of the moving force of existence. I somehow stood 
outside of myself and blended in simultaneously in a new way. Ultimately, I had been 
taught a new way to think. But I had to be led into it and through it the first time, 
and each repeated generative encounter seemed to be practice at this new way of 
listening and seeing.
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Surely this was an aesthetic encounter which exemplified the curiosity and vitality of 
aesthetic theory at its best. But this somehow surpassed pure aesthetics, as this 
particular work of art and music had somehow managed to operate at a level of 
existence—that peculiar place in which imagination and materiality exert a 
reciprocal influence on one another, where possibilities and actualisation are one 
and the same. This particular aesthetic encounter, which in itself is likely only one 
permutation of other similar experiences made accessible through music and art, 
had somehow dislodged my notion of subjectivity as the starting point for the truth 
of perception. The correlations which I made at any given point were highly 
contingent upon a more fundamental level of truth which enabled these varying 
connections to be thought at all.  These two levels of truth and the ensuing shift 
between them thus required that I look beyond aesthetics to ontology in the 
exploration of this encounter in order to subvert my own cognitive categories and 
bypass the accompanying preconceptions which would further entangle me in 
subjectivity rather than offer a vantage point on it.  
While an ontological approach to generativity made sense, several challenges still 
presented themselves from a research perspective. How does one analyse or 
examine a music which doesn’t have a pre-existence? It not only inherently lacks a 
discrete beginning or end but also never repeats itself in quite the same way. This 
lack of musical object led me to question the degree to which I am reading music into 
these sounds. Do they sound like music because of how I organise them in the 
moment of reception and how I anticipate what comes next? This seemed to suggest 
that the music was as much in me as it was in the computer. It was somewhere in 
between, in the juxtaposition or intersection between the machine performing as 
such and me in a certain receptively curious orientation towards it. But the 
experience clearly didn’t end there; it bled out of the artistic bounds into the 
mundane moments of everyday life. Not only did I lack a discrete object to dissect, 
but I also seemingly lacked any conceptual boundaries of the experience as well. 
Each layer readily bled into the next in an unending deferral of meaning. Oddly, 
somehow the music sounded like that. Its properties reflected this ongoing process 
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of ghostly traces where the significance of this experience resides. So the research 
somehow needed to address this reflective quality which never quite caught up with 
itself. It suggested a resonance with a core at the very centre of being or at the most 
basic, primal experience of life and the world. I was implicated in the music somehow 
from the beginning despite the music not having a pre-existence.  
In trying to tie these questions together into some functional structure of inquiry, it 
became clear that I needed a language which could encompass art in both universal 
and specific terms, technology, and the experiencing self. At this point, two well-
known essays of Heidegger, who was already implicated in my ontological pursuit, 
sprang to mind: ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ and ‘The Question Concerning 
Technology’. Heidegger’s unique way into things via linguistic explorations seemed 
not unlike Brian Eno’s generative music. It started in one place and took you through 
several permutations, never finishing as such and in leaving things thus open pointing 
the reader back to the process as the very point of significance. Could one combine 
the two essays somehow or read the spaces in between to conduct a study on 
technological art and its relation to being? This seemed to be the most promising 
approach.  
Heidegger, however, is not without his problems. One academic criticism which 
bears itself out in this enquiry is that while his ontology accounts for the structures 
or factions which make up our being, it doesn’t seem to account for how we account 
for other beings as beings. They seem reduced to the status other things in-the-world 
hold. This problem of alterity plays out similarly with regard to technology and 
subjectivity: by what mechanism can we take in something new and not reduce it to 
the same? How can I hear a new music that I haven’t already altered or subsumed 
its uniqueness in the very act of hearing? Or, in Heidegger’s language, can my 
thoughts escape their destined path of enframing [Gestell] which technology 
supposedly reifies? Ultimately, how can thought transcend its own limitations?  
At this point, it became necessary to extend Heidegger’s philosophy beyond himself. 
Taking his critique of Western metaphysics to heart, however, meant that I needed 
to remain firmly within his ontological-phenomenological lineage; I must find other 
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thinkers on his path which focus on transcending subjectivity. For this, I argue, is the 
core of Eno’s aesthetic philosophy as it is played out in generative music and is 
subsequently the binding force between the seemingly odd coupling with Heidegger. 
Exploring Heidegger’s thought further through the lens of other philosophers even 
seemed methodologically correlative with generativity itself, almost as if his thought 
was resounding in new ways with each iteration. These iterations ended up playing 
out through two of his students, Hans George Gadamer and Emmanuel Levinas. As 
they both built upon Heidegger’s ontological foundation and expanded it in ways 
which would prove useful, a path began to emerge which was not hierarchical in 
nature, but rather seemed to be a natural unfolding. Thus, it seemed appropriate to 
give them each their own separate spaces in which to resound rather than risk 
subsuming them under Heidegger’s voice at every conceptual turn. Besides, 
generative music doesn’t repeat intervallic relationships in close proximity; if this 
study is to somehow compositionally reflect generative principles, the respective 
voices shouldn’t feature too close together either. The dynamics of a more closely 
placed dialogue weren’t consistent with the generative music ambience. 
While Gadamer and Levinas shared the experience of being Heidegger’s students, 
although not concurrently, they also both challenged the centrality of subjectivity in 
ways which shed light on the generative music listening experience I sought to 
explore. Gadamer sought to reveal how art as an experience changes the one who 
experiences it through a hermeneutics which built upon Heidegger’s notion of 
temporality as well as his aesthetics. As one defining aspect of generative music is its 
ability to transcend our own temporality, Gadamer offered a method and a 
vocabulary through which to explore the ways in which a transformative aesthetic 
experience can have temporal continuity in the moment of encounter. Levinas 
addressed the issues of alterity which were problematic in Heidegger’s thought, and 
his account of the formative event of subjectivity would help to situate the ways in 
which technology, as a quasi-other, could elicit an experience in which we become 
open to the unknown and are able to leave it as such. 
The study which followed from these three thinkers was very much about thought 
itself as the site of receptivity or interaction with music. As Brian Eno had twice 
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succeeded in changing the way I listened to music, and this in turn altered both the 
way I thought about music and the way I thought in general, I wanted to investigate 
how this happened, using the elements of the 77 Million Paintings listening 
experience as the foundational catalyst. In this sense, however, Eno himself began 
to fade into the background, as the phenomenological basis for the study was the 
experience of the music and not some arbitrary endpoint outside of ourselves, 
whether that be a musical object or a composer. As such, I attempted to delineate, 
or in phenomenological terms ‘bracket out’, the constituent ingredients of the 
experience, and these seemed to be curiously tied to Eno’s ambient and process-led 
aesthetics but also somewhat indeterminate in their relationship with him. So just as 
Eno had not composed but enabled the music in question, similarly did he enable 
and anchor this inquiry; his generative music was a catalyst, an attractor which pulled 
the disparate parts of the study into a whole, a structuring model which opened a 
gateway and then reappeared as an exit. In this way, this inquiry has wider reaching 
implications with other music and art forms which share similar characteristics but it 
also doesn’t attempt to paint all of Eno’s work with a single aesthetic brush. The key 
component is the listener’s subjective orientation, which is made manifest in the 
presence of certain elements. These elements are found specifically in Eno’s 
generative music but possibly elsewhere as well. As such, this study is not about Brian 
Eno or even his music as a specific object of focus, although these are important 
ingredients; rather, it is about an aesthetic intersection in our thoughts which 
flourishes under the conditions which Eno initiates.  
These conditions are not particular to Eno, although I can think of no one who 
achieves them more readily. The elements of 77 Million Paintings which I have 
identified have natural correlates with other music, and in this way, I feel I can discuss 
generative music as a whole; however, certain qualities must be exhibited in order 
to elicit the experience in question, and as such, not all generative music fits the 
mould. The music must first be an extension of ambient music, not requiring one’s 
full attention but also not unable to sustain it either. In other words, the interplay 
between the background and foreground is enabled by this indispensable quality, 
and for this reason, some of Eno’s ambient pieces might elicit elements of the shift 
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in question. However, recorded ambient pieces have a beginning and end and the 
potential for familiarisation, and thus lack the temporal transcendence and the 
perpetual novelty which the computer affords generative music. Something occurs 
in this intersection of indeterminacy and rote process which, coupled with a slow 
speed and lots of spaces for reverberation, makes the generative listening 
experience a unique one amongst other music. While Eno’s articulation of his 
aesthetics lend a great deal to the present study, I do not pretend to limit this 
experience solely to his music. However, as this inquiry grew directly from Eno’s 
work, it is inherently bound to it and can serve to reciprocally explain some aspects 
of the ambient listening experience. In other words, not all ambient music is 
generative, and not all generative music is ambient. This study refers to ambient 
generative music, with generative, in the sense I am using it here, meaning simply 
the unending soundings which arise from specified structural limitations.  
The final structure of the thesis, which is based around terminology, was deliberately 
designed for two reasons. Firstly, I wanted to somehow mirror the generative music 
listening experience with a textual experience in order to stay phenomenologically 
grounded in and around the self and receptivity. Secondly, I wanted to foreground 
language as both a medium for this experience and as a direct correlate with 
listening. While Heidegger seldom dealt with music, listening as it relates to poetry 
was of the utmost importance as a prompting trail back to the remembering of being 
and its perpetual becoming. This twofold listening sat on either side of the shift which 
I sought to explain and explore. The significance of poetry lay in its ability to invoke 
a way of reception which bypasses our understanding and the preconceptions 
carried with it. The unusual, paratactic arrangements of poetry resonate their truths 
in the same way generative music operates; side by side or face to face, the unending 
stream of notes in sounding in succession elicit a digital contemplation which is 
similarly freeing for the listener and not technologically constraining, thus 
challenging the notion that technology and its accompanying arts are somehow self-
limiting and overly regulated, as I myself once suspected.  
The danger with poetry and a self-reflexive focus on language is its tendency to stray 
from its author; the sense of agency is sometimes lost and the words subsequently 
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seem suspended, indefinitely resonating without a destination. This has been a 
particular criticism of Heidegger, who has been blamed, particularly by Adorno, for 
creating ‘jargon’ which ‘causes all its words to say more than each single one’2 
through the over-determination of concepts. Unfortunately, Adorno’s criticism that 
jargon predisposes people toward submission to authority, or specifically to 
authoritarianism, seems to miss the point. The space left open from the exited 
agency of the author operates as an invitation to the reader or listener; the resonant 
openings in Heidegger’s terminology only appear hollow when the reader has not 
performed his or her side of the exchange. The differing paradigms of interpretation 
between poetic ontological or existential terminology and the more anthro-political 
vocabulary of Adorno do not invalidate the former as a discursive approach. So just 
as Heidegger’s use of language was both deliberate and ultimately unavoidable as he 
operated at the boundaries of language itself, so too is the linguistic strategy of this 
study. While its attempts may not always reach their desired outcome, to use 
language in a way which is inconsistent with the way it actually operates would be a 
detriment to the subject matter at hand. Similarly, as the voices of Eno and Heidegger 
collide stylistically, the ensuing tension is utilised as a moment which elicits further 
action and involvement from the reader rather than artificially glazed over in what 
would be an act of over-determination.  
Perhaps the most detrimental practice with language occurs when words become 
reified into common usage to such a degree that they no longer require thought. By 
letting language resound as in poetry, or Heidegger’s works, or even Eno’s music, a 
larger spectrum of connotations and possibilities arises and informs our thoughts. In 
order for these resonances to not be merely echoes of our preconceptions, we must 
become open to something outside of ourselves. If we can approach ‘music’ and 
‘philosophy’ in this way, not as occupants of distinct stations and trajectories, but 
rather as similarly unfolding experiential paths, then an opportunity akin to the 
generative listening shift is regenerated. If, as in ambient generative music listening, 
we view our world through them rather than treat them as external and abstracted 
                                                                            
2 Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (trans.), 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 11.  
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organising principles, we can enter into them and allow ourselves to be overtaken, 
glimpsing a new level on which to experience truth. While this is certainly not a new 
or innovative practice, the opportunity to learn or rehearse it in another way and 
uncover what this means to us as beings is a unique invitation which will carry infinite 
resonances in our everyday lives.  
But before we officially drift into this more poetic register, it might be useful to 
reiterate the structure and function of this thesis. I aim to explore the ontology of 
the generative music listening experience, how the subject undergoes this 
experience, and the pertinence of Continental philosophy in this pursuit. The focal 
point of this juncture is a subjective shift which specifically manifests between two 
levels of truth, as a momentarily transcendent temporality, and as an occurrence 
which opens us to an otherness which is otherwise blocked by our preconceived 
subjective notions. These elements are all mirrored to one degree or another in 
either Eno’s aesthetic and compositional approach or, more broadly, in the 
mechanism of operation of generative music itself, the algorithm. As such, each of 
these elements are dealt with by specific philosophers who have each been given 
their own separate sections, although some natural continuity and overlap is 
expected as they all emerge from the same philosophical trajectory. Finally, in the 
conclusion we will start anew, bringing in the algorithm as a sort of technological 
voice which joins Heidegger, Gadamer, Levinas and Eno in a collective exploration 
and summations of the preceding ideas and how they pertain to our daily life and 
world view at the level of being. Rather than expecting a linear progression of ideas, 
anticipate instead a dispersal of terms and gloss on ideas which will eventually settle 
into their respective homes in the conclusion. However, as with generative music, 
the process is one of a gradual arrival, and expectations only seem to hinder the 
journey.  
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Introduction 
The Invitation 
Each one of us arrives at a discussion about ‘music’ with an unspoken, underlying 
experience which unites us as listeners and which enables the very term ‘music’ and the 
ensuing conversation to have any meaning. It is a moment of connection, of the 
interweaving of internal and external harmony, in which music has shifted and aligned 
our experience of the world and of ourselves into one of continuity and significance. This 
experience is so difficult to articulate because of the level on which it occurs—a level 
within us upon which all others are founded—a level which constitutes us as a living 
being. This level naturally evades discussion because it is already inherently involved in 
every discussion. It is nearly impossible to disentangle it from other layers of experience 
and meaning because this level has created the space in which all else can arise for us. 
And while it may be difficult to explain, it is not as challenging to recall. Thus, ‘music’ 
becomes shorthand for our recollection of this experience, which has left its mark on us 
and changed us as listeners.  
We are thus left with ‘music’, a discursive placeholder which is at once always too vague 
to do justice to our specific moment of encounter, and also too narrow, as one person’s 
transformative musical encounter is never directly translatable into that of another. 
Textually, the sound either evades the page completely or runs off the end of it. Thus, 
no amount of defining or delineating will bring ‘music’ to presence here; however, we 
can approach this dilemma from a different direction—the direction of our music 
experience. We can attempt a textual invitation which sets our thinking in motion rather 
than lingering over static concepts. The text can set the parameters within which the 
mutualities of our experiences fall, and from which they may again arise of their own 
accord if nurtured in their respective emergences. We cannot present the music; we can 
and will, however, provide some juxtapositions and let them resound to us and within 
us, and this practice holds the potential to connect with the unspoken experience which 
binds us together in the unity of a silence, a silence which now occurs in the open.  
This is an open invitation. The listener is invited to undergo a textual event which is 
generated from the seeds of an inarticulable experience which itself has manifested and 
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flourished in countless and inimitable ways. This will thus elicit a new iteration of an 
ever-changing continuousness, which lies just below the discursive surface and raises 
itself into appearance during certain juxtapositions and convergences in which bonds 
forge naturally between concepts, language, experience, and perception. This will be 
the space of possibilities in which music can arise—not in the text, but rather within the 
reader. The music will surface and resound and fall away within us, as the text shapes 
and contours its reliefs and curves.  
This textual process accomplishes more than mere conceptual generation; it both 
reflects and sets in motion the process of genesis by which music, and one exemplary 
form of music—generative music—arises. In doing so, it presents an opportunity to 
receive music in a new way, with an awareness of the process whereby it comes into 
being and the ways in which meaning arises for us. It provides an opportunity to engage 
with the structures which enable meaning to arise, rather than getting lost in the specific 
manifestations resulting from them. As we approach music not as an object of study, 
but rather as a way of being, we aim to discover through a textual analogue of the 
generative process an authentic way of engaging with generative music which both 
preserves its continuity and explores its perpetual originality. 
The Iterations 
Generative music itself is a specific iteration of ‘music’ as a whole, and as such, an 
exploration of this specific listening practice can inform the broader field of ‘music’. As 
generative music appears only under certain enabling conditions and as the result of 
specified processes, it becomes necessary to define both the specific iteration under 
consideration as well as the structural parameters from which it arises. Generative music 
can be broadly defined as a compositional practice which sets a system into motion with 
some degree of autonomy which in turn results in a complex musical generation. There 
are varying degrees of technological involvement, ranging from the randomized jingling 
of a wind chime set in motion to a fully computerized process via algorithmic 
composition. My definition of generative music for the present study, regardless of the 
degree of technology used in its implementation, is simply the un-ending soundings of 
possibilities which arise from specified structural limitations. These soundings capture 
the essence of a freedom, of a transitory expansion and expression, of transcending time 
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while carrying with it a thread of continuity. There is a certain confidence in their refusal 
to appear in exactly the same way twice, and to only manifest initially in real time, 
without hesitation or forewarning. The soundings exude a fundamental, driving sense 
of curiosity and wonder, always morphing into new shapes in order to explore the ways 
in which things could be in an infinite striving toward new possibilities.  
The specific generative music iteration at which we arrive is manifested by way of Brian 
Eno. For Eno is the cultural conduit of generative music, popularizing a hitherto rare 
subset of specialist music with his audio visual generative software 77 Million Paintings 
as well as his generative applications for iPhone, including Scape, Bloom, Trope, and Air. 
While these invite varying degrees of interaction, from merely choosing the speed of 
visual mutations in 77 Million Paintings, to actually becoming co-creator in the 
generative output by way of touchscreen interfacing within the iPhone applications, 
perhaps the interaction overshadows a more significant element. More important than 
the interactive elements, which are present in some but not all of his generative works, 
is his presentation and framing of the generative practice. Eno has presented numerous 
invitations to partake in generative music creation and has embedded them within our 
daily lives and activities; they now lay dormant in our computers, which await being 
transformed into a generative music installation via 77 Million Paintings, and proliferate 
on our mobile phones as downloadable applications effectively transform the mobile 
phone into an interactive music-generating device. This is a continuation of the ambient 
music aesthetic, whose identifying dictum states that it must be ‘as ignorable as it is 
interesting’1, hovering in that peculiar borderline between attention and awareness, 
presence and absence. The generated music thus comes to embody the ambient quality 
through anticipation of its environmental attenuation. Even the interactive aspects, 
where present, exist as a function aiming toward automation. As such, Eno’s generative 
music exists by design as an absent presence, constructed to exist alongside its 
environment rather than compete with it. It is a music upon which not to focus; thus, I 
contend that it naturally points away from itself and toward the listener. It emerges from 
                                                          
1 Brian Eno, ‘Ambient Music’, in Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner, eds., Audio Culture: Readings in 
Modern Music (New York, Continuum, 2004), 97. 
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its relegated background stance in short bursts of awareness and attention and then 
recedes in prominence back to into the atmosphere which it has constituted.  
Eno’s specific brand, or iteration, of generative music is not merely representative of his 
current compositional practice. Instead, it reflects a natural culmination of his creative 
approaches and retains a sense of artistic continuity within the overarching sonic 
themes and characteristics of his historical output. One could say that the trajectory of 
his musical approach has itself evolved generatively. His generative practice has grown 
naturally out of his ambient tradition, which has in turn been informed by his production 
work which utilized the recording studio as a virtual instrument, a practice which itself 
is informed by his prior experimentation with synthesizers and reel to reel tape. The 
guiding thread in a vast and varied career has been the technological extension or 
embodiment of his musical thought processes. He has continually sought ways to 
engineer himself into the process not as a composer personality or popular identity, but 
rather as a perpetual first listener. His continual focus on the design and implementation 
of systems which in turn create a music new even to him reflects his broader interest in 
music’s function and how it connects to larger systems of art and culture.2 As he 
navigates the dichotomous realms of the tangible sounds and the virtual spaces they 
seem to create, which elicit notions of interiority and exteriority, the theme of 
connectivity becomes readily apparent. The music whose presence he has enabled is a 
unifying element which conceptually explores and challenges these boundaries. 
As such, Eno’s creative path reflects that of generative music’s ontology. It radiates in 
concentric circles outward from music’s internal organizational principles toward 
music’s exterior or outer edge. He first removed any traces of a subjective identity by 
omitting vocals, as in his ambient works, or using them in ways which are ‘emotionally 
ambiguous’3 and hence neutralized, as on his album Drums Between the Bells. A further 
step finds the dissolution of melody and rhythm, leaving notes to sound and resound as 
if suspended in the atmosphere; the resulting sense of staticity which is evident in works 
such as Neroli or Thursday Afternoon is achieved at least partially through the 
                                                          
2 For a good introduction to Eno’s views on art’s cultural implications, see Brian Eno, ‘A Talk Delivered in 
San Francisco, June 8, 1996’, In Motion Magazine, (1996), 
http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/eno1.html (21 August, 2013). 
3 Ben Sisario, ‘Pushing Back the Limits of Speech and Music’, The New York Times, (2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/arts/music/brian-eno-and-rick-holland-release-drum-between-
the-bells.html (21 August, 2013). 
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implementation of these methods as well as simply leaving enough space between 
sounds to allow the listener to enter. The listener is invited in, as it were, just as Eno 
seems to be exiting the music himself, leaving only traces of his presence in the duration, 
timbre and resonance of the lingering notes.  
It is precisely this point of passing between the listener and the composer which can be 
accessed at the level of production, and Eno’s production style reflects an organic quality 
as he attempts to humanize or de-stabilize the predictability of technology. This is an 
intervention at the level between the actual note or pitch and the listener, and in both 
ambient and generative music replaces melody and rhythm as a focal point. This is a 
technologically enabled step away from the ‘object’ of music toward its outer ethos, its 
point of connection with the listener. Generative music occupies the furthest point of 
emanation from the centre as it lives not only within this space of music’s own sonic 
atmosphere, but also one step further in this space’s wider envelope of possibilities. 
Thus, as technology enables a certain level of disengagement on the composer’s end, it 
elicits a reciprocal level of re-engagement on that of the listener. As the sound explores 
its own space of possibilities, the music comes full circle.  
As such, this inquiry will explore my argument that generative music is the culmination 
of a process of externalization and reflection which has the ability to elicit a unique 
listening response which can transcend subjective limitations, opening the listening 
subject to a listening process which occurs on an ontological level, a level in which it 
comes into being. As the music comes into presence in real time, it is not being 
composed, but rather is set free as it explores, through each successive iteration, the 
possibilities enabled by the variable constraints of the parameters. Brian Eno facilitates 
our entry into this generative space by arranging the sonic parameters of our moment 
of encounter and embedding it in our world for subsequent discovery. He has even 
provided the label for this experience, championing the ‘generative’ descriptor over 
other possible terms such as ‘algorithmic composition’, ‘stochastic’, ‘probabilistic’, or 
even ‘indeterminate’ or ‘random’. In so doing, he has retained the notion of genesis, or 
point of origination, which naturally implicates an ontological level of inquiry and 
engagement. 
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The Components 
Just as generative music requires both a system and an application, or in computer 
terminology an algorithm and a data set to which it is applied, so too does its inquiry. 
Brian Eno’s generative practice provides the sonic structural system which enables a 
particular experience to arise, and this experience in turn requires a larger application 
or point of connection to enable the creation of a space in which meaning can arise and 
traverse. In the language of cybernetics, which is the science of systems, and in which 
Eno has a keen interest, a ‘meta-system’ is required in order to contextualize and 
understand the operation of an individual system. Thus, it becomes the relation 
between the two systems and not the subsuming of one into another that enables a new 
level of understanding to arise. As generative music inherently incorporates aesthetics, 
technology and ontology within its very being, it requires a system which is inclusive of 
all three components. Such a system is implicit in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.  
Heidegger’s philosophy not only deals with aesthetic concerns and with technology, but 
also contains a nexus of interaction between the two. I contend that his conceptions 
regarding the respective essences of art and technology as they relate to Being suggest 
a possible framework through which to view a technological art form such as generative 
music. Not only—as it turns out—does he provide a philosophical language within which 
to situate generative music and its listening ontology, but this language is embedded in 
a wider framework of ontology and phenomenology. These philosophical spheres 
combined provide the fundamental, ontological ground necessary to uncover the 
conditions or structures which enable and inform existence as well as the method of 
inquiry which enables the discernment of these ontological structures. Both ontology 
and phenomenology are necessary parts of the process as we, the inquirers, comprise 
part of the very question. Thus, we need a way to disclose the truth about our own 
existential structures and how these allow meaning to arise within and through the 
world.  Put in the language of generative music, we live in and through a set of 
parameters which determine our surrounding possibility space; to question these 
parameters is to question both ourselves as individual iterations and our world which 
we help comprise. Similarly, as generative music explores its own parameters to their 
fullest extent, I suggest that it becomes a natural ontological reflection of our own 
existential situation. Thus, seeking to employ the generative listening experience as a 
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specific way of formulating our inquiry is also necessarily a way in which we may 
articulate our very being. In doing so, we question the very structures from which we 
emerge, and this inherently ontological process is both mirrored and demonstrated in 
our generative listening practices.   
These listening practices reveal a connection between music and philosophy which is far 
more intimate and primary than it might initially appear. As music manifests itself as a 
specific configuration of sound, philosophy manifests itself as a specific configuration of 
perspectives and abstracted conceptions. The essential bond exists in the configuration 
as each structure provides boundaries in which thought can move and develop, allowing 
meanings to arise in the subsequent spaces created. Thus, as philosophy and music both 
strive to overreach themselves and transcend these boundaries, they alter their own 
parameters in the process. As one level of thought is clarified and elucidated, or as one 
chord sounds, another level is thrown into question, and modulations approach the 
thought horizon. If music is one configuration of experience which connects with and 
shapes our subsequent thoughts, then philosophy is the receiving structure into which 
music permeates and pushes toward expansion. Together, they have the potential to 
unlock one another—with music allowing philosophy to resound and resonate while 
philosophy is simultaneously enabling music to move into and within a more concrete, 
linguistic realm. The reciprocal interaction of the two thus charts its own course and has 
the potential to carry us further than either individual navigational system would allow. 
Music lives and moves through and within philosophy of its own accord. We thus need 
only reveal the configurational clusters at which the bonds have occurred and let the 
possibilities play themselves out. This process occurs at the level of being.  
Just as a harmony becomes richer as more notes are added to the chord, so too does 
the philosophical-musical resonance as more voices are added to the score. Thus, 
Heidegger’s philosophy evolves and unfolds in new generative iterations through his 
student Hans Georg Gadamer, who extends the hermeneutic nature of being to include 
the process of mediation. As the present text linguistically mediates the generative 
music experience, the process of mediation becomes one not only relevant to 
technologically dependent forms of music generation such as generative music, but also 
its entire ensuing discussion. Similarly, Emmanuel Levinas, another student of 
Heidegger’s, reveals new variations on Heidegger’s ontology as he explores notions of 
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alterity and the ways in which these are formative of our subjectivity. Heidegger’s 
thought thus reverberates through these additional voices as they perform as 
parameters within which new configurations and soundings can arise in other minds. As 
Gadamer and Levinas engage with Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and further 
develop or critique it accordingly, Eno acquires additional space in and through which 
his music can resonate; this resonance occurs at the level of being. 
Combined Parameters 
Music is a way of being. We experience the world and ourselves differently when we 
are attuned to its presence. It is a unique configuration of a moment in time which we 
receive sonically and structure perceptually; we are both receivers and creators in this 
moment. To enter into this way of being is to surrender to a sonic flow which 
transforms the way we exist in that moment and thereafter—our being. Thus, music 
arrives toward us as a fragmented, folded sonic entity which unfolds both externally 
and internally, creating a potential space for unity between our surrounding 
environment and our interior world. It is within this space that music acts as a way, or 
path, which unfolds itself toward us, inviting us to approach its fundamental unity 
which both precipitates and enables its essential unfolding. In so doing, our way of 
being becomes that of music. This is the engaged listening encounter with music in 
which we are opened to new ways of experiencing ourselves and our world—our 
being. 
Music is a way of becoming. It leads us toward a potentially transformative encounter 
with our way of being. It presents a space in which possibilities arise and converge and 
build upon one another, taking on a life of their own. We hear not only sounds, but 
also that which sounds; we hear sounding itself as it comes into being. This is the 
intersection at which we can participate in the creation of our own experience as and 
within being. This is a space in which meaning can arise—a meaning which is 
contingent upon our experience and upon our ability to be receptive to the 
environment in an authentic, engaged way. In this way, music is part of a larger 
experience which we seek to enter, a state of possibilities which we seek to become. 
Thus, music comes into being. It becomes. As it does, it manifests both the 
fundamental continuity and the difference or tension between being and becoming—
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between presence and its coming to presence. As we hear sounds immediately present 
which anticipate those which follow, the sounds find their ultimate unity and 
subsequent organization within us. We become the site of the encounter with the 
being of music. This process mirrors our own ontological situation, our truth, as we are 
both being and becoming; we are both at once, often without conscious awareness of 
this duality. Music exists in between—as a mediating work of truth. It is in this liminal 
position that it can act as a work of truth by setting truth to work within us. Music, I 
argue, manifests the possibility of unifying this ontological tension and of experiencing 
its unity within the moment. Therein lies the transformative power of music. This 
power, however, is only accessible as such through experiencing and receiving a unity 
or essential connectedness on the ontological level, or the level of being. Thus, we 
need a way to engage with the moment of music’s unfolding; we need a new way of 
listening, or a listening transformation.  
As music stretches itself out between our present and future being and between our 
interiority and exteriority, its position suggests two possibilities of re-entry into this 
transformative, unifying moment. As we embody the site of both reception and 
transformation, we can either adjust our reception practice, our aesthetic orientation, 
or we can alter that which we receive—the music itself. The history of music, and 
subsequently its aesthetics, can thus be seen as a subtle interaction and process of 
adjustment between experiencing, engineering, and explaining the momentary power 
which we hear as music. In our struggle to recreate this experience, our musical 
practices evolve which in turn evoke new listening sensibilities in an ongoing, iterative 
process. Our listening, as well as the aesthetics of listening, is thus both inherently 
temporal and hermeneutic; that which we hear is always both perpetually new in the 
moment and also serves as an aesthetic trail back through our personal listening 
history which we bring to the moment. This is the process of temporalizing which we 
perform as an inherent part of our being, and I suggest that music has the power to 
reorient our awareness of and participation in this process. In this way, altering either 
the way in which we receive or altering that which we receive must necessarily involve 
this engagement with the unifying practice of temporaliziation. This unity occurs within 
the moment, and thus implicates the moment as an aesthetic focal point in which 
these forces converge and from which the transformative power emerges. 
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Within this focal point is a synthesis, a synchronicity of being and coming to be in the 
moment, and it is at this point between temporalizing as being and being temporalized 
by music that I believe our own creative agency can be thus awakened. This point 
exists at the border between sound and music, between sensations and perception, 
and between meaning and truth. With our arrival into this space comes the realization 
that we as listeners are not peripheral to this process; rather, we embody it. As such, 
we do not merely create and use music; music uses and creates us. This is a 
fundamentally creative reciprocity. Thus, an alteration to either side of this mutuality 
necessarily enacts a transformation of the entire nexus. Consequently, a new music 
and a new aesthetics must arise concomitantly.  
The difficulty which arises in both the creation and reception of a new music and a 
new aesthetics is that of subjectivity. The experience of unity, otherwise known as 
‘truth’ in aesthetic discourse, is necessarily challenged and dispersed as it encounters 
the inherently fragmenting structure of subjectivity. While the subjectivization process 
enables creativity, and is thus integral to bringing music into being, it also colours 
receptivity; the hermeneutic nature of our specific subjective experiences preconfigure 
the ways in which we are able to open ourselves to the sound approaching us in the 
moment. The nature of understanding, for which listening is a vehicle, is such that 
becoming open to the origin of a new experience inherently involves an unlearning, or 
an unhearing, of that which we bring to the process. We read ourselves and our 
preconceptions and presuppositions into any encounter to such a degree that we are 
subsequently unable to move ourselves out of the way to receive something from 
outside of ourselves—something which we have not yet already come to know or 
predefine. We can be blocked by our own subjectivity. We thus need a way to hear our 
way back into the whole of music. 
The Generative Being of Music 
Fortunately, we have been presented with an infinitely possible music—a music which 
both manifests and holds open articulations of the way things are and also the way 
things could be. These possibilities necessarily arise from a given structure which 
shapes and forms the sonic boundaries which they ultimately transcend during their 
unfolding. This is a sensitive music, a multi-centered music which never arises or 
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unfolds in exactly the same way twice. It allows us only a glimpse of its entirety in its 
unending soundings. It presents us with the idea that music has an independent 
existence in and of itself, of which we hear only pieces and fragments in different, 
diffused moments. As each sound iteration arises from the same initial parameters and 
yet reveals itself in a unique formation, we are presented with a unity larger than we 
can hope to experience. Subsequently, we are led by this music to the idea that 
something larger than ourselves exists while being presented with an opening into 
which we might gain entry into it. The infinite state of music’s being comes to us as the 
experience of the possibility space of infinity. And by definition, there are innumerable 
entrances into this space, if we know where to look, or to listen. As we encounter this 
space, we are encountering the Being of music. This is generative music.  
Generative music is not the only source of these entry points into music’s larger unity. 
However, implicit in its coming to presence are characteristics which I contend are 
specifically conducive to evading the traps which subjectivity can set for the listener. 
As we receive its originating presence in real time, our tendency to approach the 
sound as a predefined, preconceived object is naturally dissipated. We are 
momentarily forced out of the mode of being which is dominated by abstracted ideas 
and are returned to the experiential, sensorial moment; this is the point at which both 
music and the conceptions which inform our future experiences are born.  As such, my 
primary argument is that generative music thus provides a way to recognize these 
subjective barriers and subsequently opens up the possibility of a perceptual shift in 
which the barriers once again become points of entry. We can be transported from a 
silent, conceptual realm into a musical, experiential realm. While both states are 
essential components of musical creation and reception, the former must be grounded 
in the latter. Our conceptions must be abstracted from our experiences in order for an 
authentic relationship to arise between our being and environment, between our 
sensibilities and our understanding as such.  
In thus seeking to meet generative music as it presents itself to us rather than merely 
being presented with our own aesthetic assumptions, we approach generative music 
not as an object of study, but rather as a way of being which we encounter and come 
to embody within a concrete, experiential moment. In this way, we move toward a 
new aesthetic which both arises from and enables the reception of a new musical 
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experience; the aesthetic first arises through engaged practice, and is thus 
subsequently able to mediate our experiences and conceptions accordingly. The 
moment, as a distinct intersection of being and time, thus serves as our entry point 
into generative music, into music itself, and thus into our experience of being. In order 
to textually examine these entry points, we must begin with the experience of one. So 
we turn to those experiences during which we engage with this music, when it not only 
informs our daily existence but also emerges from within it. For if music reaches us on 
the level of being and thus becomes part of us, then we must carry with us seeds of 
the origin of this experience. These seeds are embedded in our everyday encounter 
with music, in our use of it. As such, the moment serves not only as a temporal unit in 
which to anchor experience, but also as a structure through which we encounter our 
own being as it is engaged, or as it is becoming. This is the moment of our unspoken, 
underlying experience which unifies us as listeners and which I aim to articulate 
through a linguistic-based methodology which structurally combines the discourses of 
music and philosophy.  
When our being is thus engaged in such an encounter, we become part of a larger 
experience. To become part of a larger experience is also to become part of a larger 
conversation. We thus locate music within a more expansive moment, the moment of 
the work of art. Historically, aesthetics has sought to gather together these disparate 
moments under various guises and into varying organisational configurations; this has 
inevitably brought about divisions which, although informative in varying degrees in 
their own right, ultimately serve to undermine the fundamental unity of the work 
which is performed by and through art as a whole. ‘Art’, in the holistic sense and 
within the Western post-Enlightenment tradition, names a specific kind of experiential 
encounter, which manifests itself in numerous ways through varying mediums, yet 
retains a fundamental consistency of action due to its performative function. The 
‘work’ of art, as such, thus serves as an opening through which various points of 
interaction become possible, and while the experiences through various mediums 
remain unique, the ontological level at which they occur enables linguistic 
commonalities to arise. This is the unifying action of aesthetics; a linguistic and 
conceptual framework arises which enables analogies and differences across 
experiences to resonate and inform one another. However, aesthetics lies in perpetual 
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danger of both overgeneralization, or blurring distinctive properties within each 
unique manifestation, and also overspecification, or the denial of a common 
ontological ground from which varying but similar experiences originate.  
Thus, in order for aesthetics to achieve this delicate balance, it necessarily has 
attempted to provide an all-encompassing narrative for the meaning and function of 
art while simultaneously attempting to transcend itself in order to ground these very 
claims. It has done this in various ways, including the separation of art from everyday 
life and engaged use via Kant’s pervading notion of disinterestedness. Similarly, the 
intellect and the emotions, conceptions and perceptions have been sharply 
demarcated under the guise of understanding beauty. But I believe the biggest point of 
separation exists in the misapprehended notion of directionality of influence of art; 
traditionally influence has moved laterally between creator and perceiver rather than 
in concentric circles which radiate out from the work of art back toward the world it is 
simultaneously entering and helping to recreate. This fundamentally overlooks a rich 
network of mutual influences and nodes of meaning creation. Both individually and 
collectively, these points of artificial separation have enabled a false sense of meta-
level analysis for aesthetics. The higher vista from which it demarcated realms of 
experience predicated on the subject-object relationship ultimately severed its 
connection with the aesthetic experience itself, thus rendering it discursively 
disconnected from that which it purported to explain. 
Thus, the larger experience which we enter is articulable by way of aesthetics, but 
ultimately points toward its fundamental, ontological ground. As we move back and 
forth between this ontological ground and the aesthetic layer which is built upon it, 
the movement manifests a phenomenon which Heidegger expresses in his aesthetic  
philosophy as that of strife. And paradoxically, it is only through strife that we can 
experience the unity which we seek.  
Unity 
The term ‘unity’ has accumulated much theoretical baggage from its originary 
inception in Greek philosophy, particularly as it served as a guiding thread in Greek 
aesthetics. However, as ontological considerations regarding the question of being 
have been subsequently covered over and forgotten through the progression of 
14 
 
metaphysics, unity has taken on meanings which are not intended in this text. This is 
particularly true within the realm of musicology and music analysis, such as in the 
theories of Schenker, who presumes a fundamental organicism which underpins his 
musical analysis. While this could be considered a concentric radiation from the 
originary, ontological sense of ‘unity’ intended here, unity’s connotation transcends 
such a specified application. For unity in the Greek, and thus Heideggerian sense, 
denotes an essential connectedness on the ontological level. This connectedness, 
however, is not a state, but rather a dynamic which preserves and reflects the 
fundamental strife which exists between being and becoming, and thus between 
materiality and abstraction. This unified tension exerts a mutual reciprocity which is 
inherently unifying while simultaneously preserving differences. This would be, at best, 
conceptual utopianism were it not for the fact that unity is not a state, but rather a 
relational dynamic whose very non-static nature provides the force which gathers 
together. Unity, therefore, is the very movement with which we seek to engage. It is a 
specific, gathering movement which moves us along a path. This path is that of truth, 
for which music can provide a map within the moment of engagement. 
Perhaps a concrete instance of unity in this originary sense occurs within Eno’s 
aesthetic practice. As his aesthetic philosophy finds a concrete, sonorous expression, I 
suggest that his music becomes his philosophy embodied. The existing tension 
between his philosophical articulations and the musical work itself demonstrates the 
reciprocity of articulations which both arise and inform the very work in which they 
appear and which they have made manifest. In this sense, I contend that Eno’s ability 
to articulate aesthetic conceptions which are inherently grounded in his musical 
practice provide an opening or point of intersection for Heidegger’s aesthetic ontology 
to be engaged and explored in a concrete, experiential manner. This practical 
engagement and philosophical intersection occurs with the added benefit of 
Heidegger’s relative avoidance of musical commentary, and this is mirrored in  Eno’s 
status as a self-professed ‘non-musician’4; a space exists on either side for a mutual 
interaction to occur which is thus free of preconceptions which would need to be 
identified an dispelled. I therefore argue that Eno embodies a point of entry into 
                                                          
4 Lester Bangs, ‘Lester Bangs Interviews Eno’, Hyperreal, (1979), 
http://music.hyperreal.org/artists/brian_eno/interviews/musn79.html (21 August, 2013).  
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Heideggerian aesthetics just as Heidegger provides a language in which to articulate 
Eno’s aesthetic practice. This reciprocity continues to develop and widen to include 
Heidegger’s thought as it subsequently unfolds through Gadamer and Levinas. As each 
philosopher arises from the same Heideggerian ground, they necessarily harmonize 
with the key of the initial dialogue while offering differing sonic tints or tinges which 
reflect the gloss of the evolving work in subtly varying ways. They add a layer of 
ambience, of richness and depth which reflect, through their natural progression from 
and beyond Heidegger’s thought, an inherently organic quality which reflects a 
production value reminiscent of that of Eno.  
The Map 
A structure has thus been presented as components are fed into and interact with 
combined parameters thus generating multiple iterations. While the structure 
determines the possible lay of the land, it does not determine the path through it as 
such.  Thus, I offer a few guiding remarks which do not intend to determine a path in 
themselves but rather equip the reader with a set of descriptions which enumerate the 
parameters from which he or she has been written into the text already. Just as every 
text presumes a reader, so too does every reader presume a text prior to arrival. It is 
precisely that which one brings to the present work which we seek to reveal and thus 
locate similarly within the listening process.  
The present inquiry contains some conspicuous absences; ‘music’ would potentially 
occupy one such space. Eno released an album in 1997 entitled The Drop which 
contained pieces at least partially created by generative music software. The title 
doubled as the name of both the album and a new type of music contained within it, a 
music which he described like this: ‘It’s as if you had explained jazz to someone from a 
distant planet without ever playing them any examples of it and they tried to do some 
on the basis of your rather scant explanation’.5 This is an apt description of our present 
experience; in this instance, however, our music never arrives. The permanently 
pending appearance of Eno’s generative music highlights the preconceptions and 
subjective barriers which potentially impede a more unified listening experience. Thus, 
                                                          
5 Brian Eno, ‘Transcript of Brian Eno’s BBC World Service Interview’, Hyperreal, (1997), 
http://music.hyperreal.org/artists/brian_eno/thedrop.html (21 August, 2013).                                                                                       
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instead of referring to the music in an objectified sense, although some specific 
examples will be cited along the way by means of illustration, I will alternatively 
indicate specific elements of the moment within the listening experience. Similarly, in 
keeping with Eno’s own role as a producer who by definition does not feature in the 
foreground of the work, Eno will shape and mould the inquiry through his ambient 
presence in the background. As with his generative music, he sets the process in 
motion by enabling the encounter and allowing it to play out autonomously.  
In a similar way, Heidegger appears initially and then steps back to allow Gadamer and 
Levinas to generate their own iterative interpretations. Thus, Heidegger’s thought is 
able to transcend its own boundaries and limitations as it is subsequently viewed and 
processed through the lenses of other minds. Therefore, both Gadamer and Levinas 
exist as discrete, stand-alone encounters but which comprise part of the larger whole or 
unity of the text; conclusions offered within their respective sections suggest and shape 
a possibility space in which the larger whole can be philosophically situated. Finally, the 
conclusion represents a new beginning or origin in which a new generation of circular 
movement arises from the previous three iterations. Generative music thus not only has 
a technological origin but also a textual origin, one in which we experience its ontological 
essence.  
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Heidegger and Eno: The Aesthetic Encounter 
The principal aim of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for the basic philosophic 
framework of the thesis, and this particular foundation finds its footing from a rich 
network of terminology taken from two of Heidegger’s essays, ‘The Origin of the Work 
of Art’ and ‘The Question Concerning Technology’. This is the first section of the chapter, 
organised around particular vocabulary which will feature throughout the entire inquiry.  
In the second section, Heidegger’s organising words will be restated, but this time as 
adumbrations of small biographical portions from Eno’s life and philosophy with which 
they particularly resonate. This associative correlation, despite the seemingly odd pairing 
and cultural and linguistic particularities, will help to situate the aesthetic evolution of 
generative music within Eno’s musical practice and philosophy and draw it nearer to 
Heidegger’s aesthetics by way of their commonalities. It will also highlight their shared 
focus on art, technology and their broader functions as well as their shared approach to 
both language and music as possibility spaces in an effort to disrupt the typical subject-
object dynamic of aesthetics. The third section moves on from the work of art and its 
mechanisms of action to the perceiver as the point of focus. The processes of questioning 
and surrender, which characterise both Heidegger and Eno’s approach to their respective 
work, are examined as approaches which are mirrored and adopted by the perceiver 
during the particular generative music encounter which we are exploring. Between the 
three sections are two ‘shift’ sections which draw attention to the variations in style and 
content between Heidegger and Eno. These differences and the arising tensions can be 
read as built in instructive moments during which the reader must actually perform a 
shift as he or she moves from one style and voice to another. These shifts highlight the 
process of linguistic mediation and demonstrate through actual engagement with the 
shift experience what is at stake in the aesthetic encounter through the experience of 
strife.  
 
It is often during the most improbable juxtapositions that the most fruitful 
developments arise, combine, and issue forth, ones which elicit reconsideration not 
only of the conceptions involved but also of the very nature of the encounter itself. 
And so it is with our present inquiry and the aesthetic encounter between Eno and 
Heidegger. The invitation which has been issued is not to textually witness a forced 
meeting in which one side is categorically subsumed under the other, thus covering 
over differences and variations for the sake of an imposed uniformity. For by the very 
nature of the encounter, the dimensions exceed that of two; the encounter itself is 
encountered, bringing the experiences and sensibilities of the one who encounters—
the reader—into the fold. The acknowledgement of this often overlooked third 
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dimension creates a textual space in which the reader’s own listening experiences, 
inarticulable and private though they are, can meet and find resonance with and 
between two other merging worlds. The reader forms part of the horizon, and this 
mirrors the formative truth of the aesthetic encounter itself.   
The encounter thus enables the arrival at a new beginning; an origin. The point of 
entry enabled by this particular meeting between Heidegger and Eno is not as obscure 
as one might imagine; they approach the same territory from opposite, yet 
complementary directions. In fact, their respective approaches mirror one another as 
they approach the space in which art and technology intermingle in their essences. 
Heidegger endeavours to reach the ontological level of Being through language; by 
tracing paths of thought back through to linguistic origins, he seeks to generate an 
experience of Being rather than define it. By letting the language resound and 
reverberate, bringing its embedded history of usage into contact with our present day 
resonances, he aims to reorient our thought process toward a space in which an 
encounter with the Being of being can occur. He seeks to enable the encounter 
through creating the space and marking the path which we can then follow toward our 
own experience rather than merely reading about his. In doing so, Heidegger allows 
language to work on and within the reader, and this process inherently encompasses 
the experiences which are brought to the text by the reader.  
Eno arrives at this same moment, this intersection, from the opposite—yet mirrored—
direction. While Heidegger creates linguistic possibility spaces in which our thinking 
and our experiences can resonate authentically, I suggest that Eno creates equivalent 
spaces sonically—and these sonic spaces or worlds are informed by and grow out of 
his aesthetic philosophy. This is often achieved through omission, during which the 
very elements which are intentionally left out—vocal personalities, overt melodies, 
repetitive rhythms—issue forth an invitation for the listener to enter into the space 
enabled by their absence. The space between notes sounding independently of a 
melodic phrase leaves endless possibilities of subsequent aural connections by the 
listener, and this calls into play the previous listening experiences and history of the 
listener. Eno provides sonic structures into which we, as listeners, become part of the 
possibility space; we are sonic extensions of a world into which we are more fully 
invited. 
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Heidegger and Eno are thus both concerned with art and technology, and in this sense 
they occupy shared territory prior to the present encounter. While the philosophical 
fields of inquiry are broad within these topics, both adopt a specific approach in which 
these terms indicate not objects of study but rather ways of thinking and being. Eno’s 
primary question regarding the function of art is echoed in Heidegger’s question 
regarding its origin; the work of art is an origin itself as its function is to set truth to 
work. Similarly, Heidegger’s exploration of technology’s essence, which is not itself 
technological but rather a way of revealing, is sonically played out as Eno utilizes 
technology to ‘grow’ data rather than to order information. This common emphasis on 
function denotes a shared propensity to examine these elements at the practical, 
everyday level of engagement rather than from a detached, ‘objective’ perspective. 
Just as Eno composes music to be ‘used’ rather than ‘observed’, so too does Heidegger 
engage and redirect our thought processes rather than merely listing his conclusions. 
In this way, the crucial emphasis on process over product is mutually demonstrated 
while retaining the uniqueness of their respective approaches.  
Thus, in order to preserve the place of importance which is mutually afforded to 
process, we seek an encounter which demonstrates rather than represents. Just as Eno 
engages with systems-based art and Heidegger critiques metaphysics as a system, this 
encounter similarly aims to establish a linguistic system and set it into motion. In such 
a system, key terms from Heidegger’s aesthetic theory as delineated in two mutually 
informative essays, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ and ‘The Question Concerning 
Technology’, are explored both within Heidegger’s thought and Eno’s practice. In this 
way, I suggest that Heidegger’s terminology can be viewed as linguistic ontological 
parameters into which Eno’s practice can settle and emerge, revealing new points of 
resonance in the process. Through this generative approach in which the structural 
parameters yield novel configurations, the possibility is afforded of transcending the 
traditionally employed aesthetic relation of subject-object, leaving the musical object 
absent as such and instead revealing the structures which enable its coming into being. 
This reflects what I argue is the decisive moment of the work of art for both Heidegger 
and Eno, one in which we see the constructed nature of our experiences, our identity 
and our knowledge echoed in the reflection of someone else’s construction of the 
same things: world, earth, strife. 
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Heidegger 
Aesthetics 
Heidegger succeeds in both reviving and challenging aesthetics while situating it 
ontologically. The aesthetic tradition which Heidegger inherited contained what he 
considered to be a similar flaw to metaphysics in general in that it misrepresented 
Being from the outset.  Aesthetics arose from the dichotomous view of Being as a 
subject and the world as cognitively represented objects. On this view, rationality and 
sensuality combine to form a specific doctrine of the way meaning can be formulated 
within art from the aesthetic tradition through mechanisms such as symbolism and 
other concepts of representation: 
It is the imagination as a productive faculty of the representing subject 
that posits the work as symbol, informs its matter...The work of art is 
thus the expression of the artistic will of the representing subject. Since 
the Being of beings resides in their representation, the work of art, by 
expressing the subject, also represents this being. Aesthetics thus 
conceives the work of art as proceeding from the artistic subject’s 
autonomous creative activity.1 
In this way, the work of art becomes the object both of the creator and the subject 
who receives it. Heidegger finds this view problematic in both aesthetics and 
metaphysics in general as it presupposes a static, non-historical Being and speaks not 
from the perspective of Being but rather from a contrived point outside of it. This 
externalizes meaning, or truth, as an appearance or property of Being rather than as a 
process which occurs between being and the world in which it is embedded and helps 
comprise. Accordingly, Heidegger terms Being as Dasein, which means ‘being-in-the-
world’2 or being ‘there’,3  with ‘there’ indicating the world in a specific time and place. 
This suggests that for Heidegger, we are first and foremost engaged with our 
surroundings, and thus it is inconsistent with Dasein’s natural state to divide the whole 
into dichotomies as such or look for truth in a state of disconnectedness from our 
world. Thus, Heidegger’s reformulation of aesthetic ideas involves the same pursuit of 
                                                          
1 Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Art of the Modern Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 242. 
2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.), (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2001), 133. 
3 Ibid., 133. 
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knowledge regarding Being and the work of art as that of aesthetic tradition, but 
begins from a different formulation of the relationship between Being and the world. 
Truth 
For Heidegger, ‘Being’ denotes an action or process rather than a state or condition; so 
too does truth. Thus, as processes, truth and Being both exist as inherently historical. 
The unifying principle for both essays, and indeed for art and technology, becomes 
that of the history of Being as it relates to truth. Just as Being is not static, neither are 
art and technology merely forms or objects such as paintings or machines, but rather 
are distinct modes of revealing with specific characteristics which relate ways of being 
and truth. Truth, therefore, can exist in relation to beings in different ways. 
In both ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ and ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, 
Heidegger begins by linking the idea of truth with that of essences. He introduces the 
idea of the work of art’s origin by stating that ‘[w]hat something is, as it is, we call its 
essence or nature’.4 Similarly, finding the essence [Wesen] of technology is the primary 
goal of the latter essay. As Heidegger explains, ‘We shall be questioning concerning 
technology, and in so doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The 
relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology’.5 
Therefore, it is existence that he places in relation to the essence, indicating that this is 
the proper relationship in which truth is revealed.  
The discussion of essence within ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ demonstrates 
that the relationship between language and technology reveals things about the 
nature of truth. Heidegger states that ‘it is technology itself that makes the demand on 
us to think in another way what is usually understood by “essence”’.6  Technology, 
therefore, is characterized as a force which has influenced language and the reality 
represented therein. This point is crucial to understanding Heidegger’s style of 
argumentation and thought processes, as etymologies and translations, particularly of 
verbs, abound throughout his works. This highlights the changing nature of Being 
                                                          
4 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, A. Hofstadter,( trans.), (New York: Harper Perennial, 
2001), 17. 
5 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, William Lovitt,( trans.), (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1977), 3. 
6 Ibid., 30. 
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throughout history as expressed through language as well as the notion that languages 
of antiquity express concepts closer to essences as they have undergone less 
technological influence. 
For example, as Heidegger makes linguistic explorations of ‘essence’, he notes that the 
noun Wesen is derived from the verb form wesen. This form is understood similarly in 
meaning and pronunciation to währen, which means ‘to last or endure’.7 This 
connotation is markedly closer to the concept of essence as Socrates and Plato used 
the term, denoting ‘what essences, what comes to presence, in the sense of what 
endures’.8 This has served both to set the idea of the essence into motion and also to 
exemplify the alterations in language over time. Thus, the tracing of essence-ing or 
enduring demonstrates the process during which a subtle shift has taken place not 
only in language, but also in the experience of being of which language speaks.  
Although ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ was written nearly twenty years before the 
publication of ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in 1954, it reflects very 
consistent, albeit less developed, notions of essences and truth. In both essays, 
Heidegger describes the modern conception of truth as that which corresponds with 
the Roman word veritas, meaning the correctness of a judgment or idea,9 or the 
‘conformity of knowledge with fact’.10 This has been historically carried forward in the 
notion of propositional truth which denotes a correspondence or agreement, and thus 
continues as the notion of truth in Western metaphysics. This conception of truth 
denotes a relational mastery over the correlating ideas and thus reflects the culture 
from which veritas emerged.  
This idea of mastery, as issuing from the subject-object split, is explained as Heidegger 
differentiates between a work of art and a thing. He compares the Greek word 
hypokeimenon with the Roman-Latin correlate subiectum. While the Greek denotes an 
underlying core of being to which properties attach themselves with the separate term 
symbebekota for the properties, the Latin already predicates only the properties as 
presence. The difference between the two demonstrates that ‘[s]omething that lies 
                                                          
7 Heidegger, Question, 30. 
8 Ibid., 30. 
9 Ibid., 12. 
10 Heidegger, Poetry, 50. 
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beyond the purview of this essay speaks in them, the basic Greek experience of the 
Being of beings in the sense of presence’.11 This experience illustrates a ‘translation of 
Greek experience into a different way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the Greek 
words without a corresponding, equally authentic experience of what they say, without 
the Greek word’.12 While this experience is untranslatable as such, Heidegger 
elucidates the concept behind this by expanding it from syntax to sentence structure. 
The structure of the propositional statement puts into question whether the subject-
object division reflects the true nature of the thingly object or whether we transpose 
this structure from speech onto the object. While neither is true for Heidegger, this 
question demonstrates that the essence of the thing is not present in this type of 
articulation when compared with the Greek, and as such, Heidegger looked to 
language to elicit a shift from one way of thinking to another. 
The conceptual nature of speech, however, lends itself naturally to the propositional 
conception of truth as it represents things which can be experientially verified as 
correct. While this is accurately defined as truth on one level, it presupposes a deeper, 
more fundamental truth. The pre-existence of this level is necessary as Heidegger 
states: 
With all our correct representations we would get nowhere, we could 
not even presuppose that there already is manifest something to which 
we can conform ourselves, unless the unconcealedness of beings had 
already exposed us to, placed us in that lighted realm in which every 
being stands for us and from which it withdraws.13 
Thus, this deeper level of truth reflects entities as uncovered or unconcealed rather 
than as corresponding.14 Therefore, truth in the sense of veritas fails to reveal or 
unconceal anything, as the entire process already necessarily occurs in the open of 
unconcealedness. 
The notion of truth as unconcealment is not only arrived at theoretically but also 
linguistically. The Greek word aletheia is translated as unconcealment 
                                                          
11 Heidegger, Poetry, 22-23. 
12 Ibid., 23. (italics in original) 
13 Ibid., 51. 
14 Uncoveredness and unconcealment are further divided into separate levels. For an explanation of 
further divisions, see Mark A. Wrathall, ‘Unconcealment’, in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall 
(eds.), A Companion to Heidegger (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 337-357. 
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[Unverborgenheit] and is discussed in both essays. Similarly, ‘truth’ is also articulated 
through the use of the related Wahr-heit, which indicates close relation with the verb 
meaning ‘to preserve’ [bewahren] and also ‘to watch over and keep safe’ [wahren].15 
This is immediately reminiscent of the way in which essence is described as the 
process of lasting and enduring, as something which is kept safe or preserved is 
something which endures. Significantly, wahren is closely related to wesen, the verb 
form from which essence is derived. Thus, the translations of these verbs have 
revealed something significant regarding the relationship between essence and truth, 
with essence describing a particular way of being of consistency toward a state of 
unconcealedness.  
As essence is a way of being-toward, or comportment, which remains consistent 
between objects of similarity,16 it indicates the possibility of being experienced 
differently while maintaining continuity. Thus, essence as it relates to truth is 
particularly significant with regard to aesthetic considerations as it can reveal the ways 
in which truth can be experienced through different modes of comportment. The 
essence also demonstrates the ways in which Being’s relationship to truth changes but 
truth remains infinite. This is due to the fact that when we cognitively categorize 
particular objects, we are responding to particular characteristics or properties which 
seem most salient to us. These properties, however, only represent a small number of 
an indefinite amount of those which could potentially be responded to.17 Thus, truth is 
a relation in which things are unconcealed while others remain necessarily concealed. 
That which remains concealed, however ,remains important as it creates a balance 
between that which can be thought, articulated and analyzed within a culture and that 
which is unintelligible as such but not insignificant. As the prominent Heideggerian 
scholar Hubert Dreyfus articulates, ‘What is most important and meaningful in our 
lives is not and should not be accessible to critical reflection’.18 As mystery exerts its 
force on decisions and practices, it also helps to determine our modes of comportment 
                                                          
15 Heidegger, Question, 12. 
16 Wrathall, ‘Unconcealment’, 353. 
17 Ibid., 354. 
18 Hubert L. Dreyfus, ‘Heidegger on the Connection Between Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics’, in 
Charles B. Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 289-316 (294). 
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toward truth. Therefore, art and technology, as two modes of revealing toward truth, 
contain unintelligible aspects which must remain as such in the relation of truth. 
World  
The relationship between that which is revealed and that which remains concealed is 
expressed by Heidegger through the terms world and earth respectively. In ‘The Origin 
of the Work of Art’, Heidegger states that ‘[t]he setting up of a world and the setting 
forth of earth are two essential features in the work-being of the work’.19 These two 
aspects of intelligibility give the work its unity while simultaneously setting it in motion 
through their opposition. The relation of world and earth are illustrated through the 
exploration of three specific art works. The first is the painting entitled A Pair of 
Shoes20 by Vincent Van Gogh which Heidegger describes in a very poetic, descriptive 
tone which differs considerably from the tone of the surrounding text. The effect 
conjured by the text introduces the notions of the ‘world’ and the ‘earth’ which are 
fundamental to understanding the work-being of art. When describing the pair of 
peasant shoes depicted in the first example, Heidegger gleans much information from 
the painting: 
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome 
tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the 
shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the 
far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw 
wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under 
the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the 
shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening 
grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the 
wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to 
the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood 
want, and trembling before impending childbed and shivering at the 
surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth, and 
it is protected in the world of the peasant woman.21 
                                                          
19 Heidegger, Poetry, 46. 
20 Some controversy exists regarding which Van Gogh painting Heidegger viewed by this title and also 
who owned the shoes depicted. However, his efforts to phenomenologically engage with the painting 
are of the most importance to this text. For further discussion regarding the controversy, see Iain D. 
Thomson,  Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 106-120. 
21 Heidegger, Poetry, 33.  
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While the picture ostensibly depicts nothing but a single pair of shoes, Heidegger has 
linguistically expanded the image into a sort of narrative, as ‘[t]he artwork lets us know 
what shoes are in truth’.22 While the description is by no means exhaustive, and 
indeed Heidegger laments that it likely produced too little of the experience of the 
work , the reader is introduced to the world of the work; this concept is articulated 
separately and therefore differentiated from that of earth.  
Heidegger’s engagement with the painting demonstrates a phenomenological exercise 
during which he seeks to linguistically convey the world of the shoes. This expresses an 
interaction with the image of the shoes on an engaged level rather than a constructed, 
objective one as he does not describe how the shoes are painted, but rather the 
experience held by the peasant woman while wearing them. This approach reflects 
Heidegger’s view that aesthetics is fundamentally flawed as an approach; we are not 
primarily disengaged observers of our surroundings. Rather, we approach a work of art 
which is always already embedded within the surroundings with which we engage. 
Therefore, our experience of the world of the image is informed by our experience of 
our world from the perspective of an embodied and engaged being rather than as a 
subject perceiving an object. 
The process of engagement is not limited to the experience of the artwork, however. 
The world of the shoes is only revealed upon the consideration of the shoes in their 
utilization. The thoughts and experiences of the peasant woman during this engaged 
use reveal feelings of hunger, responsibility, and environmental sensitivity which all 
serve both to inform and comprise her world. Thus, to see what the shoes are ‘in truth’ 
is to interact with the world of the artwork at the level on which truth is revealed. In 
doing so, the painting speaks, and Heidegger states, ‘In the vicinity of the work we 
were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be’.23 
In this sense, the world exhibited by the painting is not merely the imaginary place 
experienced by the peasant woman or even a representative framework of that which 
is around her. Rather, as an artwork, the painting ‘sets up a world’. The world is 
described as ‘the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject as long as the paths of 
                                                          
22 Heidegger, Poetry, 35. 
23 Ibid., 35. 
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birth and death, blessing and curse keep us transported into Being’.24 World, 
therefore, can be conceived of as a way in which Being happens. In other words, it is 
both the conditions in which we find ourselves as beings and also the way we 
cognitively reflect, organize and ultimately co-create those conditions. As this process 
occurs within the bounds of temporality, the world is necessarily historical in nature. In 
fact, Heidegger states that ‘[w]herever those decisions of our history that relate to our 
very being are made, are taken up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are 
rediscovered by new inquiry, there the world worlds’.25 
It is thus by way of the work that world is ‘set up’. In this way, the work is a making or 
presencing26 rather than the mere expression of form and matter as described by 
traditional aesthetics. In his description of Van Gogh’s painting, Heidegger 
demonstrated how his engagement with the world of the work was a way in which his 
world met and converged with the world of the painting. This process results in a 
presence which involves ‘the horizon of all our horizons, the horizon within which all 
perspectives available to us are contained’. As this horizon extends and recedes, the 
conception of that which is intelligible meets the unintelligible.  
Earth 
In order to conceive of the horizon, that which lies beyond it must be conceptually 
represented. This would correspond to a sort of nothingness or incomprehensibility 
which exists at the very limits of intelligibility. Significantly, prior to Heidegger’s 
interaction with the painting above, he stated that ‘[t]here is nothing surrounding this 
pair of peasant shoes in or to which they might belong—only an undefined space’.27 
Thus, it is from out of the ‘nothing’ of the background of the painting that the shoes 
appear. This is not only compositionally significant in the visual sense, but also 
important in its conceptual correspondence, as the art work characteristically engages 
in the ‘setting forth of the earth’.28 
                                                          
24 Heidegger, Poetry, 43. 
25 Ibid., 43. 
26 Ibid., 44. 
27 Ibid., 33. 
28 Ibid., 46. 
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Thus, the ‘nothing’ surrounding the shoes corresponds to a sort of ‘noth-ing’, which 
Heideggerian scholar Iain Thomson describes as ‘the phenomenological manifestation 
of that which both elicits and eludes complete conceptualization, an initially inchoate 
phenomenon we encounter when we go beyond our guiding conception of what-is’.29 
Earth is completely untiring, effortless and inexhaustible and is just intelligible enough 
for us to recognize that it is impenetrable by nature. This inexplicability, however, is 
significant in that it informs and influences our conceptions by providing contour or 
shape. Heidegger offers an example of this process with regard to the heaviness of 
stone. He points out that we are unable to access the manifestation of the weight of a 
heavy stone, as breaking it up into segments would be to experience the dispersal of 
its weight and not the weight as manifested in its totality. Similarly, placing a stone on 
a scale would produce a numerical value, but this would remain a number and not 
actual knowledge of the weight’s burden.30 
These attempts to penetrate earth are inherently doomed to destruction by earth 
itself. As Heidegger states, ‘This destruction may herald itself under the appearance of 
mastery and of progress in the form of the technical-scientific objectification of nature, 
but this mastery nevertheless remains an impotence of will’.31 In other words, earth 
represents the very limits of our subjectivity. The endeavour to conceptualize earth by 
means of technology and science is a crucial theme for Heidegger, and will be explored 
in depth later. The exertion of human will upon the unknowable is not only ineffective 
but also detrimental in Heidegger’s view, as the techno-scientific representation of the 
supposed ‘truth’ of earth causes the authentic interactions with earth and its 
unknowable truths to either diminish or cease altogether. Thus, that which appears as 
progress or mastery is in actuality a further obfuscation of truth, and this obfuscation 
itself is missed when the will, and thus subjectivity, dictates the entirety of the 
encounter.  
While technological and scientific endeavours conceal the truth of earth through 
mastery, the art work is a ‘happening of truth’32 in which earth remains earth. It is 
                                                          
29 Iain Thomson,‘Heidegger's Aesthetics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/heidegger-
aesthetics(5 September, 2011). 
30 Heidegger, Poetry, 45. 
31 Ibid., 46. 
32 Ibid., 69. 
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revealed as ‘the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is continually self-secluding 
and to that extent sheltering and concealing’.33 Heidegger illustrates this through the 
example of a sculpture in which stone is utilized but not used up; it retains a unique 
character and dramatic presence in a significantly different way than that of a tool 
made from stone. Despite making a feature of the stone, the sculpture remains unable 
to reveal any ontological truth about the stone. In this way, earth can only appear as 
itself when it is preserved as that which is undisclosable. 
Despite the inability of earth to be knowable, it nonetheless performs a vital role in 
conjunction with both world and Being. This can be seen in the example of the Greek 
temple in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’; as Heidegger states: 
A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in 
the middle of the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses the figure of 
the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct 
through the open portico. By means of the temple, the god is present in 
the temple. This presence of the god is in itself the extension and 
delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct. The temple and its 
precinct, however, do not fade away into the indefinite. It is the temple-
work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself 
the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster 
and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the 
shape of destiny for the human being. The all-governing expanse of this 
open relational context is the world of this historical people. Only from 
and in this expanse does the nation first return to itself for the 
fulfilment of its vocation.34   
Thus, although the temple is non-representational in its physical appearance, it 
nonetheless influences the world of the Greeks through giving shape and form to that 
which is unknowable. It is by means of the temple, therefore, that the Greek world is 
both established and reflected. However, this world would lack context without the 
emergence of the earth. Being would be completely immersed in the world of 
immediate surroundings in the absence of a reminder of the infinite and unknowable. 
There would exist a ‘forgetfulness that our realm of being is just one disclosure of 
reality that contains within itself the possibility of infinitely many alternative beings’, 
and this is precisely the danger which technology reifies for Heidegger.35 
                                                          
33 Heidegger, Poetry, 47. 
34 Ibid., 40-41. 
35 Julian Young, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 41. 
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Heidegger’s choice of the Greek temple coupled with his linguistic references to Greek 
terminology can be misread as mere nostalgia. However, while Heidegger does 
describe Being as historical and therefore changing over time, he is not privileging 
Greek culture in this sense, as it has been supposed by some. Instead, the Greek 
temple is used to demonstrate a point in time during which art performed a different 
role. As Thomson explains, ‘[t]he Greek temple shows that art was once encountered 
in a way other than as a subject’s intense aesthetic experience of an object, and thus 
suggests that, while those ancient and medieval worlds have been lost irretrievably, 
other works of art might yet be encountered non-aesthetically in our late-modern 
world’.36 The most significant aspects of Greek life, the ‘death, disaster and blessing, 
victory and disgrace, endurance and decline’, were shaped and united through the 
understanding provided by way of the temple. For this reason, art occupies a 
privileged place for Heidegger as it can offer an alternative to objectifying 
technological forces and aid in our comprehension of being.37 
Strife 
While world and earth are dependent upon each other for their respective identities, 
this dichotomy is not sufficient in itself to reveal truth. Heidegger describes the 
relationship between earth and world as a strife which is instigated by and within the 
art work. This striving is not a destructive process, but rather brings out the best and 
most authentic natures in each opponent through the forcing of self-assertion. This 
striving creates a paradox, as ‘the more the struggle overdoes itself on its own part, 
the more inflexibly do the opponents let themselves go into the intimacy of simple 
belonging to one another’.38 Thus, the work gains its unity through the intimacy 
achieved through battle. 
The intimacy is achieved not through the resolution of the battle between earth and 
world, but rather through its very lack of resolution. The process of striving never 
ceases; earth tries to draw the world into itself and conceal it while world strives to 
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surmount earth. The world ‘grounds itself on earth’ while the earth ‘juts through 
world’.39 The result is a rift (Riss), which binds earth and world together in their shared 
oppositional border. The rift is described as ‘a basic design, an outline sketch, that 
draws the basic features of the rise of the lighting of beings’.40 This process of the 
bringing forth of being is the happening of truth, whereby the being is brought forth 
into the Open and then set back into the self-secluding earth.  
Open 
Thus, Being is established in the Open or clearing [Lichtung], or the ‘lighting-clearing of 
the There’,41 through the conflict between revealing and concealing. This primal 
conflict between earth and world is a way in which truth happens; truth is not a pre-
existing, external imposition onto Being, but rather is a way in which these conflicting 
traits already within Being are brought into the Open of intelligibility. It is essential to 
understand how Heidegger conceives of truth happening, as this shapes both his 
phenomenological processes and also the perceived threats to authentic modes of 
revealing. Accordingly, Heidegger spends much time elucidating these conceptions in 
‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in which he states a conceptual starting point for the 
process: ‘Beings refuse themselves to us down to that one and seemingly last feature 
which we touch upon most readily when we can say no more of beings than that they 
are’.42 
This point of initial knowledge of presence necessitates the Open as the way in which 
human beings are granted a passage to both those beings we are not and also to our 
own being.43 The Open, therefore, happens both in the midst of beings and to beings, 
as ‘the lighting center itself encircles all that is’.44  While the Open requires the 
presence of beings in order to exist and encircles this existence, it does not guarantee 
intelligibility; not all aspects of Being are able to be mastered, and according to 
Heidegger, most things remain unknown. This is his conception of destiny, as 
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something veiled which passes through Being.45 Decisions are made, and also made 
possible, based on that which appears in the lighting of the Open and that which 
remains concealed. 
Unconcealedness, then, is that which is won in the fighting of the battle between earth 
and world. This happening of truth within the art work occurs to us as the shining of 
the illumination of the self-concealed being. This appears to us as beauty. The work is 
beautiful, therefore, due to the happening of truth within it and through it. In this way, 
beauty is something which is experienced on an engaged level of experience rather 
than from the privileged, detached perspective of traditional aesthetics. Truth, 
therefore, comes to operate in the art work not as correctness or representational 
acuity, but rather as a process revealed and held by the work.  
The work of art is one of many ways in which truth establishes itself. Heidegger 
discusses other manifestations of truth, including the founding of political states and 
essential sacrifices. He continues: 
Still another way in which truth becomes is the thinker’s questioning, 
which, as thinking of Being, names Being in its question-worthiness. By 
contrast, science is not an original happening of truth, but always the 
cultivation of a domain of truth already opened...When and insofar as a 
science passes beyond correctness and goes on to a truth, which means 
that it arrives at the essential disclosure of what is as such, it is 
philosophy.46 
The art work, therefore, operates on a different level of truth than that of science, 
whose level of veritas allows for correct corresponding of facts and judgments based 
on observations which exist in the realm of the already revealed.  
Technology     
In order to begin to answer the question posed by the combination of art and 
technology, we must have an accurate understanding not only of art, but also of 
technology. Technology, in Heidegger’s view, is widely misunderstood; we tend to view 
technology both as a means to an end and also as a human activity which utilizes a 
contrivance to achieve this posited end. As these views are correct but not true on a 
                                                          
45 Heidegger, Poetry, 51. 
46 Ibid., 60. 
33 
 
more fundamental, essential level, they characterize the danger contained within 
technology as it relates to Beings. If we do not recognise the influence latent within 
technology, we are apt to be mastered by it. Thus, in order to reveal the truth of 
technology, we must discover its essence. Using the method of questioning in the ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger ‘builds a way’.47 This process, through 
which Heidegger comes into a free relationship with technology, is significant and will 
be explored in depth in a later chapter.  
The way of questioning used by Heidegger involves a linguistic tracing of technology to 
its essence. He begins by examining the supposition that technology is a means to an 
end, which can be seen in the human activity which creates instruments in order to 
achieve ends.  These, taken together, comprise the instrumental and anthropological 
definition of technology, which, while correct on the level of veritas, does not reveal 
the essence of technology and thus enable a free relationship with it.48 This conception 
of technology is particularly problematic for Heidegger because it ‘conditions every 
attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology’.49 We come to view 
technology as an instrument to manipulate or master; this ‘will to mastery’ becomes 
urgent as we continue to attempt mastery over the very tools which helped initiate 
mastery. Significantly, Heidegger offers only the Latin instrumentum here to begin the 
way of questioning, which echoes the dilemma discussed earlier of Greek experience 
being lost in the Roman translation whereby mastery was culturally characteristic. 
The notion of instrumentality leads to the examination of causality, for ‘wherever 
instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality’.50 Returning to Greek thought once 
again, Heidegger examines Aristotle’s fourfold doctrine of causality which includes the 
causa materialis, the causa formalis, the causa finalis, and the causa efficiens.51 
However, Heidegger lists the causal types in Latin, again highlighting the deviation in 
meaning as it travels from language to language. Thus, although all four causes were 
conceptually present in Greek thought and language, causality in modern thought is 
reduced to and dominated by one cause, that of causa eifficiens, in which something is 
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brought about as a result. Significantly, the Roman causa corresponds to the Greek 
aition, which means ‘that to which something else is indebted’.52 This is completely 
unrelated to the modern conception of causality, and instead signifies a sort of 
conglomeration of all four causes denoting a way in which something is responsible for 
something else.53 This responsibility does not involve willing something into existence, 
as in modern thought, but rather a type of indebtedness of that which has come into 
existence. The Greek experience of aition would be an ‘occasioning’ in which 
something which is not present is brought forward into presence.54 
The occasioning or presencing [Anwesen] is a way of ‘bringing-forth’ [Her-vor-bringen] 
in the sense of the Greek poiesis. Within poiesis, two types of bringing-forth occur; one 
is physis, in which something arises from out of itself, such as a blossom which blooms, 
and the other involves something which is brought forth by way of another, such as by 
the artist. It is on both levels of poiesis that something comes into unconcealment 
from a state of concealment, thus making poiesis a mode of revealing, or aletheia. Just 
as aletheia is mentioned in both essays, so too is techne, which derives from Greek 
Technikon.  Techne describes both the work of the artist and the craftsman, and is 
linked with epistēme, or knowledge. Thus, both techne and epistēme are ways of 
knowing. However, the opening up provided by this knowing differs for each term, for 
with techne, that which is brought forth into presence was shaped by the conception 
of the completed thing; the potential for other manifestations were present prior to its 
presencing. It is thus that Heidegger states that ‘what is decisive in techne does not at 
all lie in the making and manipulating, nor in the using of means, but rather in the 
revealing mentioned before. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techne is 
a bringing-forth’.55 
The bringing-forth of technology in the modern era begins to differ from that of 
poiesis; modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern]. This challenging forth 
properly belongs to exact science as everything is calculated as potential energy and 
resource to humans. As Heidegger states, ‘The field that the peasant formerly 
cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did when to set in 
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order still meant to take care of and to maintain’.56 Farming is now a process of the 
agricultural industry. The unknown is quantified and stockpiled as ‘standing-reserve’ 
[Bestand]. Significantly, Heidegger makes the point that ‘whatever stands by in the 
sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object’.57 In this way, we 
appear to have mastered everything, but have failed to recognize that within this 
process we have ourselves become standing-reserve as well.  
While the dependence of modern technology upon the exact science of modern 
physics would appear to be the cause of this shift in revealing, in fact the reverse is 
true; modern physics is dependent upon technological apparatus for its progress and 
development and as such the two are mutually dependent upon each other.58 This 
dependency indicates that the challenging claim issued both within and toward 
modern technology is a symptom of the way in which man’s will relates to 
unconcealment.  
Man is always already in the presence of unconcealment; he lacks any control over 
that which withdraws or reveals itself.59 Heidegger notes that this has always been the 
case, as Plato did not bring about Ideas, but rather ‘only responded to what addressed 
him’.60 In a similar way, man is ‘called forth into the modes of revealing allotted to 
him’.61 In this way, modern technology, as a way of revealing, is a response to a claim 
made upon man. Heidegger explains: 
When man, in his way, from within unconcealment reveals that which 
presences, he merely responds to the call of unconcealment, even when 
he contradicts it. Thus when man, investigating, observing, pursues 
nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has already been claimed by 
a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object 
of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of 
standing-reserve.62 
This challenging claim is enframing [Ge-Stell], which denotes a kind of frame or 
skeleton. Enframing ‘gathers man with a view to ordering the self-revealing as 
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standing-reserve’.63 In this sense, it is an opening up or way of revealing which 
determines on the ontological level the very possibility of truth revealing itself to man. 
As such, it is thus not at all technological in itself, but comprises the essence of 
technology.  
To question enframing always occurs too late, as Heidegger notes, because we are 
already within its realm. Nevertheless, it is not only necessary but essential to do so, as 
enframing represents the danger which lies within technology. This danger lies in the 
nature of enframing, as it is a destining [Geschick] which starts man upon a way of 
revealing. This particular way of revealing blocks poiesis, during which further 
revealing would be revealed. This blocking makes man’s revealing as standing-reserve 
appear final; man is therefore in danger not only of being forced to take himself as 
standing reserve but also falling for the illusion that everything exists as his own 
construct. Put another way, we see only our own limited perspective as the ultimate 
and final truth and thus close off other ways of being and knowing.  
Despite the fact that we already operate within the realm of enframing, there still 
exists a hope. Heidegger quotes Hölderlin, stating: 
But where danger is, grows 
The saving power also.64 
Thus, that which threatens us also contains its antidote, or saving power. As this saving 
power is dependent upon discovering technology’s essence, the process of discovering 
its essence within Heidegger’s essay reveals how the shift can occur. As he leads us 
through a path of linguistic transformations which ultimately elicit a shift in the reader 
akin to that of the saving power of which he speaks, I contend that this shift is 
technologically paralleled in generative music listening. It is thus that the saving power 
arrives through the use of art, and eventually, as I argue, technological art.  
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The Shift 
The questions which Heidegger raises in both ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ and ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology’ are significant; however, just as significant is the fact 
that he leaves them largely unanswered as such. The first essay moves circularly, 
leaving the question regarding the origin of the work of art to a self-reflexive definition 
of the work of art as an origin. Similarly, the saving power which potentially coexists 
within the danger of technology is left completely unnamed and unexplained. I 
maintain that the key to unlocking Heidegger’s writing lies in the textual hints along 
the way. This is evidenced in Hölderlin’s poetic assertion that the saving power ‘grows’, 
which, coupled with the structure of the poem’s stanza, mimics the structure of 
Heidegger’s essay. Thus, the saving power has grown along with the reader as he or 
she moves through the essay, tracing technology to its essence as a way of revealing. 
This way of revealing lies within our thoughts, and it is our thoughts which have been 
reoriented toward poiesis as the essay progresses. In this way, Heidegger incorporates 
the product into the process in which the reader, like Eno’s listener, is co-creator.  
This interplay of form and function between the parts and the whole within 
Heidegger’s works points toward a fundamental tension which exists both textually 
and within the work of art; we strive to reach a meta-level from which to view things 
as a whole while simultaneously attempting to remain fully engaged in the physical, 
embodied experience of the present moment. This tension is manifested and 
reiterated in the subject-object relationship in which our abstracted thoughts and our 
engaged sensations both cooperate and compete as primary modes of accessing truth 
about the environment. The tension is demonstrated in Heidegger’s essay on 
technology, as viewing it from a meta-level reveals the saving power which must by its 
very nature remain obscured at a lower level of explicit reference. Thus, these differing 
levels of engagement with the text, our environment, the work of art, and with 
thinking itself highlight the role of mediation; just as language for Heidegger is the 
‘house of being’ which both structures and enables being’s presence, so too does 
technology enable and shape Eno’s music. As both engage with meta-level creations, 
or the creation of systems which yield creations of their own, the attempt to occupy 
and embody two levels at once is made manifest.  
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We endeavour to engage in a similar process in the present aesthetic encounter 
between Heidegger and Eno. We seek a perspective which both arises from Heidegger 
and Eno and also rises above them; we want to attain a view which is simultaneously 
engaged and abstracted, interior and exterior to the dialogue. As we move along a 
path of commonly resonating linguistic cues, a disjointed pattern of mutual 
connections, variances and dissimilarities arises. However, this pattern emerges not 
only from points of connection which occur at the level of content, but also from the 
coexistence of the two differing stylistic registers of Heidegger and Eno. As Heidegger’s 
dense philosophical constructions encounter Eno’s more conversational explanations, 
the juxtaposition of the two textual worlds create a Heideggerian strife:  one climate 
attempts to pervade the entire text and yet is pushed back by the other, sometimes 
gently and at other times forcefully. Thus, the reader must make a shift from one way 
of reading to another, and this shift must be performed repeatedly. As such, the shift 
becomes a feature of the text itself on a meta-level and thus issues a repeated 
challenge to the reader.  
The shift is not only a challenge; it is a necessity to the topic. It demonstrates, through 
tangible experience to the reader, what actually occurs during a perceptual shift, and 
this is precisely what is at stake in the aesthetic encounter with the work of art, and 
more specifically within generative music. Therefore, the unlikely meeting between 
Heidegger and Eno is additionally advantageous as these two styles can instigate and 
thereby demonstrate the very phenomenon which it attempts to describe: strife 
between two orientations or ways of thinking. As such, the path along which we move 
is both enabled and shaped by these shifts which manifest a pattern of movement 
within the reader. As this pattern takes shape between Heidegger and Eno, a common 
ontological earth opens up with grounds their respective worlds. This earth lies just 
below the shared language which ultimately eludes them both and yet connects them 
through the reader in the moments of the shift. Thus, together Heidegger and Eno 
issue an invitation to read differently—to think differently. However, the invitation, 
like the saving power, lies in the process and the movement rather than in a 
declaration.  
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Brian Eno 
Aesthetics 
The link between a biographical history and the development of a philosophical 
outlook is not insignificant; we are embodied in a specific time and place and these 
enable further parameters to arise within which we move and think philosophically. 
However, this encounter does not seek to recount a biography of Brian Eno as such;65 
it endeavours on a larger scale to reveal the ontology of generative music listening. 
Thus, Brian Eno must be properly situated within that formulation: he enables the 
specific type of generative music which invites the listening experience under 
consideration. In this sense, Eno’s role could be conceived as that of a parameter itself, 
one through which generative music arises and takes on a specific shape with 
characteristic contours. In this way, not all of his biographical details directly affect his 
aesthetics, but his aesthetics do directly influence his generative output. Thus, the 
present encounter attempts to reveal some relevant experiential points from which his 
unique generative music has been cultivated, the details of which paint a rough picture 
of the aesthetics of the experience as much as they do of its progenitor.  
If Heidegger’s aesthetics begin from a reconfigured starting point at which Being and 
the world are engaged rather than disconnected, Eno’s aesthetics starts from a 
rearrangement of the perceiver, the artist and the aesthetic process. Steward Brand 
describes Eno’s approach: 
Like all significant artists, Brian works from a deep and complex and 
evolving frame of reference. Unlike most artists, and like most scientists, 
he talks about that frame of reference. He's not worried that your 
experience of his art might be sullied by your understanding something 
about what he's up to — rather the opposite: he would like to include 
you in the process. This is risky, but valuable. It's risky because once 
viewers or listeners know what the artist is attempting, they have 
criteria for judging when he has failed. Brian's approach is valuable 
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because it is so inviting. The informed viewer or listener is invited to 
think like an artist and therefore in a sense to become an artist.66 
Eno thus approaches the work of art with the perceiver conceived as part of the 
system; his or her knowledge of the system and engagement with it becomes factored 
into the system itself. For instance, in Discreet Music, he provides a diagram of the 
system which generates the music, including the inputs, outputs and manipulations in 
between. The system thus informs not only the process of generating and shaping 
sound, but also the listening process; it provides cognitive frames of reference which in 
turn shape the listening experience. Similarly, the demarcation between artist and 
viewer or listener becomes blurred, particularly in the interactive iPhone applications 
of Scape, Bloom, Trope, and Air in which Eno provides the sound possibilities and the 
user determines the configuration. Thus, Eno’s artistic philosophy involves inclusion of 
the perceiver into the system of the work, whether it be through knowledge of the 
system which is reflected back during listening, or as part of the creation process itself 
through interactive choices.  
 Just as the perceiver is part of the aesthetic process, which unfolds with the same 
degree of surprise for both Eno and the listener, the aesthetic process itself is 
inherently part of a larger system. Eno’s guiding question involves the function of art, 
and this requires a broad frame of reference which is able to transcend aesthetics in 
order to situate it within the larger framework of relationships. As he states, ‘there 
should be one language that fits these things together’.67 However, he finds traditional 
aesthetic discourse to be too vague, and finds other writing in and around the arts 
‘appallingly bad’.68 Therefore, Eno often looks to science, and specifically to 
Darwinism, to provide an overarching mechanism through which to examine art in the 
wider context of culture and human behaviour.  
Eno appreciates not only the unifying language provided by Darwinism, but also the 
effects which it has had on science in its practice; it embodied a shift from detached 
observation and data collecting to making active correlations between non-static 
entities, a process in which the scientist’s very identity was ultimately implicated as 
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part of the inquiry. As Eno explains, ‘In a way he brought to an end the sort of 
gathering stage of natural history, the stage where the job of a natural historian was 
just to go out and make observations, and he brought into being the next phase, which 
was the task of somehow relating things together and making extrapolations and 
predictions, and saying if this happens, we might expect that this would happen’.69 
Significantly, these outcomes are mirrored by Heidegger’s ontological contribution to 
metaphysics; Being itself is a historically and temporally embedded process rather than 
a detached, timeless consciousness, and this situation inherently includes Dasein not 
as an observer but rather a manifestation of Being.  The importance of process and 
self-reflexivity thus remains constant between Eno, Darwin, and Heidegger.  
As a unifying structure and language, Darwinism is particularly relevant for generative 
music as it often involves algorithms which have been modelled on natural selection. 
Its emphasis on process and interrelations likewise provide a natural resonance with 
Eno’s aesthetic practice. However, Darwinism remains tied to the larger field of science 
which necessarily employs an approach to the world which reflects specific methods 
and aims, some of which fall specifically under Heidegger’s critique. It consequently 
lacks the self-reflexivity to examine itself at a more fundamental level, the level which 
enables science to come into being at all. Thus, within the present encounter, Eno’s 
Darwinian structure can remain viable while benefiting from being situated within an 
ontological framework of reference.  This enables both the unifying language which 
Eno desires as well as a method by which to engage with Darwinian concepts and 
structures without automatically adopting the problematic methodology which 
accompanies its science.  
Eno’s aesthetics are not theoretical abstractions created separately from the work; 
they are an integral part of how the work comes into being. They arise from the work 
both as a result of experiencing the work and also from creating it. As one of its guiding 
principles is the question regarding the function of art, the artwork itself becomes a 
way of playing out this question and others in an ongoing, iterative process. This 
process can be likened to a description in a recent comment by Eno as he stated that 
‘instead of shooting arrows at somebody else’s target, which I’ve never been very good 
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at, I make my own target around wherever my arrow happens to have landed. It’s like 
you shoot an arrow and then paint the bullseye around it’.70 This metaphoric 
description of his work reflects the reversal of the traditional artistic approach; his 
work embodies the exploration process which then serves as an anchoring point for 
further inquiry.  As such, his aesthetic philosophy exists more as a brush stroke around 
the edges of some selected, relevant bullseyes than as a pre-patterned object of focus. 
The very act of shooting an arrow and accepting the ground on which it lands as one’s 
own, as Eno describes, has the propensity to bring about creative dilemmas which 
otherwise would not occur if one were aiming for a predetermined target. As such, it 
can bring about more questions than it originally set out to answer. As early as 1975, 
with the help of a painter and friend Peter Schmidt, Eno developed a set of cards 
named ‘Obilque Strategies’ which aimed specifically to foster new perspectives and 
ideas during times of creative difficulties. These cards are referred to as ‘over one 
hundred worthwhile dilemmas’, and are explained on an introductory card: 
These cards evolved from separate observations of the principles 
underlying what we were doing. Sometimes they were recognized in 
retrospect (intellect catching up with intuition), sometimes they were 
identified as they were happening, sometimes they were formulated. 
They can be used as a pack (a set of possibilities being continuously 
reviewed in the mind) or by drawing a single card from the shuffled 
pack when a dilemma occurs in a working situation. In this case the card 
is trusted even if its appropriateness is quite unclear. They are not final, 
as new ideas will present themselves, and others will become self-
evident.71 
Some of these cards are action-oriented, such as ‘Ask people to work against their 
better judgement’. Others are formulated as questions, such as ‘Is it finished?’ or ‘Who 
should be doing this job? How would they do it?’ Still others state just one word such 
as ‘Water’ or ‘Accretion’. The variety of the linguistic constructions reflects both the 
diversity of situations under which these cards were formulated and also the 
propensity for stimulating multiple manners of responses. The cards function as a 
systematic and non-determinant approach to creative situations and perfectly 
illustrate and encapsulate what I suggest are Eno’s underlying aesthetic sensibilities; 
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specific connections occupy a place of less importance than the actual process of 
connection itself, and this process exists in continual motion between the music, Eno, 
the perceiver and the space of uncertainty and surprise which unites them.  
Truth 
When discussing his role in the aesthetic experience, Eno states that ‘[a]n artist is a 
trigger, making something happen between you and the work. Art is not a property of 
things, it is the site of a relationship with things’.72 Thus, the point of significance is the 
process occurring both through and around the work. Put another way, Eno sets a 
process in motion which invites the listener to share that approach or way of being. 
The ‘something’ which happens is the process of unconcealment, or the happening of 
truth.   
While Eno’s philosophical inclinations have been articulated in slightly different ways 
over his long career, there exists a definite cohesion in his overarching view of art as a 
system itself. Early in his career, he explained, ‘You see, the prime interest in being an 
artist for me is that it's a system of knowledge, it's a way of investigating the world. It's 
different from rational investigation of the world because it proceeds simply from 
excitement. And what I think is most interesting is that when you work, you 
deliberately find yourself moving towards an area of uncertainty’.73 This area of 
uncertainty is one in which Eno is both creatively stimulated and comfortable, as his 
interest is directed primarily at seemingly organic structures which themselves can be 
viewed as systems of growth and change, thus requiring a degree of acceptance in 
uncharted territory. Acceptance for Eno is not a passive state, but rather actively 
enables a new level of complexity, as he explains: 
Acceptance involves incredibly complex refigurations [sic] of your own 
perception. To be able to see what's going on - and that phrase has 
many different levels of meaning, but I'm using it on one of its lighter 
levels at the moment - to see what's going on requires real examination, 
first of all your own perceptual mechanisms which are related to your 
own survival needs and your own environmental context and so on... so 
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it involves a Critical Examination of all those things. Which is 
immeasurably difficult to do as it’s always under review.74 
Thus, the uncertainty embraced in his work, particularly in that of generative music, 
necessitates a degree of acceptance as complete control is surrendered over the 
output. This in turn reveals a point at which one can see more clearly that which we 
bring to the process of perception. As art is a way of investigating the world, it explores 
the way things could possibly be, as elicited in the work of art. In this exploration, one 
comes to know the truth of how things presently are more profoundly, including the 
ways through which we see them as such. This process demonstrates itself endlessly in 
Eno’s generative music such as that of 77 Million Paintings, which shows a seemingly 
infinite number of possible visual and aural combinations. As the listener experiences 
them with the knowledge that their configurations were not planned as such but 
instead were generated, any patterns which are heard or seen as such can be 
identified as imposed by the listener. In this sense, Eno’s concept of truth could be 
conceived as the site of a relationship in which possibilities and actualities converge to 
inform our present configuration of reality.  
World and Earth  
If art is described as ‘the site of a relationship with things’,75 then the relationship 
exists not only between the perceiver of the work and the work, but also between the 
work and the larger environment in which it exists and to which it contributes. ‘Things’ 
in the statement thus encompasses a point of convergence between the world of the 
work and the world around the work as perceived by the listener or viewer. As such, 
‘things’ is appropriately ambiguous, as Eno conceives of art as part of a process 
through which we deal with uncertainty. The work manifests a concrete instance of an 
abstract notion while the abstraction is preserved to some degree. As Eno explains, 
’Evolving metaphors, in my opinion, is what artists do’.76 He continues: 
Humans actually codify most of their knowledge not in terms of 
mathematical  tables, sets of statistics and scientific laws, but in terms 
of metaphors. Most of the things we normally have to deal with 
understanding are complex, fuzzy, messy, changing, and in fact poorly 
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delineated. We don't actually know where the boundaries of them are, 
let alone being able to make clear questions about them. We spend a lot 
of our time as ordinary humans navigating through complicated 
situations with one another, that require constant negotiation, and 
constant new attempts to understand.77 
In this statement, the fluidity of intelligibility is acknowledged; there is a constantly 
changing clearing in which the known and unknown, the world and earth on which it is 
grounded, configure to form different aspects of our intelligence from situation to 
situation. The different rift designs potentially produce different configurations of 
earth and world, thereby eliciting varying metaphors. Thus, Eno’s conception of 
metaphor, and of art as such, is a way of expressing a structural correlation which is 
able to recognize and encompass the unknown as mysterious while still retaining a 
cognizable mimetic structure.  
This metaphor-making process occurs as artists ‘invent metaphors, break up 
metaphors, challenge them, pull them apart, put them together in new order and so 
on’, they ‘remind you constantly of this process that you’re most of the time engaged 
in, the process of metaphor-making’.78 While Eno is speaking on the universal level 
about artists, his artistic practice is such that many decisions are surrendered to a 
process or system. As such, the artist in this instance and work become 
interchangeable functionally, and the work in fact performs these actions.   As the 
metaphor-making process is brought to the forefront of thought, the viewer or listener 
is compelled to adopt a comportment consistent with poiesis; the exacting nature of 
enframing is deterred as the possibility for more revealing becomes apparent.  This, I 
maintain, is precisely the saving power of which Heidegger spoke.  
Eno contends that science provides an extreme example of this process by providing 
the structure upon which to build metaphors by isolating pieces of our environment or 
experience and making predictions or theories around those parts.79 This is the point 
of connection between science and art, as Eno states that ‘each is a highly organized 
form of pretending; of saying “let’s see what would happen if the world was like 
this”’.80 This perspective of science demonstrates Heidegger’s notion that the saving 
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power of technology can be seen in its danger; the pretending involved in science 
opens up possibilities for further truths, while the quantification and labelling process 
issues forth standing reserve. Thus, the imagination that is required to ascertain 
correlations in science can be lost when everything is perceived as being under our 
control.  
Much like Heidegger, Eno laments that it is control which has become celebrated in our 
culture today.81  This is evident in the proliferation of technological advances which 
enable us to connect, quantify and organize things. While one might expect Eno as a 
studio producer to champion this mindset, in fact the opposite is true. He views the 
possibility of perfectibility and certainty as ‘a sense that has become a real albatross to 
us’ as it limits the part of us that is ‘a bit messy and barbarian’.82 Thus, it is this unknown, 
or Heideggerian earth, which Eno desires to both recognize and celebrate as 
unknowable in his music and art.  
Eno’s description of art as a system of knowledge, or a way of knowing, is related to his 
view of culture, which he describes as ‘everything you don’t have to do’;83 variations 
can exist in modes of knowing as a result of the freedom which accompanies 
nonessential decisions.  Eno’s summary is perhaps a simple way of conveying the 
ontological situation of culture; it emerges as an interrelatedness of the possible ways 
in which Dasein can be, given its set parameters for existence. Or, as Eno again 
summarises, ‘[I]ts necessity stems precisely from its contingency’.84 The system of 
culture becomes necessary in order to make sense of and navigate a set of possibilities 
which are not otherwise determined by necessity in the sense of survival.  Culture is 
thus contingent, but not optional. It comprises an interactive structure through which 
various ways of being become contextualized, and this occurs necessarily as earth 
grounds and unites them. Culture thus becomes its own system within which other 
systems exist.       
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Consequently, if art exists as a system of knowledge within the cultural system which is 
interactive, there is an inherent organic component to the subtext of the system from 
the outset. Possibilities emerge and grow from different combinations of earth and 
world configurations. As such, systems-based creative practices introduce a framework 
which sets in motion a process of decision-making on a meta-level; the creator can 
interact with the system both to introduce and remove boundaries from which the 
output of the system arises. The system thus introduces not only structural limitations, 
but also a freedom which ensues from both the surrender of decision-making on the 
micro level and also acceptance of the output as it arises from the predetermined 
systemic structures. Thus, in systems-based creative practices, an element of earth 
always remains preserved within the system itself as it generates new worlds. 
The creation of new worlds was something which always interested Eno, even as a 
young child. His early love of drawing and the subject matter represented pointed the 
way toward the creative connection between imaginary worlds and systems. He loved 
to draw houses which incorporated labyrinths, waterfalls, bridges, and all sorts of 
futuristic imaginings.85 He explains, ‘The feeling I like is the feeling of making a world of 
some kind, and that’s what I still like; the feeling of being inside this world, and 
wondering if everything was like that. And that was the first time I had that feeling. 
Creativity is always a very strong desire to make a world of your own’.86 Thus, for Eno, 
creativity inherently involves Heidegger’s worlding of the world. This creativity evolved 
from drawing to his present day music and installations; these present the listener and 
viewer with alternate worlds which are safe to explore. One musical example of this 
often cited by Eno is that of his album On Land, which aims to create a sense of place 
and time for the listener.87 
The desire to create new worlds soon found an outlet for expression on the systems 
level as Eno enjoyed listening to the hymn ‘Jerusalem’ as played by his grandfather’s 
player piano. This activity soon captured his interest in the player piano as a way to 
make new sounds. He describes all of the rolls that his grandfather had collected which 
contained the instructions via holes in the paper for the player piano. Eno would make 
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new holes in the rolls or cover pre-existing holes with pieces of tape. He states that ‘I 
liked the system that the player-piano represented—and I like performing some extra 
surgery on the rolls that nobody liked!’88 Thus, this was an early generative music 
forerunner which combined the sensibilities of systems-based creation with the 
creation of new sonic possibilities and their ensuing worlds. 
Eno’s process-led creativity was encouraged and nurtured when he attended art 
school in 1964 at Ipswich Civic College. This ended up corresponding with Roy Ascott’s 
arrival to Ipswich to head the art school. Ascott came from Ealing School of Art after 
founding the controversial ‘Groundcourse’, which was an extremely unique approach 
to teaching art which involved a blending of science and art as well as an approach that 
challenged the students’ identity and work processes.89 Ascott was specifically 
interested in applying cybernetics and behaviourism to art and art education. His 
unique practices extended to that of his hiring of faculty members for his department, 
such as a cybernetician and mathematician, which were both highly unusual in an art 
department both then and now. Ascott describes the first year of the course as being 
about ‘changing preconceptions...by dismantling the idea that you are either a good or 
bad artist and whatever you are is fixed—who you are, and so forth’.90 The second 
year focused on the notion of self-recreation and designing models of human beings, 
then moving between these models via exercises, role-playing, diagrams and mind-
maps. Many students found this process very challenging both emotionally and 
cognitively and subsequently left the course. 
Eno, however, thrived in the systems-based environment. It also forced him to get 
‘used to the idea that you were expected to be articulate, and people would call you on 
it...You had to try, at least, to think out what you were doing. Ipswich made me 
become fascinated in the connection between intellect and intuition’.91 These came to 
be viewed by Eno as part of a continuum rather than as a binary opposition as a 
result.92 It was also at Ipswich that he was introduced to the painter Tom Phillips, who 
introduced Eno to the musical avant-garde scene in both England and America, 
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exposing him to composers such as John Cage, and introducing him to Cornelius 
Cardew and Morton Feldman among others. Thus, both the processes and the very 
conceptual framework which enabled these processes had their ‘ground’ in the 
Groundcourse which had a lasting impact on Eno and his work. The conventional 
boundaries between science and art were temporarily suspended in their mutual 
contributions to creative processes and the articulations of their larger context in the 
world.  
Strife 
The process through which generative music comes into being technologically is one in 
which strife continually manifests itself. As each iteration articulates one sonic 
configuration among many possibilities, the generative process itself continually 
references or points toward the level of earth, or the ground from which all the 
possibilities gain their viability as such. Similarly, strife arises in the listener between 
ways of listening; expectations of certain compositional practices or musical structures 
such as melody and harmony compete cognitively with an open comportment in which 
preconceptions are surrendered. This process of surrender is thus both a response to 
the strife present in the work and also initially manifests as a striving in the listener.  
The concept of surrender, I would argue, is the most championed principle in Eno’s 
work, as he strives to create situations which invite that response, or which say to the 
listener, ‘This is where you can surrender!’93 While the idea can be traced back as far 
as the development of ambient music, which resulted in part from surrendering to the 
experience of a malfunctioning stereo system, it has reached its apex in generative 
music. The idea is inherent in the structure of the generative system, as Eno explains, 
‘Generative forms in general are multi-centred. There's not a single chain of command 
which runs from the top of the pyramid to the rank and file below’.94 It is thus that the 
very creation of generative music becomes a structural analogue for the process of 
surrender as it is elicited through strife.  
                                                          
93 ‘Brian Eno: The Philosophy of Surrender’, The Polymath Perspective, 2009, 
http://www.polymathperspective.com/?p=9(23 August, 2013). 
94 Brian Eno, ‘Generative Music’, In Motion Magazine, (1996), 
http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/eno1.html, (23 August, 2013). 
50 
 
The idea of surrender has changed culturally over time; in this age characterized by 
enframing, it has lost its cultural currency. Eno conceives of control and surrender as 
occupying two ends of a spectrum, with control being significantly more valued. He 
states, ‘We've tended to think of the surrender end as a luxury, a nice thing you add to 
your life when you've done the serious work of getting a job, getting your pension 
sorted out. I'm saying that's all wrong’.95 Instead, surrender is a natural aspect of being 
that corresponds to the part that is ‘a bit messy and barbarian’. It is the part in which 
earth is not only acknowledged but honoured as we relinquish attempts at control.  
Historically, the act of surrender can be identified in all societies in varying degrees or 
points on the spectrum which appear in different parts of culture. Eno explains: 
You have these different areas of human activity which appear to 
overlap, which are basically sex, drugs, art and religion...The umbrella 
that they all exist under is this word, ‘surrender’ because they are all 
forms of transcendence through surrender. They are ways of 
transcending your individuality and sense of yourself as a totally 
separate creature in the world. All of those things involve some kind of 
loosening of this boundary that is around this thing called ‘yourself’.96 
The process of surrendering part of yourself and identity is inherently tied to the 
notion of mystery or the unknown. In the area of human activity which involves art, 
Eno sees surrender as a way of experiencing an imaginary world or way of being while 
remaining in complete safety.97 Thus, I maintain that the creation of an imaginary 
world, as presented in the work of art, invites surrender by presenting a unique 
combination of earth and world; the strife which occurs between the two within the 
work is reflected by the navigation between control and surrender within the listener 
or viewer. 
Eno has been intrigued by surrender since childhood, although he lacked the 
terminology at the time to articulate that which was occurring. He describes the first 
visual art that made an impression on him, a Piet Mondrian painting, which is an 
unlikely pictorial candidate for creating a strong emotional stirring in a young boy due 
to its lack of realistic presentation. However, Eno recognized it as generating the 
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feeling which he sought from art and being an artist where a condition is recreated 
‘where you’re actually out of your depth, where you’re uncertain, no longer controlling 
yourself, yet you’re generating something, like surfing as opposed to digging a 
tunnel’.98 The metaphor of surfing denotes the idea of a balance between control and 
surrender in the water, whereas tunnel-digging suggests necessity and pure control. 
Thus, the move toward earth as it occurs during surrender necessarily involves a 
temporary loosening of world which affects our sense of security.  
The four key areas in which humans practice surrender can appear in varying 
combinations which are culturally contingent. However, they serve the same purpose 
regardless of the combination. However, religion is one such area which offers a 
narrative explaining and contextualizing the process. While Eno describes himself as an 
‘evangelical atheist’,99 he does engage with spirituality as a kind of meta-discourse or 
as ‘the highest level of discussion one entertains in life’100 while rejecting the various 
systems which comprise religions. Some Eastern religious perspectives interest him, 
however, which he encountered first through reading Cage’s Silence. Two ideas in 
particular interested Eno from this reading, the first being the idea ‘that every moment 
is a concatenation of hundreds of forces which just meet at that instant, and will never 
come together in the same way again—synchronicity’.101 This is demonstrated quite 
obviously in generative music, and more specifically in 77 Million Paintings, as its very 
name denotes the possible number of combinations of images accompanied by music 
which is also randomly combined. As the sonic and visual elements are variable in both 
duration and combination, one will never see the same combination twice, nor hear 
the same thing repeated, despite how long the software is run or the installation is 
viewed. The moment as such will be explored further later on. 
The second idea of influence deals with the Eastern conception of time passage which 
involves a different mental model than that of Western perception. Summarily, instead 
of looking into the future with the past behind, the Chinese ‘look at the past, and the 
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future washes over them’102 as Eno describes. This concept finds its way into Eno’s 
work as well, again particularly with 77 Million Paintings, as the viewer observes the 
overlapping images changing at such a slow rate that the past seems to converge with 
the present as future images gradually emerge onto the screen(s).  
Eno’s interest in the notions of synchronicity and temporality indicate a strong parallel 
with issues addressed in Heidegger’s first major work Being and Time. In this work, 
Heidegger explores the ontological structures which enable and shape Being, including 
temporality. As such, Eno’s creative incorporation of these ideas points toward the 
level of ontology as a natural meta-level of discourse, one which contains the 
possibility of transcending and thus situating four key areas in which surrender occurs. 
Thus, perhaps another level of strife is added as Eno’s work, particularly that of his 
generative music, strives to find expression in a meta-language which can encompass 
the ontological level on which it operates. As such, the interaction which occurs 
between Eno’s creative practice and Heidegger’s philosophy as they inform one 
another manifests a textual strife which reflects that of the earth and world encounter.  
Open 
Aesthetic ideas which are inherently innovative are not always arrived at by way of 
inspiration or even intuition; rather, the act of surrendering to an experience can 
sometimes marry these two concepts which results in the idea coming into being. This 
was the case with ‘ambient music’, a term coined by Brian Eno and explained in a 
manifesto of sorts on the inner sleeve of his album Music for Airports. The experience 
which culminated in the creation of a new musical genre occurred largely as a result of 
being bed-ridden following a car accident in 1975. Eno describes the situation: 
My friend Judy Nylon had visited, and brought with her a record of 17th-
century harp music. I asked her to put it on as she left, which she did, 
but it wasn’t until she’d gone that I realized that the hi-fi was much too 
quiet and one of the speakers had given up anyway. It was raining 
outside, and I could hardly hear the music above the rain—just the 
loudest notes, like little crystals, sonic icebergs rising out of the storm. I 
couldn’t get up and change it, so I just lay there waiting for my next 
visitor to come and sort it out, and gradually I was seduced by this 
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listening experience. I realized that this was what I wanted music to 
be—a place, a feeling, an all-around tint to my sonic environment.103 
The events and sounds revealed and concealed themselves in such a way that the 
presence of a new music came into the Open. The Open was the field in which and 
from which the rain, the notes, and all factors involved were able to appear, 
manifesting themselves as a unique presence. As such, the music came into view, in 
the lighted clearing, rather than being composed or arranged, and this characteristic 
continues in his generative practice. Significantly, this experience came about through 
Eno’s waiting, which allowed his focus to be reoriented to the specific configuration of 
sounds which were present at that moment. Waiting, as a component of surrender, 
will be explored later.  
This particular experience immediately echoes the philosophical influence of John 
Cage, to whom Eno was first exposed while at Ipswich via Tom Phillips.104 The above 
statement reflects Cage’s identification of a false dichotomy between ‘noise and so-
called musical sounds’,105 which he predicted would be a future point of disagreement 
which would replace the consonance versus dissonance point of contention occurring 
at the time from the initial impact of serialism on compositional schools. While Eno’s 
experience involved music which was obviously intended as such, the technology of his 
sound system, or malfunction thereof, coupled with other sonic elements pre-existing 
in the environment such as the rain, combined in such a manner to produce a new 
aural experience. These elements are not sufficient, however, to give rise to a new 
method of inclusive listening, as described by Cage, without the recognition of a new 
experience and the accompanying surrender described by Eno in this instance as a 
gradual seduction. I suggest that one of Eno’s defining characteristics is this readiness 
to listen to sounds as they are and then the subsequent ability to both cognitively and 
emotively arrange them into a new meaningful form. 
Eno’s encounter with ambient music thus highlights the nature of perception in 
relation to the Open; presence is enabled by and within the Open which likewise 
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enables the subsequent cognitive ordering to occur. The ordering process takes place 
as contextual boundaries are constructed which enable meaning to arise; the sounds 
arose and Eno began to experience them as music. Thus, we do not experience the 
Open as such; rather, we experience new configurations of presence and the 
conceptual boundaries which arise from our attempts to make sense of that which is 
revealed within the Open. Eno is acutely aware of such boundaries, whether they are 
self-imposed or implicitly part of the form of that which he is experiencing. Even in the 
latter instance, he has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to use boundaries, or 
‘frames’ as Oblique Strategies often reference, in creative and unpredictable ways by 
either removing them from places in which they are expected, as in ambient music, or 
using them to emphasize an element which might otherwise be lost. This is articulated 
on the Oblique Strategy card which states ‘Make a blank valuable by putting in an 
exquisite frame’.106 The Oblique Strategy cards themselves can be viewed as tools 
which enable a new cognitive arrangement of the creative boundaries. As such, the 
cards initiate a new relationship with the Open.  
Another example of a creative engagement with boundaries exists in Eno’s conception 
for his album Music for Airports, the idea for which was conceived in the Cologne 
airport in 1977. Eno observed the space and the ways in which it was used, thus 
creating a kind of music based on observational limitations. These included the fact 
that it had to be interruptible to make way for announcements, it had to sound outside 
of both the speaking frequencies and speed of speech of people, and it had to be 
accommodating to the typical noises of the airport. Most importantly, however, it had 
to deal with the context of the environment and the reason for occupying it, which for 
Eno was that of ‘flying, floating and, secretly, flirting with death...I want to make a kind 
of music that prepares you for dying—that doesn’t get all bright and cheerful and 
pretend you’re not a little apprehensive, but which makes you say to yourself, 
“Actually, it’s not that big a deal if I die”’.107 Thus, like generative music which arises 
from set parameters or boundaries, Music for Airports similarly emerged from the use 
of situational boundaries utilized in the composition process.  
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We do not impose boundaries solely on our environment; we impose them internally 
as well. As Eno points out, this process becomes evident in listening, during which we 
hear not only that particular piece but also the entire history of music.108 The ways in 
which sounds are perceived are largely influenced by the listener’s internal contextual 
references, thus colouring a piece of music by way of mental relation to that which has 
been listened to previously. This reveals both how conscious Eno is of his own 
influences and his awareness of the existence of a hermeneutics of music as such. 
Additionally, his contextual awareness gives rise to the ability to cognitively position 
his work both territorially and historically, thus allowing him to use this very awareness 
as a creative tool. As he states, ‘The interesting thing about boundary conditions is that 
they're extremely useful as thinking tools, but not as experiences. As thinking tools, 
they say to you, This is as far as you could go in that direction - and suddenly you think, 
gracious me, I never realised you could go that far’.109 This preference for creating 
boundaries rather than experiencing them as such is upheld creatively within the 
generative music process.  
Similarly, Eno continued utilizing the cognitive tool of boundary conditions as he 
developed his conception and practice of ambient music. The first boundary which 
seemed to present itself lay in the perceptions of what a ‘serious’ work of music was 
considered to be at that time, which largely consisted of writing songs and performing 
them on instruments. As the studio became a new sonic environment with possibilities 
of its own, Eno was determined to move the process of making and shaping sound into 
the foreground as ‘one of the distinguishing characteristics of new music’ and one that 
could ‘in fact become the main focus of compositional attention’.110 This enabled a 
new field of boundary conditions to arise as he started utilizing the studio as an 
instrument in its own right.    
Another boundary condition of early ambient music manifested at the level of 
attention as a shift occurred in the way Eno and his peers were listening to music. They 
seemed to be using it in a new way; music became something Eno described as ‘part of 
                                                          
108 Brian Eno—Another Green World, by Nicola Roberts, 2010, 60 min. (BBC ). 
109 Paul Merton, ‘Paul Merton’s Hour of Silence’, Enoweb, (2005), http://enoweb.co.uk/ (23 August, 
2013). 
110 Eno, ‘Ambient’, 95. 
56 
 
the ambience of our lives—and we wanted it to be continuous, a surrounding’.111 In 
fact, it was predominately painters and writers who enjoyed and encouraged Eno’s 
ambient work the most, as they tended to use music as they worked in their respective 
mediums.112 The arrival of synthesizers also made this new process inviting, as Eno 
became increasingly lost in the different sonic environments he could create and in 
which he could become immersed. The new possibilities of the studio and synthesizer 
coupled with new uses and environments for music interested Eno as both a musician 
and visual artist; as he noted, ‘it suggested moving the process of making music much 
closer to the process of painting (which I knew something about)’.113 Consequently, he 
made music under the self-imposed label of a ‘non-musician’, as he lacked technical, 
instrumental skill and music theory knowledge but was able to create and manipulate 
sound in a manner which was as conceptually and aurally valid as any trained musician 
through the use of technology. 
Technology 
One would not expect Eno to be critical of technology given his complete reliance upon 
it as a creative medium. However, this same reliance is perhaps that which enables 
both a well-informed critique and also the ability to develop ways to combat or avoid 
its pitfalls. Thus, as Eno approaches technology from a standpoint of poiesis, his 
creative practice manifests an extension of this mode of revealing rather than 
succumbing to the enframing which comprises the possible danger. As such, Eno does 
recognize the presence of danger. However, he locates this danger not in technology 
as such but rather in a perspective or way of approaching the world. He states: 
Everybody knows that science is powerful and could be dangerous, 
therefore there's a whole lot of criticism on that basis. What people 
don't realize is that culture is powerful and could be dangerous too. As 
long as culture is talked about as though it's a kind of nice little add-on 
to make things look a bit better in this sort of brutal life we all lead, as 
long as it's just seen as the icing on the cake, then people won't realize 
that it's the medium in which we're immersed, and which is forming us, 
which is making us what we are and what we think.114 
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Thus, Eno shares Heidegger’s view of science as a potential danger, but this danger is 
perhaps lessened by its visibility as people generally recognize it as such. The real 
danger for Eno is the inability to see the constructed, contingent nature of our world 
and thus how one can play a part in the process. In other words, the danger is that of 
enframing, and the passage above rearticulates Heidegger’s fear of the ‘final delusion’ 
in which it appears as though ‘‘man everywhere and always encounters only 
himself’.115 
Heidegger and Eno both locate the danger not in material objects as such, but rather in 
an approach or perspective. Similarly, both value engagement rather than a detached 
perspective in order to reveal truth and set it to work creatively. In this way, 
technology poses a potential difficulty in its mediation of creativity. The increasing 
computerization of music-making thus presents this problem of detachment for Eno: 
I'm struck by the insidious, computer-driven tendency to take things out 
of the domain of muscular activity and put them into the domain of 
mental activity. This transfer is not paying off. Sure, muscles are 
unreliable, but they represent several million years of accumulated 
finesse. Musicians enjoy drawing on that finesse (and audiences 
respond to its exercise), so when muscular activity is rendered useless, 
the creative process is frustrated.116 
This shift from hands-on creation to a cerebral mode is what Eno terms ‘screwdriver 
mode’,117 in which one’s intuition is thwarted in favour of endless tinkering with 
details. This, in turn, acts as a barrier to revealing, and thus to creativity. As Eno 
describes the situation, ‘It's as though a new layer of bureaucracy has interposed itself 
between me and the music we want to make’.118 Thus, as technology becomes an 
object of focus which replaces engagement, it reiterates the subject-object dynamic 
reflected in the traditional aesthetic encounter.  
Technology consequently obstructs creativity as both the intuitive and physical 
processes inherent to creativity often become weakened through mediation. As Eno 
states, ‘Intuitive actions confine the detail work to a dedicated part of the brain, 
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leaving the rest of one’s mind free to respond with attention and sensitivity to the 
changing texture of the moment. With tools, we crave intimacy’.119 This intimacy which 
exists between the instrument and musician is therefore thwarted by the existence of 
endless technological options rather than being liberated by them. Consequently, the 
music which results from technological processes often seems ‘stilted’ and fails to 
seem organic and intimate.120 The lack of intimacy in the process of creation is thus 
reflected in the lack of warmth or life in the output.  
Thus, part of Eno’s creative approach to technology involves the process of giving it a 
type of personality by accentuating its flaws, and in doing so, I would argue, he 
disrupts the process of enframing by drawing attention to technology in a non-
mastered state. The imperfections of technology are often highlighted and utilized by 
Eno as a method of introducing both an organic element to an otherwise seemingly 
sterile digital environment and also as a featured characteristic of his production 
sound. Sometimes this involves a technique of omission, such as actively resisting the 
urge to digitally perfect a slightly imperfect drum track. This correction process 
enabled by technology has a cumulative effect which, if corrections continue 
throughout the track, results in a homogenized sound which lacks lustre and character. 
At other times, the choice of sound itself can add personality through imperfection. An 
example of this process would be the use of ‘retro’ sounds which inherently contain 
distortion or static.121 This serves to contextualize the sounds within a culturally 
specific time and place and thus introduces the listener to the surrounding cultural 
conversation, both of which imply a human connection.   
Another method of achieving a more humanized sound is by implementing 
indeterminacy, which reflects another Cagean influence. By implementing chance 
procedures during the compositional process, the process is thus preserved as such 
and not solidified into a fixed form. The Oblique Strategy cards can be seen as one 
example of this indeterminate methodology, as the framework through which the 
creative dilemma is viewed is determined by which card is randomly chosen. While for 
Cage this often resulted in chance procedures which occurred as a part of the 
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performances as well as through the use of the I Ching beforehand, Eno approaches 
the concept in a slightly different, although conceptually similar way. Through his 
generative works, he focuses on processes and getting ‘the biggest effect for the 
smallest amount of input’.122 When considering Cage’s use of indeterminacy, one could 
view it as a surrender of decision making, while it is in fact quite the opposite; Cage 
shifted the focus of decision making from the direct shaping of the final output to the 
process of formulating questions which informed the work. These questions were then 
surrendered to the I Ching. Thus, the work became the product of a certain solution to 
specifically formulated questions, which involved a fundamental shift in focus to how 
the work comes into being rather than what comes into being specifically.  
In the case of generative music for Eno, the input which the computer software uses to 
combine in infinitely novel ways becomes a parallel to the question formulation by 
Cage. Eno has not surrendered control of the input, but rather the outcome. The 
indeterminate outcome, which is new for both Eno and also the listener, is one way in 
which computers can gain a more humanized quality. As Eno expressed, ‘I wanted 
something that had an organic quality to it. Had some sense of movement and change. 
Every time you played it something slightly different happened’.123 This sense of 
movement and change are important elements which serve to de-sterilize computers 
and their subsequent output, as Eno initially viewed computers and their 
accompanying influence on music and art as potentially detrimental rather than 
beneficial. Specifically, he identified and profoundly disagreed with the view that the 
strength of the computer lies in its ability to ‘move huge blocks of data around, such as 
displaying pre-defined pictures and information’.124 Instead, Eno chose to utilize and 
highlight a completely different function of the computer during which it becomes a 
‘tool for “growing” things’.125 
The application of technology to the process of growing something from seeds of input 
does in theory add a sense of humanity to what is generally perceived as a cold, 
impersonal process. Although constant change and unpredictability do operate as 
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humanizing elements, one is still ultimately listening to computer-generated output as 
determined by a system, therefore raising the relevant question as to how systems-
based sound and images can indeed have a humanized essence. The answer lies not in 
the output, but rather in the process itself; instead of dissecting the music endlessly to 
a state of compositional and digital perfection, generative music cultivates possibilities. 
As Eno describes, ‘Generative music is more like gardening; you plant a seed, and it 
grows different every time you plant’.126 Thus, I maintain that these possibilities speak 
directly to Heidegger’s saving power which requires one to see within technology the 
ambiguity and multiplicity of revealings made possible by it rather than succumbing to 
enframing. I would further suggest that it is the unique configuration of technology 
and art, of organic movement and digital manifestation, that allows generative music 
to act as a bridge between techne and poiesis, between Heidegger and Eno, and 
ultimately between control and surrender. While Eno and Heidegger articulate 
surrender differently, both see this process as crucial; Eno sees surrender as a human 
gift which must be rehearsed. Heidegger sees it as a saving power. The listener hears it 
as a world of infinite possibilities.  
The Second Shift 
Thus far, we have explored the aesthetic encounter; this has included various 
components which comprise the work of art (world, earth, strife) as well as 
mechanisms which operate between the work of art, the environment and the 
perceiver (truth, Open). These have been gathered under a mode of aesthetic 
experience, an experience which gives rise to a field of inquiry (aesthetics) which 
attempts to explain and inform itself reciprocally. The history of this field has erected 
barriers to understanding the aesthetic encounter in its full import as it began from a 
fundamentally flawed configuration between the work and the perceiver, the subject 
and object. As such, it inserted a space of disinterestedness and disengagement 
between the work and the perceiver which is not an accurate assessment of that which 
occurs in the present aesthetic encounter. The present aesthetic encounter begins 
from a point of engagement, a place at which the perceiver participates in the mutual 
construction of meaning as it is enabled and initiated by the work through an 
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interactive process. This engagement, in turn, re-informs and re-situates the 
environment contextually as it undergoes a similar process. 
This engagement has been twofold; one has occurred on the level of the encounter 
itself, in which linguistic systems of ontological parameters have resonated between 
two enabling structures (Heidegger, Eno). A second engagement has manifested at the 
level of the encounter of the encounter, a meta-level at which the reader participates 
as he or she shifts between a micro-level reading of the text and a macro-level of 
assimilating larger structures and thus resonances of the text at a level which both 
transcends and encircles the text. This abstracted level is a necessary component of 
the experience, and indeed has its correlate in the aesthetic experience; however, to 
remain at a level of relative disengagement is problematic, as it reinstates the very 
difficulties of the traditional aesthetic relationship which we seek to transcend. Thus, 
we reach a point in the path at which both Heidegger and Eno found themselves in 
varying ways as they attempted to retain unity of experience, either in thought or in 
music creation, while allowing for something outside of our experience to gain entry 
into it. 
This dilemma necessitates another shift; the present discussion must change its focus 
from the work of art and its surrounding environment to the perceiver. Thus far, the 
aesthetic encounter has presupposed one general mode or approach to the work of 
art when in fact probably as many aesthetic comportments exist as there are 
perceivers. While certain properties within the work evoke and encourage specific 
modes of approach which are particular to its unique dynamics, there exists a basic 
mode with which the perceiver makes the initial approach. This primary way of being 
at the entrance into an aesthetic encounter represents a point of convergence 
between the cognitive aspects which the perceiver brings to the encounter and the 
influence which is exerted from work of art in the process. As such, a perceiver can 
either block parts of the encounter or invite a more full experience to unfold within it 
depending upon the orientation present at this particular point. Thus, the aesthetic 
encounter is not a phenomenon which is detached from everyday life but rather is 
continuous and this point of orientation is less a point and more of a curve as the 
perceiver moves throughout the process.  
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Just as the aesthetic encounter is a continuous process embedded in everyday life, so 
too is it continuous between the work of art and the perceiver. It is therefore difficult 
to isolate parts of a continuous process of exchange to one side of the encounter or 
the other, to that of the work of art or the perceiver as such. Ways in which the work 
manifests itself become mirrored in its reception; conversely, the perceiver brings 
elements to the encounter which seemingly become part of the work itself as they are 
read into the work hermeneutically. Therefore, it becomes necessary to look for a 
constant presence or guiding thread that can be seen to operate in and between the 
two sides, as it is this element which will provide the means to view the encounter as a 
unity which transcends the traditional subject-object duality.  
This guiding thread has by definition already appeared in the text, although its role as 
such has not completely emerged. This has occurred from the beginning, as it features 
in the title of one of Heidegger’s essays, and has subsequently determined our own 
mode of approach toward technology and thus technological art. This is the mode of 
questioning, a process which creates a particular relationship between the work of art 
and the perceiver, or between the text and reader. Questioning as such carries the 
potential to both transcend the subject-object duality as it acts as a precursor to a 
second guiding thread, that of surrender. As two processes within a process, 
questioning and surrender thus constitute constituent components of the aesthetic 
encounter which exist as trace elements within the work of art and the perceiver. 
We thus endeavour to lift questioning and surrender out of their respective positions 
as they have been delineated thus far and explore them further in the light of the 
resonances to which they have contributed. As questioning is a mode of thinking which 
precedes surrender, the textual order of appearance is thus determined. When taken 
together, however, a process arises which inherently carries a space in which the 
unknown can emerge and remain as such. This space implicitly acknowledges those 
aspects of truth which still remain concealed but which resonate within the work of art 
as possibilities. Thus, through surrender, a mode of both engagement and 
disengagement arises which enables the perceiver to move out of the realm of a mere 
experience with an object and into an encounter which transforms his or her mode of 
being. The perceiver and the work become continuous as the truth of the work is 
entered into by way of surrender. Therefore, I argue that it is surrender which provides 
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the key to unlocking the divisive subject-object duality as a third possibility is 
presented: it transcends the realm of activity and passivity all together.   
Gelassenheit and Surrender 
Questioning 
Questioning is a process which is simultaneously ambiguous and deterministic. It 
generates a self-perpetuating system which influences its own outputs without being 
overly constraining. In this way, questioning itself can be conceived as a heuristic127 
process in which specific results ensue from vague instructions or directional cues; the 
particular arises from the vague while maintaining traces of the path travelled. It is 
thus that the process rather than the end result becomes the focal point for both 
Heidegger and Eno as they approach their respective aesthetics. Additionally, during 
the process of questioning, multiplicity is generated which could not have been 
predetermined, thus creating a rich synthesis of interconnectedness which both lends 
value to the process as such and also elicits a unique range of responses or output.   
When Heidegger states that ‘questioning builds a way’, he is indicating a process which 
could be considered to have a digital equivalent in heuristics. Eno’s heuristics build a 
way, as he expresses a very similar sentiment while quoting Stafford Beer: ‘Instead of 
trying to specify the system in full detail, specify it only somewhat. You then ride on 
the dynamics of the system in the direction you want to go’. 128 The destination to 
which both Heidegger and Eno want to go is a place of surrender; this is less an event 
or end point and more of a process in itself. However, it becomes clear upon 
examination that in order for surrender to be invited or awakened, the system which 
invites it must contain traces of surrender within itself. Thus, the process of surrender 
and surrendering to process appear to be inherently linked.  
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Eno’s Questioning: Process and Function 
One could say that Eno was the product of a specific system; the art school 
environment of the mid to late 1960s encouraged the active questioning and 
articulation of artistic ideas. These conditions fostered a natural ability within Eno to 
analyze and verbalize theoretical abstractions, which proved advantageous during the 
increasing popularity of the conceptualist art movement. As Eno described, ‘The idea 
became that artists should concentrate on the way they were doing things, not just the 
little picture that came out at the end, and the picture was even relegated to the 
status of a memento of the process: the process was the interesting part of the 
work’.129 
The new emphasis placed on process over product resulted in a disparity between the 
aesthetic theories of the time and the work which it attempted to describe. Thus Eno, 
like Heidegger, found aesthetics to be a problematic field, describing it as a process of 
‘trying to graft a redundant philosophy onto a set of events that it had not been 
designed for’.130 The solution to this problem, it seemed to Eno, was to speak in 
extreme generalities which failed to articulate anything. Thus, to state that ‘art is the 
highest achievement of the human spirit’ or similar proclamations are what Eno 
describes as the ‘muck of language’; this muck was a state in which aesthetics seemed 
to thrive.131 
Eno was dissatisfied not only with the seemingly vacuous language of aesthetics, which 
failed to meaningfully bridge theory and practice, but also with the very 
presuppositions  regarding the structure and function of art itself upon which 
aesthetics was built. A key thinker with whom he identified was Morse Peckham, who 
articulated a view which seemed to describe art as Eno both experienced and created 
it. In Man’s Rage for Chaos, Peckham discredits the notion that the primary function of 
art is to ‘transform the chaos of human experience into a reassuring vision of order 
and unity’.132 This conception is also extended to suggest that this order is constitutive 
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and reveals a hidden order behind nature and even the human mind. Peckham 
explains: 
The claim is (1) that experience comes to us in a chaotic blizzard of 
phenomena, and (2) that only art offers us order.  As for the first part of 
the claim, is it true? Does experience really come to us in a chaotic 
blizzard? No, it does not. All behaviour is patterned and all behaviour is 
styled, including perceptual behaviour; and by ‘perception’ I mean in 
this book all data reaching the brain through the various senses...Thus 
the observer of the work of art already has an order which he uses to 
perceive it with; not art but perception is ordered...As for the second 
part, that only art offers us order, this is likewise patently untrue. A 
work of art is the deposit of artistic behaviour. All behaviour is 
patterned and styled, or ordered.133 
As Eno employs evolutionary theory as an overarching concept to speak about art, the 
functionality and behavioural elements of Peckham’s view naturally appeal to him. 
Additionally, this view matches how Eno perceives the art experience, as he observes 
that the experiential value for the viewer or listener actually occurs through 
developing expectations and then breaking them.134 Thus, the key point for both Eno 
and Peckham would be art’s ‘disorientative function’135 provides an escape from the 
perpetual process of sensing and ordering in which we are always engaged.  
The opportunity for disorder which art offers is also biologically advantageous. 
Peckham perceives that the work of art creates a false ‘world’ of disorientation and 
uncertainty in which the perceiver can practice dealing with ‘cognitive tension’. This 
arises when the world around us does not conform to our mental model of it and the 
presuppositions therein.136 Thus, art provides a way of experiencing disorder in safety. 
As Eno explains, ‘It is what happens to you in life all the time, that you’re faced with 
situations that you didn’t choose and you have to somehow make the best of them. 
You have to survive them’.137 This imaginary world gives the perceiver a place of safety 
to experience disorder without presenting a physical or psychic risk. Eno adopted a 
phrase of Peckham’s that resonated with him, stating, ‘Art is the exposure to the 
tensions and problems of a false world so that man may endure exposing himself to 
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the tensions and problems of the real world’.138 This explanation afforded Eno 
assurance that art had a biological function, and that it was a significant force for 
modifying behaviour patterns.139 
The notion of the biological significance of art provided support for Eno’s conception 
of surrender as not merely a luxury to be engaged in when possible but instead as a 
natural, integral part of being itself. Like Heidegger, Eno sees modern Western culture 
as one which places a high value on control; thus, there are few places where 
surrender can be practiced. Although it is a part of being, it does not simply subsist 
below the surface and arise when it is desired; it must be rehearsed. This rehearsal 
occurs in the four major areas of sex, drugs, art and religion previously discussed, 
which can exist as independent spheres for surrender or as overlapping variations. 
Perhaps the underlying principle common to all four areas is the origination from an 
external source. Surrender must first and foremost be invited from outside of the 
individual, thus initiating surrender to something. Surrender is transcendent, and it 
cannot be done solely within ourselves. In fact, it is a transcendence of ourselves, 
which Eno describes as ‘transcending your individuality and sense of yourself as a 
totally separate creature in the world’, which involves ‘some kind of loosening of this 
boundary that is around this thing called ‘yourself’.140 
A favourite example of this transcendence of self for Eno through art, and more 
specifically music, is singing with an a capella group which he formed. The group meets 
weekly, and has grown from four to nearly twenty participants. Musical expertise is 
not required; the song choices are generally familiar to everyone, including songs such 
as ‘Dream’, ‘Cotton Fields’, ‘Chapel of Love’, and ‘I’ll Fly Away’.141 Eno has discovered 
that it is crucial to choose the right songs, and these generally consist of songs ‘based 
around the basic chords of blues and rock and country music’.142 Other features of the 
songs include ‘word-rich’ songs containing long vowel-sounds as well as complex 
rhythms. As Eno states, ‘It’s thrilling when you get the rhythm of something right and 
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you can all do a complicated rhythm together’.143 Similarly, the vowels create another 
opportunity for rich harmony, as he explains, ‘To be able to hit exactly the same vowel 
sound at a number of different pitches seems unsurprising in concept, but is beautiful 
when it happens’.144  
While singing has been proven to induce physiological and psychological benefits, Eno 
recognizes another benefit which he terms the ‘civilizational benefit’ of the activity: 
When you sing with a group of people, you learn how to subsume 
yourself into a group consciousness because a capella singing is all 
about the immersion of the self into the community. That's one of the 
great feelings — to stop being me for a little while and to become us. 
That way lies empathy, the great social virtue.145 
While this specific activity affords both an instigation to surrender and also a safe place 
in which to do so, it also provides a connection to others by way of a shared activity. It 
is the others who provide another key element of surrender in this instance; a sense of 
security is essential, but so too is variety and a sense of the unknown. In order for 
surrender to occur, there must be some element of risk involved, whether real or 
imaginary. The other singers in this example comprise the community that provides a 
sense of both something larger than the self and also something which falls exclusively 
outside of the control of the one who surrenders. Thus, the ability to be surprised is an 
essential element of surrender. 
The uncontrollable situation or world in which surrender occurs generates the 
possibility of surprise. This paradoxical element of a wilful loss of control, and the 
inherent acceptance of potentially unpredictable conditions, indicates the necessity of 
a state of wonder prior to the act of surrender. As surrender is done willingly, the one 
who surrenders must conceive of something which lies outside of himself or herself 
and holds some desirable possibility that is worth the act of surrender itself. Surrender 
to something fixed ceases to be surrender; it is merely submission. Thus, in order for 
surrender to be successfully initiated, an interaction with the unknown must occur to 
some degree in order for the instigation of wonder to occur. This, I suggest, makes 
music particularly suitable as an instigator of surrender; most music contains a degree 
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of familiarity through features such as melody, rhythm and structure which establish 
expectations while simultaneously creating a space in which to break them.  
Even when confronted with the perfect conditions which invite surrender, it is still a 
wilful choice which begins a process; surrender is a way of being or comportment 
rather than an event. Thus, questioning and surrender are inherently linked, as 
questioning too is a process which approaches the unknown openly while honouring it 
as such. In this way, questioning can be conceived as a prerequisite step to surrender. 
While the question of surrender for Eno is informed by his conception of the function 
of art and its biological and social implications, surrender also exists as a point of 
relation between Being and art. Thus, the ontological implications of both questioning 
and surrender exceed that of an anthropological or scientific treatment. 
Heidegger’s Questioning 
Within both ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ and ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, 
questioning plays a central role. Indeed, for Heidegger philosophy in its entirety 
emanates from the central question, which is the question of being. Thus, it is essential 
to consider Heidegger’s questioning process within these essays and not just the 
resulting conclusions. Similarly, he states, ‘The answer to the question, like every 
genuine answer, is only the final result of the last step in a long series of questions. 
Each answer remains in force as an answer only as long as it is rooted in 
questioning’.146 Conclusiveness is as impossible as it is undesirable; an answer contains 
within itself both the questions which shaped it and the seed for yet another question. 
Questioning, therefore, is a process. Heidegger emphasises this as he states that 
‘[q]uestioning builds a way’.147 Considering it as such reveals the reason for his 
meandering etymologies, which otherwise could appear as nostalgic digressions into 
Greek antiquity. In tracing the lineage and history of key terms in his discussions, a 
‘way’ is being built toward an origin. This evidences his statement that ‘philosophers 
always think backwards’,148 as the origin of something is its ‘essential source’ or ‘that 
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from which and by which something is what it is and as it is’.149 Thus, it is no accident 
that the essays under consideration consider a ‘question’ concerning technology and 
an ‘origin’ of the work of art, for questioning builds a way to an origin and essence 
whereby being exists in relation to Being and truth. 
What is the ‘way’ toward which questioning builds? As Heidegger explains, ‘The way is 
one of thinking’.150 Thus, just as there are multiple levels of truth, so too are there 
different manners or modes of thinking. The notion of a ‘way’, and indeed many other 
aspects of Heidegger’s later thought, were influenced by his encounter with the 
ancient Chinese text Dao De Jing in which ‘dao’ is commonly translated as ‘way’.151 The 
dao in this sense is ‘an ineffable, nameless and transcendent metaphysical entity’ 
which provides a form of guidance. This seems harmonious with Heidegger’s use of 
‘way’ [Weg] as not ‘a stretch connecting two places’, but rather ‘reason [Vernunft], 
spirit [Geist], raison [Raison], meaning [Sinn], logos’.152 He describes it as a ‘primal 
word [Urwort] which speaks to the reflective mind of man’153 and enables man’s 
power to reason that which these words are saying in their essence. Heidegger 
describes the ‘way’ as that which lies behind modern methods, which he describes as 
‘merely the drainage of a great hidden stream which moves all things along its track-
drawing way’.154 He states accordingly in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ that 
‘[w]e would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our 
attention on isolated sentences and topics’.155 The way, or process, is essential. 
The way through which Heidegger treads in examining the origin of the work of art is 
indicative of the way in which he sees art. Art is not a concept derived from a set of 
characteristics found in the work, nor is the work considered to be art due to its 
creator. Instead, art happens; it is a propriative event [Ereignis] through which Being 
can be understood. Heidegger leads the reader to this decision through questioning 
which is left unanswered, as to answer the question would be inconsistent with the 
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essence of art. Art is a way of questioning; thus, the circle created by the questions 
emulates art’s unfolding essence. Heidegger explains: 
Thus we are compelled to follow the circle. This is neither a makeshift 
nor a defect. To enter upon this path is the strength of thought, to 
continue on it is the feast of thought, assuming that thinking is a craft. 
Not only is the main step from work to art a circle like the step from art 
to work, but every separate step that we attempt circles in this circle.156 
The circular movement is necessary to hold open the question of the origin which 
prevents it from becoming a mere tautology or mimesis.157 Thus, the circle can be seen 
as a ‘way’ which is created by thought engaging in its strongest form. This is indicative 
of the ‘riddle’ which art is for Heidegger, about which solving the riddle is of much less 
importance than seeing the riddle itself.158 
If questioning is one path for thought, another is described in relation to technology. If 
questioning creates a circle, enframing creates a ‘skeleton’ or ‘bookrack’.159  That 
which is revealed is solidified into a structure which prohibits further revealing. Rather 
than holding open a space where an essence can unfold, enframing is a setting upon 
which gathers and orders into standing-reserve. As previously discussed, enframing 
does not occur as a result of technology; rather, technology is a result of the 
challenging claim of enframing. It situates man and ‘puts him in position to reveal the 
actual, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve’.160 As both questioning and 
enframing are modes of revealing, they both form a path or way. The revealing in 
enframing, however, ‘reveals to itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths, through 
regulating their course’.161 The path is pre-determined or calculated in advance as it 
does not allow for more revealing, as in the circle of questioning. Enframing is a 
challenging-forth rather than a bringing-forth. Therefore, one could say that Dasein is 
challenged through enframing and questioned by way of art. 
While both enframing and questioning could be considered comportments or ways of 
being, enframing is something in which Dasein always already is. By way of destining 
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[Geschick], which means ‘to start upon a way’ or ‘to send’,162 Dasein is called upon to 
view the world in this way. As Hans Ruin explains, ‘Ge-stell is not something external to 
human beings and their free will, but a way in which this will orients itself’.163 Thus, a 
choice exists, if Dasein does not forget, because the will can be reoriented, which 
occurs during an engagement with art or during the process of questioning. The 
reorientation of the will reminds Dasein of his role in safeguarding the essence of 
being. In this way, Dasein is ‘given to belong to the propriative event of truth’; he is 
granted ‘entry into something which, of himself, he can neither invent nor in any way 
make. For there is no such thing as a man who, solely of himself, is only man’.164 
The orientation of will is significant, as this is the point at which the saving power can 
arise from the danger. In order to reorient the will, a free relation must be entered into 
with regard to technology. This requires Dasein to consider both how he relates to 
technology and how this relation affects his being. As Ruin describes, ‘What Heidegger 
has been working towards...is a mode of thinking that can somehow incorporate the 
how of thinking into its what: to bring thinking to a thoughtful awareness of what it 
accomplishes in its very way of conceptualizing being’.165 Much like the circular 
questioning employed when exploring the origin of the work of art, Heidegger does 
not merely inquire what the nature of technology is—rather, he asks us to look at the 
essence of enframing itself in order to come into a new relation with it and thus with 
thought and the enframing within.  
Coming into a free relationship to enframing allows us to consider not only technology, 
but the way of thinking behind it and how it influences and manifests itself within our 
thinking. If enframing is an orientation of the will, then questioning builds a way which 
embodies this new orientation. This is the way of Gelassenheit. 
Gelassenheit 
The history of the term Gelassenheit can be traced back to the thirteenth century 
when the German mystic Meister Eckhart coined the term. Since its first use in the 
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1959 publication of the same name, Gelassenheit has been translated as 
‘releasement’, which denotes ‘a sense of “calm composure”, especially and originally 
that which accompanies an existential or religious experience of letting-go, being-let, 
and letting-be’.166 While it arose within the context of Christianity, Heidegger does not 
retain in his usage the notion of submission to a divine will, as this would still remain 
firmly entrenched in the domain of the will. The question for Heidegger is not between 
activity and passivity; rather, Gelassenheit is an active transition out of the domain of 
willing altogether.167 
While the term Gelassenheit can be approximated in translation, the linguistic 
representation not only fails to denote that which inherently falls within the realm of 
experience, but also can paradoxically enable its direct opposite, which Heidegger 
describes as ‘constructing a concept...just to be in possession of this concept’.168 In this 
sense, the representational role of language becomes emblematic of Ge-stell, or 
enframing, in which humans are called upon to wilfully represent the world as 
standing-reserve. In this process, things become ‘neutralized by the undifferentiated 
process of information’169 and it becomes possible to believe that being in possession 
of a ‘correct’ understanding of Gelassenheit means full comprehension. As the concept 
is particularly sensitive to representation as such, as it is offered precisely as a point of 
transition from the domain of the will, Heidegger seeks to demonstrate Gelassenheit 
rather than define it.  
This demonstration comes in the form of a conversation on a country path between a 
guide, a scholar, and a scientist. The conversation addresses the question of the 
essence of man, which in philosophical tradition has been understood in terms of 
thinking; thus the topic becomes the essence of thinking as the ‘distinguishing mark of 
the essence of the human’.170 However, at one point during the conversation the guide 
states that ‘what is essential to this essence, namely the essence of thinking, can be 
first properly caught sight of only insofar as we look away from thinking’.171 This 
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statement is reminiscent of Heidegger’s statement that ‘the essence of technology is 
by no means anything technological’.172 While seemingly paradoxical, the notion of 
essence in both cases is dependent upon Heidegger’s notion of truth as aletheia rather 
than truth as veritas, or correctness, as previously discussed. As truth is a process of 
revealing and concealing, so too is an essence, whether of technology or of thinking 
itself, as the essence will necessarily always reflect those characteristics which are 
unconcealed. As Don Ihde explains, ‘[B]eings as such are never simply given: they 
appear or come to presence in some definite way that is dependent upon the total 
field of revealing in which they are situated’.173 Thus, that which remains concealed 
comes to bear on this process, as it helps to determine that upon which we focus. 
Ihde goes further to describe Heidegger’s truth as a ‘complex field theory’: 
Truth is aletheia, translated as ‘unconcealedness,’ brought to presence 
within some opening that itself has a structure. Beings or entities thus 
appear only against, from, and within a background or opening, a 
framework. But the opening or clearing within which they take the 
shapes they assume, is itself structured. Overall this structure has an 
invariant feature, a concealing-revealing ratio. Thus one may say that it 
always has some selectivity factor as an essential feature.174 
Ihde’s descriptive theory of truth isn’t too distant from Heidegger’s own conception, as 
he discusses aspects of truth as a ‘constellation, the stellar course of the mystery’.175 
This constellation is encountered through the confrontation of the saving power and 
the inherent danger which exist simultaneously within technology, which ‘draw past 
each other like the paths of the stars in the course of the heavens. But precisely this, 
their passing by, is the hidden side of their nearness’.176 It is through the movement of 
passing that ‘the essential unfolding of truth propriates’.  This process reveals the 
import with which Heidegger discusses technology; it is not merely anthropological or 
instrumental, but rather is ontological. Technology, as a way of revealing truth, is an 
exclusive process in which the ‘transforming, storing, distributing, and switching’177 of 
enframing excludes the bringing-forth of poiesis. In short, it is a way of being which 
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excludes all others. It is the process of questioning which builds a way toward another 
horizon, or toward the orbit of another star in an adjacent constellation.  
Once a way or bridge is created through questioning, one is still within a constellation 
or framework. As Ihde pointed out, even the Open or clearing itself has a structure. 
This is due not only to the nature of the revealing-concealing variant, but also to the 
nature of the horizon itself. When discussing the horizon during the conversation, the 
scholar states:  
Thinking is really nothing other than the representational setting-before 
[Vor-stellen] and setting-toward [Zu-stellen] of the horizon, that is, of 
the circle-of-vision, in which the outward look and the essence of 
objects...becomes visible to us.178 
The essence of the horizon, then, turns us back to the essence of man, as it is man who 
projects a representational field. However, unless the world is to be considered merely 
a cognitive construct, a space must exist in which the horizon is represented. This 
space is the ‘open region’, which ‘surrounds us and shows itself to us as the horizon’. 
Thus, the horizon is ‘the side of the open-region turned toward our representational 
setting-before’.179 
The ways in which we conceive of and relate to the horizon is crucial, as evidenced 
through technology. For Heidegger, modern physics is the mathematical projection of 
nature through which experiments are conceived of and carried out for the purpose of 
controlling nature. In this way, technology is ‘nothing other than applied physics’,180 as 
nature becomes both represented and controlled through the human will. In order to 
conceive of nature or the world as other than objects to be utilized as standing-
reserve, man must enter into a new relationship with the open-region in which the 
horizon is situated. This is to open ourselves to the mystery of Being itself.  
As thinking is a representing, and representing is a willing, the problem of becoming 
open to the open region becomes a problem that involves the realm of the will. This is 
expressed by the guide during the conversation when he states that ‘I will non-
willing’.181 While seemingly paradoxical, the non-willing is actually a renunciation of or 
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disaccustoming to willing, during which an awakening occurs.182 This awakening is the 
first stage toward being let-in to Gelassenheit. Significantly, the way in which the 
discussion arrives at this fruitful turn arises through the process of questioning. The 
questions did not impose strict definitions; rather, the scientist observes that ‘willing 
moved into our field of vision’.183 Additionally, the path itself and its environment 
influenced the conversation and the speakers.  The night ‘compels concentration 
without using force’, whereby the men realize that by ‘slowing down our pace, it 
allows us time to ponder’.184 These statements not only describe the variables which 
gave rise Gelassenheit within the conversation, but also describe aspects of 
Gelassenheit itself which the men are beginning to experience. 
An awakening is a necessary part of the process of Gelassenheit, as the guide states 
that ‘we do not awaken releasement in ourselves from out of ourselves’.185 Thus, 
although releasement is effected from elsewhere, one can contribute to its arrival 
through keeping awake [Wachleiben].186 However, this keeping awake must not be 
toward an object of expectation, or else it would put one back in the domain of the 
will. So it becomes a waiting [warten], which the scholar describes as a ‘higher activity 
than that found in all the doings of the world and in all the machinations of the realms 
of humankind’.187 As Barbara Dalle Pezze describes, ‘Waiting is a moment of crossing; 
in waiting the swinging movement between the different kinds of thinking is present. 
In waiting something opens’.188 That which opens is both the path and the way we 
move on the path; it is the moment of the shift between techne and poiesis.  
Eno’s surrender and Heidegger’s Gelassenheit contain many points of similarity, 
particularly the transition out of subjectivity and the will and the conceptual letting-be. 
While Eno articulates surrender as a central concept that informs his work, it is actually 
within his work that surrender is both demonstrated and invited. As Gelassenheit must 
be experienced to be understood, we can examine Eno’s generative practice for the 
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conditions and traces of Gelassenheit within it to ascertain where surrender and 
Gelassenheit overlap.  
Perhaps the earliest generative activity of Eno is found on his 1975 album ‘Discreet 
Music’ in which he strove to create music that could be ‘listened to and yet could be 
ignored’.189 This reveals that the value lies in the function of the music, which he later 
articulates as that of a place of surrender. Thus, surrender in relation to ‘Discreet 
Music’, and indeed the computer-driven generative music to come, is one in which the 
role of the will is reoriented. This is accomplished in such a way that the music is not 
cognitively represented as such, but rather is accepted as an integral part of the 
environment. It becomes what Heidegger would term as ‘ready-to-hand’ 
[Zuhandenheit]190 in that it is engaged with rather than focused on as a separate 
object. 
Significantly, the processes which Eno employs to achieve this function contain a form 
of surrender within themselves. Eno seeks to create ‘situations and systems that, once 
set into operation, could create music with little or no intervention on my part’.191 As 
he favours the roles of ‘planner and programmer’ rather than ‘executor’, Eno can be 
seen to engage in a process whereby questions are put in place which generate their 
own answers.192 This allows Eno to join the audience in hearing the questions play out, 
which generates not only variety but also surprise.  
While ‘Discreet Music’ is an early precursor to the algorithm-driven generative music 
of 77 Million Paintings, it remains a ‘technological approach’193 to the fulfilment of the 
desire to remain a planner rather than an executor. Like Cage’s renunciation of making 
choices, Eno states, ‘It is a point of discipline to accept this passive role, and for once, 
to ignore the tendency to play the artist by dabbling and interfering’.194 Thus, the 
passivity involved in systems-based creativity involves the seemingly paradoxical 
choice of passivity, or the decision to not make further decisions. This ‘discipline’ could 
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be considered as a point of surrender whereby the action of the creator is a deliberate 
‘willing’ of ‘non-willing’.  
The second side of ‘Discreet Music’ contains the ‘Three Variations on the Canon in D 
Major by Johann Pachelbel’. The three track titles ‘ Fullness of Wind’, ‘French 
Catalogues’, and ‘Brutal Ardor’ are taken from the ‘charmingly inaccurate translation’ 
of the piece recorded by the orchestra of Jean Francois Pillard. This particular version 
of the work appeals to Eno due to is ‘unashamedly romantic rendition of a very 
systematic Renaissance canon’.195 In this sense, the dichotomy between emotionless 
systems and emotive performance is broken down in much the same way as the titles 
themselves broke down in translation.  
In these pieces, the emotive rendition is replicated by The Cockpit Ensemble and 
systematized, retaining aspects of both the system and the emotions. However, this 
process is merely a restatement of the original process, which contained its own 
inherent systematization. As Eno describes, ‘[T]he “system” is a group of performers 
with a set of instructions—and the “input” is the fragment of Pachelbel’.196 So while 
individual performers create variety within the original system, Eno questions both the 
score and the hierarchical control pattern from composer to performer which reveal 
additional variety. He describes the process: 
Each variation takes a small section of the score (two or four bars) as its 
starting point, and permutates the players' parts such that they overlay 
each other in ways not suggested by the original score. In ‘Fullness of 
Wind’ each player's tempo is decreased, the rate of decrease governed 
by the pitch of his instrument (bass=slow). ‘French Catalogues’ groups 
together sets of notes and melodies with time directions gathered from 
other parts of the score. In ‘Brutal Ardour’ each player has a sequence 
of notes related to those of the other players, but the sequences are of 
different lengths so that the original relationships quickly break 
down.197 
In this way, the original version is questioned; the systems employed in each section 
unfold to reveal their essence as they retain their individuality but display other 
aspects of themselves.  
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This process is technologized in the title track of ‘Discreet Music’, whereby two 
melodic phrases of varying length are fed through a synthesizer’s digital recall system. 
This signal is then run through a graphic equalizer and echo unit which alters timber. 
This result is recorded, which is then fed to a second tape recorder which mixes the 
signals and creates overlap. The technology employed does not determine the sound; 
rather, it enables variations to emerge which otherwise would be unachievable for 
human performs. The system itself does not represent a fixed input and output 
scenario, but rather represents points at which questions have been posed to the 
signals.  
Similarly, the generative software which produces 77 Million Paintings contains a set of 
parameters which act as these points of questioning. The software allows the user to 
define over 200 of these which include timbre, scale, harmony, rhythm, tempo, sound 
envelope, vibrato, and pitch range.198 Each setting could be considered a question such 
as, ‘What would it sound like with a slower tempo?’. As the software creates all 
possible varieties, the technology frees the music rather than controls it; it liberates it 
from time and space and allows itself to emerge in every possible variation. 
The original software used by Eno was developed by Tim and Peter Cole. He began 
using it in 1996 when he was impressed with its ability to produce music which closely 
mimicked that created by Eno himself. The creators stated that they ‘wanted to create 
a computer system which could affect you on an emotional level, by enhancing or 
filtering your perceptions, and provide ever-changing, eventually interactive music’.199 
As with Eno in his endeavour with Pachelbel’s Canon in D Major, Tim and Peter Cole 
knew that the emotional content was not a result of the human performers, but rather 
of the variety which they contributed.  
This software is significantly titled ‘Koan’, which is derived from a Zen Buddhist 
practice of questioning. In this system of questioning, the koan is a statement, story or 
question used by a Zen teacher to challenge and test the student. Significantly, the 
koan appears to be deliberately nonsensical to the logical, rational mind; it is designed 
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to be accessible through the intuition or lateral thinking. It can be used as a point of 
concentration during meditation, in which you commence to ‘making your whole body 
one great inquiry’.200 This is directly analogous to both surrender and Gelassenheit, as 
the will is reoriented from the role of representing to that of intuiting or waiting. This 
software is aptly named as it encourages this activity, despite being a product of 
technology.  
The Final Shift  
The process of defining surrender and Gelassenheit runs contrary to their essence; 
thus, we have followed the movements which comprise their mutual essence, as it is 
within the engaged process that their similarities arise. These lie both in the conditions 
necessary for them to arise and in the result they both produce; both surrender and 
Gelassenheit are processes in which the will is reoriented whereby one willingly 
transcends his or her sense of individuality. This is ultimately a reorientation toward 
the horizon, which in turn affects a reorientation toward the self and Being.  
 This reorientation of the will implicit in the process of surrender, as situated within 
the aesthetic encounter, is made particularly manifest in aesthetic processes which 
incorporate surrender in their own coming to presence. Therefore, I maintain that 
Eno’s generative music particularly elicits this response, as his process-led 
compositional style surrenders creative choices to a system which in turn invites a 
reciprocal surrender. This is reflected in his statement that ‘(l)istening to something is 
an act of surrender’.201  In this act, the subject-object relationship which comprises the 
traditional aesthetic relationship is transcended as the realm of passivity and activity is 
abandoned. A new comportment of receptivity is entered into which enables both a 
full engagement with the possibilities of the aesthetic encounter and also a way of 
approaching technology which remains open to further revealings.  
It is thus that subjectivity itself begins to undergo a shift; this might be characterized as 
the perceiver no longer experiencing a work of art, but instead undergoing an 
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experience in which he or she becomes part of the work of art experience. This shift 
indicates a specific moment in time in which one way of being falls away and another 
way of being takes over. This moment, as an inherently temporal point of focus, 
engages this subjective split and thus enables a further exploration of that which 
occurs between the work of art and the perceiver when the process is in motion. We 
thus turn toward the moment.  
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Gadamer: The Mediating Moment 
As we build upon the foundation Heidegger provided in the previous chapter, this chapter 
begins to explore temporality and how this operates in the work of art. How is it that we 
can have a new experience of time when we can only draw from our own experience of 
time in the first place? While staying with the linguistic structure implemented in the first 
chapter, we examine Gadamer’s terminology taken from his work Truth and Method 
which helps to elucidate how the work of art, as a foundational event, can transcend our 
subjectivity. His terminology is examined under the guiding concept of the moment, or 
an instant of time in which a temporal transformation occurs. Illustrative moments from 
both Heidegger and Eno demonstrate the kind of listening experience in which some form 
of mediation enacts a change which originates from outside of the perceiver’s 
subjectivity. Throughout the exposition of Gadamer’s terminology, we keep an eye 
toward its possible application to the conception of Eno’s 77 Million Paintings and the 
audience’s experience of it. This particular experience will serve as a basis, or original 
instance, of the larger principles in action during other possible generative music 
listening encounters. 
 
When Martin Heidegger was a young boy, he was often charged with the task of 
ringing the bells in the tower of the local Church of St. Martin, to which his father was 
sexton. While he and his younger brother, Fritz, performed many services and errands 
for the church, it was the bell-ringing which made a lasting impression and which 
Heidegger later recalls with glowing commemoration: 
The mysterious fugue...in which the church feasts, the days of vigil, and 
the passage of the seasons and the morning, midday, and evening hours 
of each day fitted into each other so that a continual ringing went 
through the young hearts, dreams, prayers, and games—it is this, 
probably, that conceals one of the most magical, most complete, and 
most lasting secrets of the tower.1 
Each of the seven bells in the tower had its own name, its own sound, and its own 
time’.2 The bells awoke the town, marked out church holidays, prayer times, school 
lessons; even their silence indicated a special time. The bells did not mete out time, 
however; they transformed it. The ‘continual ringing’ appropriated the awareness of 
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the townspeople into a unique temporality above and beyond what Heidegger would 
term ‘everydayness’. Thus, the bells demonstrate Heidegger’s insistence that 
philosophy is first about our attunement towards the world, or mood [Stimmung], 
prior to thought. It is perhaps this early emphasis on comportment as open 
relatedness that brings Heidegger not so much to explain his thought to us rather than 
lead us to experience it. This is because experience, like that of the child in the bell 
tower, is transformative.  
An experience which Eno had in 1979 led to his realization of a particular temporal 
lacking, or ‘conceptual poverty’,3 among the people in his social circle at that time. He 
attended a party in a multi-million dollar New York apartment which was hidden away 
in the heart of a slum. The extreme sense of disconnection between the poverty and 
luxury which literally bordered the same doorway gave rise to the realization that 
people’s sense of time and place was very limited; ‘here’ stopped just outside the front 
door of the luxury apartment and ‘now’ meant ‘this week’.4 As Eno recalls, ‘No one had 
any investment in any kind of future except their own, conceived in the narrowest 
terms’.5 Thus he wrote in his notebook after that experience, ‘More and more I find I 
want to be living in a Big Here and a Long Now’.6 This temporal awareness was 
reflected in the type of music he was beginning to create around the same time, which 
he describes as ‘suspended in an eternal present tense’.7 
Years later, a foundation would come to bear Eno’s temporal label as ‘The Long Now 
Foundation’, which seeks to ‘provide a counterpoint to today’s accelerating culture 
and help make long-term thinking more common’.8 The major project of the Long Now 
Foundation is the construction of a 65-foot high mechanical clock installed inside of a 
Texan mountain which will keep time for the next ten thousand years. As an ‘icon for 
long-term thinking’,9 the clock does not measure minutes and hours, but rather years, 
centuries, and millennia. As ten thousand years is roughly the time span of a 
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civilization, the clock is meant to encourage time consideration on this scale and 
expand our conception of ‘now’. Significantly, the bells of the clock are a product of 
Eno’s generative work, as their chimes will never repeat a melody over the ten 
thousand years. This is consistent with the primary focus of generative music which 
aims to transcend temporal limitations. 
As Stewart Brand, president of the Long Now Foundation, explains, the Greeks 
understood time in two different senses, kairos and chronos. While the latter is closest 
to our modern day conception meaning roughly ‘eternal or ongoing time’, the former 
was an ‘opportunity or the propitious moment’.10 As Brand explains, ‘Kairos is the time 
of cleverness, chronos the time of wisdom’.11 The distinction between cleverness and 
wisdom symbolizes the subtle shift in temporality that it is necessary to make in order 
to extend the ‘now’ into the ‘Long Now’.  
Hans-Georg Gadamer hears the same thing ringing from Heidegger’s bell tower and 
Eno’s clock chimes in the mountain. The festival time which he describes is not 
something that we enter, but rather something which enters us; it is a suspension of 
time in which the heightened moment brings to presence a unity of past and present. 
Festival time, for Gadamer, is ‘perhaps...the only way that is granted to us finite beings 
to relate to what we call eternity’.12 This unity is that with which Gadamer is most 
concerned in his hermeneutic project; understanding occurs only through bridging the 
temporal gap between the past and present, thus creating a fusion of horizons. As the 
work of art is the example par excellence of this process, the bell tower and clock 
chimes stand as Heidegger’s Greek temple as they demonstrate the temporal shift 
which transforms in manner or kind rather than direction. This shift allows us to 
become ready for listening as a transformational experience, one in which chronos 
becomes kairos and unending time becomes the eternal now. We become suspended 
in the infinitely musical present of festivity. 
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Time  
One could say that Gadamer’s festival arose directly from Heidegger’s bell tower, as he 
sought to both introduce and further develop Heidegger’s thought through his own 
work. As he explains, ‘My philosophical hermeneutics seeks precisely to adhere to the 
line of questioning of this essay [Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art”] and the 
later Heidegger and to make it accessible in a new way’.13 Thus, Heidegger’s work 
provided the foundation upon which Gadamer would build, particularly with regard to 
temporality and truth as they come to bear upon understanding. In delineating his 
aims, Gadamer states, ‘My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or 
what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and 
doing’.14 This focus firmly establishes Gadamer within the same transcendental 
phenomenological sphere as that of Heidegger’s Being and Time, as the very 
conditions of possibility take precedence over the relationships which arise 
secondarily.15 Thus, Gadamer’s ‘real concern’ is as intimately linked to temporality as 
that of Heidegger in Being and Time as the condition which makes possible our 
‘wanting and doing’.  
Gadamer thus carries forward Heidegger’s temporal conceptions. For Heidegger, 
Dasein’s understanding of itself is Being-towards-death [Sein-zum-Tode], and this 
understanding of Dasein’s most proper possibility serves as a temporalizing structure. 
Dasein ‘stretches along between birth and death’, as Heidegger explains.16 But Dasein 
does not merely ‘fill up a track or stretch “of life”’; rather, ‘the “between” which 
relates to birth and death already lies in the Being of Dasein’.17 In other words, 
Dasein’s Being is a temporalization as it ‘stretches itself’ along: 
[I]t is by no means the case that Dasein ‘is’ actual in a point of time, and 
that, apart from this, it is ‘surrounded’ by the non-actuality of its birth 
and death. Understood existentially, birth is not and never is something 
past in the sense of something no longer present-at-hand; and death is 
just as far from having the kind of Being of something still outstanding; 
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not yet present-at-hand but coming along. Factical Dasein exists as 
born; and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-
death. As long as Dasein factically exists, both the ‘ends’ and their 
‘between’ are, and they are in the only way which is possible on the 
basis of Dasein’s Being as care. Thrownness and that Being towards 
death in which one either flees it or anticipates it, form a unity; and in 
this unity birth and death are ‘connected’ in a manner characteristic of 
Dasein. As care, Dasein is the ‘between’.18 
Thus, the ‘stretching oneself along’ is ‘historicizing’, and it is through this movement 
that Dasein’s ‘connectedness of life’ or ‘self constancy’ becomes a way of Being for 
Dasein.19 
The self constancy or connectedness of Dasein’s movement [Bewegtheit] which 
stretches it along and constitutes the ‘who’ of Dasein is a process of perception. This is 
evident in the fact that Dasein’s experience of that which is real or actual is only the 
present ‘now’; Dasein ‘hops’ between the present-at-hand sequence of ‘nows’ which 
exist in time.20 The sense of connectedness arises from Dasein’s temporalising. Thus, 
defining the Self who remains constant despite these changing experiences becomes 
problematic. This is due to the nature of temporality, which ‘has different possibilities 
and different ways of temporalizing itself’.21 In this way, the Being ‘remains indefinite’ 
but appears to the temporalizing self as definite. This is consistent with Taoist and 
Buddhist conceptions of self, by which Heidegger was later influenced.  
The self can appear definite or achieve a sense of connectedness because the Being of 
Dasein becomes exhibited as care [Sorge]. Care exists as the primordial orientation or 
connecting structure between past, present and future. Within the structure of care, 
Dasein’s Being is a Being towards the world [seinzur Welt] without choosing to be so. 
In other words, Being does not exist as an entity which at times chooses to have a 
relationship with the world; rather, as Heidegger states,’[t]aking up relationships 
towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is’.22 
This facticity of Dasein’s situation is known as thrownness [Geworfenheit]. Thrownness 
is experienced by Dasein through Befindlichkeit, which is translated as ‘state-of-mind’ 
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or ‘findingness’.23 This forms our fundamental attunement, or mood [Stimmung], 
which discloses the ‘there’ and determines ‘how one is’.24 As Heidegger explains: 
Being has become manifest as a burden. Why that should be, one does 
not know. And Dasein cannot know anything of the sort because the 
possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a 
way compared with the primordial disclosure belong to moods, in which 
Dasein is brought before its Being as ‘there’.25 
Our attunement is thus finding ourselves in a certain state of mind; our understanding 
is oriented by way of this attunement.26 However, we are unable to conceptualize why 
this is so, as attunement exists prior to cognition as such. In this way, a mood is not 
something which Dasein possesses, nor is it to be confused with an emotional state; 
rather, it is a fundamental way in which Dasein is disclosed to being itself. It is the 
mode of receptivity prior to any thought regarding Dasein’s Being-there. As Heidegger 
describes, ‘Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been 
delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being 
which, in existing, it has to be’.27 In this way, the state-of-mind ‘implies a disclosive 
submission to the world’.28 It is the way in which Dasein ‘constantly surrenders itself to 
the “world” and lets the “world” “matter” to it in such a way that somehow Dasein 
evades its very self’.29 During this constant surrendering, there occurs a self-forgetting; 
this is reminiscent of, and was perhaps rethought by Heidegger as Gelassenheit, which 
can be seen as a re-alignment of the will which thus affects attunement. 
As our various attunements are ‘fleeting experiences which “colour” one’s whole 
“psychical condition”’,30 they are temporally distinctive. As Heidegger states, ‘Moods 
temporalize themselves—that is, their specific ecstasis belongs to a future and a 
Present in such a way, indeed, that these equiprimordial ecstasies are modified by 
having been’.31 Thus, the basic character of mood ‘lies in bringing one back to 
something’.32 This reflects the nature of temporality, which is not ‘an entity which first 
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emerges from itself’, but rather is the ‘primordial “outside-of-itself” in and for itself’.33 
As temporality is ‘a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases’,34 it is the way 
in which these ecstases are temporally united which gives rise to Dasein’s orientation 
toward the present and thus its attunement. In this process, it is the authentic 
temporalizing of the future which awakens the Present. A series of infinite ‘nows’ is 
considered to be an inauthentic temporalizing.35 
The way in which we experience the ‘now’ is thus intimately linked with our 
attunement. Despite the fact that this temporalizing as mood exists on a level prior to 
our cognition, one can and should master mood, according to Heidegger. This is done 
only through replacing one mood with another; as ‘we are never free of moods’.36 
Thus, this re-attunement inherently involves a temporal transformation which will re-
orient Dasein toward Being through a transcendence of both time and self. While 
Heidegger does not address music directly, attunement, or Stimmung, naturally 
suggests music, as it not only denotes the tuning of a musical instrument, but also 
reflects an interpretive way to ‘”listen” in to some previously disclosed entity as 
regards it Being’.37 Similarly, while there are various moods through which Dasein can 
be disclosed, the moods which Heidegger selects to examine the meaning of our 
fundamental situation are not those ‘in tune’, but those ‘out of tune’ or ‘out of sorts’, 
such as fear and anxiety which reveal Being as a burden. Therefore, I argue that a re-
attunement of our disclosive listening in to Being suggests the temporally 
transformative properties of sound.  
For Eno, Heidegger and Gadamer, art serves as a site at which this transformation can 
occur. This transformation involves a transcendence of our ordinary experience of 
time; our sense of temporal continuity is interrupted, reoriented and reconstituted. 
Like the process of Gelassenheit, however, this temporal transformation is not enacted 
from out of ourselves or our will; rather, the ringing of the church bells and clock 
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chimes become mediators between differing states of temporal awareness. Thus, art 
constitutes a site or event at and through which subjectivity is transcended.38 
How can that which is experienced subjectively transcend subjectivity? The answer lies 
in the work of art as origin, as previously discussed with regard to ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’. For Heidegger, the work of art is an instance of phusis, or ‘the arising of 
something from out of itself’,39 which provides a ground or ‘foundational event’ during 
which ‘the work is no longer experienced out of the ground of the spectator’s 
subjective feelings and experience’.40 As truth is set to work within the work, it 
becomes the mode of being of the work itself. We are appropriated to this event of 
truth as we enter the clearing of openness created through the process of strife. In this 
way, we encounter truth directly and originally. Like the Greek temple which ‘gathers 
around itself the unity’41 of the various ways of being for the Greeks and thus makes 
truth present, so too do the chimes and bells inaugurate the presence and unity of 
their foundational temporalities.  
Gadamer finds this foundational occurrence to be problematic, however, as it presents 
a lack of temporal continuity. How can one experience the temple or the ringing bells 
as a distinct, original event when it is our own historicality with which we are being 
confronted? As Dasein only experiences time through its own reference points of birth 
and death, there exists no super-historical state from which to form a new temporality. 
Gadamer explains this as a ‘misunderstanding of Heidegger’s ontological exposition of 
the time horizon’, as ‘people treat Dasein’s existential, historical temporality, 
determined by care and the movement towards death—i.e., radical finitude—as one 
among many possible ways of understanding existence, and they forget that it is the 
mode of being of understanding itself which is here revealed as temporality’.42 For 
Gadamer, understanding is not one activity among many that being engages in; rather, 
understanding is a mode of being which is always already inherently grounded in 
temporality. In other words, temporality is the sense of Dasein’s own being. As 
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Heidegger expresses, time is the horizon through which the question of being can be 
asked.  
Thus, Gadamer seeks to explain this apparent experiential discontinuity without 
denying the very discontinuity which is intrinsic to the aesthetic experience as an 
event. He seeks to place the discontinuity within the everyday, continual experience of 
the perceiver while honouring the transcendence of subjectivity with which he 
concurs. Understanding itself is an event of which the experience of art is the 
‘exemplary illustration’.43As the work of art is an Ereignis, or event, which 
‘appropriates’ us to itself, the event of transcendence takes on a mediated character. It 
is through this mediation that the experience reaches continuity with our everyday 
temporal consciousness. Gadamer describes this temporal, transcendent event 
through the illustration of a festival. 
The Festival 
The outstanding attribute of the festival is that it ‘possesses its own sort of 
temporality’.44 Gadamer states that ‘the mystery of festive celebration lies in this 
suspension of time’.45 This suspension occurs as each recurrent celebration is 
simultaneously unique and repeatable, such as an annual Christmas celebration which 
occurs at a unique point in time but makes contemporary the two thousand year-old 
birth of Jesus.46 It also serves as ‘something uplifting which raises the participants out 
of their everyday existence and elevates them into a kind of universal communion’.47 
The value is not simply negative, however. We are not only lifted out of our everyday 
lives, but also granted the opportunity to commune in a ‘heightened moment’ which 
exceeds specific tasks or purposes. In this way, the festival is a kind of creation which 
Gadamer compares to a cultic ceremony, which is an analogy likely to be 
misunderstood: 
There is a widespread prejudice among the general public that the 
essence of all cultic ceremony is to be understood and described in 
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terms of magical practices...It is an account that fails to perceive that 
the original and still vital essence of festive celebration is creation and 
elevation into a transformed state of being. Anyone who is involved in 
the regular practice of the particular form of worship we have described 
as cultic celebration knows what a festival really is...Cultic 
ceremony...represents a genuine creation: something drawn from 
within ourselves takes shape before our eyes in a form that we 
recognize and experience as a more profound presentation of our own 
reality.48 
The cultic ceremony thus encompasses not only rituals from pagan antiquity, but also 
includes the Catholic Mass and even theatre. They all possess a ‘cosmic rhythm’ which 
elevates it above normal time.49 Unlike the perception Gadamer wishes to dispel, this 
‘cosmic rhythm’ or ‘heightened moment’, which shall be discussed later, is not 
attributed to divine favour or magical manipulation. Instead, the elevated, 
transformed state of being is brought about through the very nature of play and its 
transformational quality whereby the participant becomes player. 
The transformation occurs between two fundamental ways of experiencing time as 
distinguished by Gadamer. The first sense of time he refers to is ‘empty time’, which 
denotes time experienced in the usual sense of a divisible, measured structure which 
needs to be filled. In empty time we experience the two extremes of ‘bustle and 
boredom’,50 both of which represent time as something to be either spent or awaited. 
The temporal structure of empty time readily reflects the representational 
characteristics of enframing; time is measured and projected within consciousness 
with direct relation to the will and its calculative ends. The second sense of time is that 
of ‘fulfilled’ or ‘autonomous’ time. This is the time of the festival, which by nature 
‘fulfills every moment of its duration’.51 Autonomous time is not specific to the festival 
or work of art; we are most familiar with it through the process of aging. The 
continuous temporal flow forms our experience of life while simultaneously containing 
discontinuous points at which we become suddenly aware that age has occurred.52 
These points of discontinuity are the ‘heightened moments’ which enable the 
temporal transformation. While the resulting autonomous time is both unique to and 
                                               
48 Gadamer, Relevance, 60. (italics mine) 
49 Ibid., 60. 
50 Ibid., 42. 
51 Ibid., 42. 
52 Ibid., 42. 
91 
 
shared by everyone, it becomes communal at the point during which the festival 
‘proffers’ time by ‘arresting it and allowing it to tarry’.53 During the temporal state of 
tarrying, Gadamer explains that ‘the calculating way in which we normally manage and 
dispose of our time is, as it were, brought to a standstill’.54 Tarrying, therefore, is not 
merely a distinct temporal relationship with which we approach the festival; rather, it 
is an outward demonstration that the process of play is occurring.   
Summarily, the festival represents a suspension of time which occurs by way of a 
temporal transformation; two ways of temporalizing coexist in one moment and as a 
result the participant feels temporarily suspended in a continuous ‘now’. This seeming 
split in our time affects the way in which we experience our being, and thus enables a 
subjective shift to occur. The temporality of the ‘now’ moment is one of tarrying, 
which ceases to exist as a subjective experience and instead occurs when play has 
overtaken the subject with its own unique way of being. 
 Play 
Play is the mode of operation of the transformation; we do not enact it, but rather it 
comes over us during the event of the work of art. In other words, play is ‘the mode of 
being of the work of art itself’.55 It is a separate entity from the perceiver who is 
overtaken by it, and this brings about a shift in subjectivity. In this way, the manner in 
which Gadamer uses the term ‘play’ differs from the way in which Kant and most 
aestheticians and philosophers have used it. When Gadamer employs the term, it is 
used to reference an experience of art which is not purely subjective; it does not refer 
to the activity of the creator of the work, his or her state of mind, or that of the one 
perceiving the work. He dismisses these notions of confrontation between 
consciousness and an object as being far too simplified to describe accurately the 
process which occurs during play. Furthermore, in his discussion of play, Gadamer 
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employs the term to describe both the player of a game and a perceiver of art, which 
he essentially views as one and the same entity. 
When play is used in reference to the aesthetic experience, it is not meant to minimize 
the seriousness with which we approach the work of art. On the contrary, play and 
seriousness are inherently linked; we label someone a ‘spoilsport’ who does not take 
the game seriously, as Gadamer points out.56 In this way, that which is serious both 
elicits play and gives play its purpose. As Gadamer explains, ‘[P]lay itself contains its 
own, even sacred, seriousness. Yet in playing, all those purposive relations that 
determine active and caring existence have not simply disappeared, but are curiously 
suspended...Play fulfills its purpose only if the player loses himself in play’.57 Thus, like 
the cultic ceremony, play exhibits a similar sacredness within the aesthetic encounter, 
as this too is a ‘creation and elevation into a transformed state of being’.58 
As a process of creation and transformation, whether during a game or experiencing a 
work of art, play cannot be examined by way of an exploration of subjectivity, as it lies 
outside of it as such and has its own unique mode of being. Instead, Gadamer insists 
that it is ‘the experience of art and thus the question of the mode of being of the work 
of art that must be the object of our examination’.59 In other words, art is the site at 
which play takes over the perceiver subjectively, and this is the intersection on which 
he focuses. Within the Kantian aesthetic tradition, only the way in which the work 
played on our cognitive faculties was considered, thus producing an aesthetics of 
subjectivity. Additionally, some post-Kantians focused only on the work, leaving the 
spectator and creator virtually invisible. Gadamer explains a more precise and fruitful 
way of viewing the relationship between the work of art, the viewer, and most 
importantly, the dynamics in between, where the art is ‘not an object that stands over 
against a subject for itself’.60 Rather, he describes: 
Instead the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an 
experience that changes the person who experiences it. The ‘subject’ of 
the experience of art, that which remains and endures, is not the 
subjectivity of the person who experiences it but the work itself. This is 
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the point at which the mode of being of play becomes significant. For 
play has its own essence, independent of the consciousness of those 
who play.61 
Play, therefore, is not limited to subjectivity, as it has its own fundamental nature. In 
fact, as Gadamer points out, ‘The players are not the subjects of play; instead play 
merely reaches presentation...through the players’.62 Play is therefore something that 
emerges when it has a medium through which to act as opposed to being something 
that is merely performed. While Gadamer will speak of performance as a type of play, 
this phenomenon still holds true. He reiterates that ‘play is not to be understood as 
something a person does...the actual subject of play is obviously not the subjectivity of 
an individual who, among other activities, also plays but is instead the play itself’.63 
This once again takes the focus away from subjectivity and the player and instead 
emphasizes the sole importance of the action of play. It is with this in mind that 
Gadamer begins his examination of play as play, and not merely as one of many 
actions that one performs which thus deemphasizes the unique character of play as a 
distinctive entity. 
Gadamer’s conceptual analysis on play examines the concept in the ‘so-called 
metaphorical senses’.64 This approach naturally lends itself to works of art as the play 
of sensations is metaphorical as well, such as the play of light, the play of sound, and 
so on. As Gadamer points out, ‘In each case what is intended is to-and-fro movement 
that is not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end’.65  This statement seems 
counterintuitive when one considers a game in which the object is to win, which would 
thus bring it to an end. However, in reality it is the game that is played and that which 
has an end, and not the playing in and of itself. Gadamer reiterates as he states, ‘The 
movement of playing...renews itself in constant repetition. The movement of 
backward and forward is obviously so central to the definition of play that it makes no 
difference who or what performs this movement’.66 Once again, it is the game which is 
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being played, as well as the players, and it is these which serve as the medium for play. 
In this sense, ‘all playing is a being-played’.67 
Another significant characteristic of play is that, like the festival, it is communal in a 
sense; one cannot have a game alone. This is directly related to the forward and 
backward or to and fro motion of play. Gadamer states, ‘In order for there to be a 
game, there always has to be, not necessarily literally another player, but something 
else with which the player plays and which automatically responds to his move with a 
countermove’.68 Thus, the play that occurs in the encounter with the work of art 
requires some explanation regarding the structure which perpetuates this to-and-fro 
movement. This is accomplished through the discussion of games. 
The Game 
The game is a particularly appropriate illustration with which to examine the notion of 
play and the work of art, for just as no two works of art are the same, neither are two 
games identical in object or spirit.  This is due to the fact that ‘the to-and-fro 
movement that constitutes the game is patterned in various ways. The particular 
nature of a game lies in the rules and regulations that prescribe the way the field of 
the game is filled. This is true universally, whenever there is a game’.69 Therefore, 
there is a determinant structure within which the movement of the game is limited, or 
a boundary which prohibits the game to be spatially all-inclusive.  Within this given 
space, however, the player may choose how to move in order to interact with the 
other player or responsive object.  
Despite being unique with regard to its patterns, every game shares the characteristic 
of having a task.70 This reiterates the fact that play necessitates a medium and thus 
‘playing is always a playing of something’.71 The game, which has a specific task and is 
demarcated into a specific space, draws the player to alter his or her behaviour in 
alignment with the game. If one solves the task at hand or wins the game, it may be 
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said that this ‘presents it’.72 Thus, Gadamer states that ‘[p]lay is really limited to 
presenting itself. Thus its mode of being is self-presentation’.73 He goes on to signify 
the importance of this concept when he states that ‘[f]irst and foremost, play is self-
presentation’.74 
The act of play’s self-presentation during the game is such that, although the player is 
engaged in ‘make believe goals’ while participating in the game, it does not matter 
whether or not these goals or tasks are accomplished.75 In fact, Gadamer states that 
‘[o]nly because play is always presentation is human play able to make representation 
itself the task of a game’.76 There is no representation without a first presentation. This 
presentation is ‘potentially a representation for someone’.77 Representation inherently 
requires another player or observer in order to represent; if there is not a viewer then 
the representation remains itself and without the ability to present. This is another 
indispensable characteristic of play, as ‘[t]he directedness proper to all representation 
comes to the fore here and is constitutive of the being of art’.78 
Unlike art, games are not always presented to spectators, but rather for the players to 
move toward the achievement of a task or goal in self-representation as they are 
‘played’ by the game. Yet when it is indeed an art work rather than a game, such as in 
the performance of a play which is aimed at an audience, the audience is not a 
detached, invisible entity merely viewing the performance. Rather, in the performance 
of the play it is as if ‘the world of play lets down one of its walls’.79 It is in this situation 
where the best representation of a character is the one closest to self-presentation, or 
where the to and fro movement between the character being played and the player 
who performs it reaches its peak. The absence of one of the walls operates as more of 
a presence as such, as it marks out the open space for the completion of its territory. 
This space itself becomes transformative, as ‘it is not really the absence of a fourth 
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wall that turns the play into a show. Rather the openness toward the spectator is part 
of the closedness of the play. The audience only completes what the play as such is’.80 
The concept of the audience forming a fourth wall demonstrates that play is ‘a process 
that takes place “in between”’.81 The performed play even exists as a game in the 
sense that it has delineated boundaries that exist in the stage and the performers with 
the audience marking the end of the interior, and the performers delivering 
representations to the audience. However, in this instance a crucial change takes place 
in that ‘[i]t puts the spectator in the place of the player. He—and not the player—is the 
person for and in whom the play is played’.82 A transformation of the audience has 
occurred as they become absorbed in another world set up by the play. The play is 
intended to act as reality, and in doing so ‘the game is raised, as it were, to its 
ideality’.83 In this way the actual substance of the play is played out and becomes 
meaningful for the spectator and performer alike. This process can take place without 
an audience, as it often does in a gallery or museum setting, during which it is the 
viewer who is transformed. This is due to the fact that ‘[a]rtistic presentation, by its 
nature, exists for someone, even if there is no one there who merely listens or 
watches’.84  
Transformation into Structure 
This process of change is what Gadamer terms as ‘transformation into structure’. It is 
in this process that ‘human play comes to its true consummation in being art’.85 The 
process of play now has its own unique appearance and can be repeated. This holds 
true for compositions which feature aleatory components, such as that of generative 
music; an autonomous structure is achieved by way of the manifestation during 
transformation, and the structure thus becomes repeatable. The transformation has 
brought absolute autonomy to play.86 
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As the transformation is not limited to the subjective bounds of the player, the 
transformation is distinct from a mere alteration. During an alteration, the initial entity 
is changed in some way but remains as the same entity. A transformation, however, 
changes an entity into an entirely different being. Thus, when he describes a 
transformation into structure, Gadamer is expressing that something which was 
previously in existence now is not, and ‘what now exists, what represents itself in the 
play of art, is the lasting and true’.87 The individual identities of the parts in the process 
do not make up the whole; rather, they have disappeared entirely. It is only the whole 
that remains. Thus, the performance of the play is now a distinct object of sorts which 
is entirely self-supporting. Gadamer explains that ‘[t]his gives what we called 
transformation into structure its full meaning. The transformation is a transformation 
into the true’.88 It is the presentation of play that ‘produces and brings to light what is 
otherwise constantly hidden and withdrawn’.89   
The transformation into structure illustrates the relationship between reality and play 
in a unique way. As Gadamer explains: 
The being of all play is always self-realization, sheer fulfilment, energeia 
which has its telos within itself. The world of the work of art, in which 
play expresses itself fully in the unity of its course, is in fact a wholly 
transformed world. In and through it everyone recognizes that that is 
how things are. Thus the concept of transformation characterizes the 
independent and superior mode of being of what we call structure. 
From this viewpoint ‘reality’ is defined as what is untransformed, and 
art as the raising up...of this reality into its truth.90   
This excerpt demonstrates the contingency of revealed truth upon recognition of the 
autonomy of the transformed structure. This recognition of ‘how things are’ is 
significant in that reality ‘always stands on a horizon’ which involves many 
opportunities toward a resolution or end. This futural orientation is consistent with 
Heidegger’s notion of attunement; the view from the horizon is always that of 
uncertainty. By definition, this uncertainty is always already just behind the horizon as 
the future is only capable of one resolution despite the inevitable existence of many 
                                               
87 Gadamer, Truth, 111. 
88 Ibid., 112. 
89 Ibid., 112. 
90 Ibid., 112. 
98 
 
desires or expectations.  Thus, the playing out of possibilities, both in art and reality, 
eventually comes around full circle. This process subsequently closes this circle of 
possibilities and thus exposes the meanings therein.  
The concept of recognition within art can be traced to classical art theory, ‘which bases 
all art on the idea of mimesis, imitation’.91 This is reminiscent of Kant, who described 
the beautiful as being representational in as much as it is tied to nature; the landscape 
portrait which exemplifies dependent beauty is representing nature. Prior to Kant, 
however, Aristotle recognized imitation as the basis of art through dancing as ‘the 
representation of the divine’.92 The relationship between imitation and representation 
is demonstrated by Gadamer in the instance of a child’s initial play which is by nature 
imitative. The child dressing up in a disguise is performing an imitative act; he does not 
want to be recognized as himself but only for the representation to exist and be 
recognized. As he explains, ‘When a person imitates something, he allows what he 
knows to exist and to exist in the way that he knows it’.93 Representation, therefore, 
involves first a conception of the thing represented, and secondly an act of imitation 
which reveals the way in which the representation is individually conceived. Thus, ‘the 
cognitive import of imitation lies in recognition’.94 
Gadamer’s conception of the relationship between recognition and the work of art 
differs from the traditional aesthetic encounter in which beauty is recognized. For 
Kant, this occurs through the notion of genius in which the imagination and 
understanding are united. The reception of an artistic idea becomes contingent upon 
the gift of its delivery. For Gadamer, however, the skill of the performer or player is 
only of secondary interest to the perceiver; instead, ‘what we experience in a work of 
art and what invites our attention is how true it is –i.e., to what extent one knows and 
recognizes something and oneself’.95 While Gadamer’s conception retains the play of 
faculties and cognition, it is directed instead toward self-recognition in the work and 
the truth which resonates from this process. However, recognition in and of itself does 
not serve as sufficient instigation for this artistic interaction, as merely recognizing 
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something does not impart a new concept or truth, but rather only serves as a 
reminder for what is already known.96 There exists a pleasure which is derived from 
self-recognition in the work, however, and the generation of interest in the work on 
the part of the spectator is ignited here.  
Representation 
An essential function for both play and the self-recognition involved in the revealing of 
truth thus becomes representation, for ‘[w]ith regard to knowledge of the true, the 
being of the representation is more than the being of the thing represented’.97 In 
previous aesthetic thought going back to Plato, this is thought to occur due to the 
absence of surroundings from the being of the thing represented which consequently 
illuminates its true essence for the spectator. The various circumstances and variables 
surrounding the thing which is represented results in the contingency of the original 
being while the representation appears as more than what it represents by way of 
presenting less. Following in this line of thought, classical thought proclaims that 
‘[i]mitation and representation are not merely a repetition, a copy, but knowledge of 
the essence...They contain in themselves an essential relation for everyone for whom 
the representation exists’.98 Presumably, the stripping of the original thing represented 
allows for more universal cognitive relations to the representation and allowed for the 
access for the spectator to the true essence of the thing.  
This process presents in Platonic thought ‘an insuperable ontological difference 
between the one thing that is a likeness and other that it seeks to resemble’.99 This 
distance between the spectator and the thing represented the space for both imitation 
and representation to exist which could place the spectator ‘in the third rank’100 from 
the original for Plato. Gadamer explains that this process of imitation as representation 
was significant enough to be considered ‘knowledge of the essence’ until it lost its 
force in contrast to the idea of reality as proposed by modern science.101 For this 
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reason, Gadamer points out his reason for beginning his examination with play and 
why the previous ideology associated with the aesthetic consciousness is insufficient: 
The work of art cannot simply be isolated from the ‘contingency’ of the 
chance conditions in which it appears, and where this kind of isolation 
occurs, the result is an abstraction that reduces the actual being of the 
work. It itself belongs to the world to which it represents itself. A drama 
really exists only when it is played, and ultimately music must resound. 
My thesis, then, is that the being of art cannot be defined as an object 
of an aesthetic consciousness because, on the contrary, the aesthetic 
attitude is more than it knows of itself. It is a part of the event of being 
that occurs in presentation, and belongs essentially to play as play.102 
Thus, the notion of the process of recognition bringing forth the knowledge of essence 
through simplification and amplification during representation is clearly not sufficient 
as a methodology for the derivation of truth from art. This method leaves the 
spectator to fill in the absent parts which were considered contingencies with what he 
or she already knows instead of participating in the play of presentation which imparts 
new knowledge through occurring as a new, singular event.     
Gadamer’s thesis which characterizes the being of art as not belonging to aesthetic 
consciousness but rather to play during the event of presentation brings up a new 
question regarding the ontological state of art. Gadamer has illustrated the location of 
play, but not what the work is in the proper sense of the word, as play is unable to 
realize itself without being played despite the fact that it possesses its own autonomy 
and being during presentation. This inquiry involves further examination of Gadamer’s 
transformation into structure and an examination into the temporality of this process. 
Gadamer reiterates his concept of transformation into structure as this is ultimately 
the transformation into the true. He states that ‘[p]lay is structure—this means that 
despite its dependence on being played it is a meaningful whole which can be 
repeatedly presented as such and the significance of which can be understood. But 
structure is also play, because—despite this theoretical unity—it achieves its full being 
only each time it is played’.103 The examination of the dependent and reciprocal 
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relationship between play and structure provides the vantage point from which the 
process of play can be seen as the mode of being of the art work itself. 
Double Mimesis 
There exists a differentiation between that which is performed by the player and the 
actual performance or delivery of the work by the player. What is intended by the 
performance is cognizable by the audience as the actual material as such, but so too is 
the delivery by the player as a separate entity, although the delivery and the material 
occur simultaneously and are mutually dependent. This is to say that ‘the poet’s 
creativity or the actor’s prowess as such are not foregrounded’ from what is imitated 
in imitation, but rather are secondary in nature.104 The audience is able to distinguish 
this phenomenon that Gadamer terms as ‘double mimesis’. This double mimesis or 
sort of imitation by an imitator is also one entity which ‘brings into existence...what 
the play itself requires. The double distinction between a play and its subject matter 
and a play and its performance corresponds in a double non-distinction as the unity of 
the truth which one recognizes in the play of art’.105 
The process of double mimesis and the unity therein form the structure through which 
the work both comes into being as a whole and is expressed through the nature of 
play. Despite the necessity of the player(s) during this process, the structure ‘does not 
remain enclosed in the subjectivity of what they think, but it is embodied there. Thus it 
is not a question of a mere subjective variety of conceptions, but of the work’s own 
possibilities of being that emerge as the work explicates itself, as it were, in the variety 
of its aspects’.106 In this statement, Gadamer refutes subjectivity as encompassing the 
structure of the work, but recognizes that variations of the work come to be 
exemplified within subjectivity. Thus, the work presents possibilities of its own which 
differs from Kant’s genius theory in which the performer or composer essentially 
interprets the work and then relates a meaning in a seemingly singular directional 
flow.  
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Double mimesis thus presents ‘the forms and the action itself’107 of the work, and 
comprises the recognizable element for the actor and spectator alike. For double 
mimesis exists as a unity, in which ‘the same thing...comes to existence in each 
case’.108 This is a unique characteristic of the performing arts, as Gadamer explains 
that the works are ‘explicitly left open to such re-creation and thus visibly hold the 
identity and continuity of the work of art open toward the future’.109 The opportunity 
for re-creation is not endless, however, as Gadamer states that this ‘would not do 
justice to the binding nature of the work, which imposes itself on every interpreter 
immediately, in its own way, and does not allow him to make things easy for himself by 
simply imitating a model’.110 
Contemporaneity 
Part of the temporally transformative power of the work comes not only from the 
continuously renewed action presented in play as double mimesis, but also from the 
simultaneously historical and futural situation of the work. As Gadamer describes 
works that ‘stretch out of a past into the present as enduring monuments’,111 we are 
reminded of Dasein’s situation as a stretching between birth and death. This 
coexistence of past and futural orientations does not objectify the work as an historical 
object, however, for ‘[a]s long as they still fulfill their function, they are 
contemporaneous with every age’.112 There always remains an original trace of the 
function of the work and it holds its own origin even if it has been displaced.113 A work 
of art in a gallery is still a work of art to be viewed, despite being placed amongst 
others, however dissimilar they might be. The work ‘affirms itself...by ‘killing’ other 
things or using them to complement itself’ and yet ‘is still part of itself’.114 Thus, the 
work of art does not evolve or change over time to the point of no longer existing as 
itself; all of these changes ‘belong to it’ and ‘are all contemporaneous with it’.115 
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Interpretive contemporaneity, therefore, raises the question as to what sort of 
temporality most appropriately correlates to the work of art itself. The general 
philosophical answer is that of timelessness, as Gadamer points out.116 However, the 
concept of timelessness is problematic in that it is ‘primarily only a dialectical feature 
which arises out of temporality and in contrast with it’.117 As Gadamer explains: 
Even if one tries to define the temporality of the work of art by speaking 
of two kinds of temporality, a historical and a suprahistorical one,...one 
cannot move beyond a dialectical antithesis between the two. The 
suprahistorical, ‘sacred’ time, in which the ‘present’ is not the fleeting 
moment but the fullness of time, is described from the point of view of 
‘existential temporality’...The inadequacy of this kind of antithesis 
emerges when one inevitably discovers that ‘true time’ projects into 
historical existential ‘appearance time’.118 
As previously discussed, a contrast arises between the existence of a work of art in a 
sacred time and one of historicity. A sacred time, as distinct from historical time, would 
infer that the work of art exists in a time which starts from a biblical standpoint of time 
arising from divine revelation and from an omnipotent temporal perspective. This sort 
of analogical timelessness ‘obscures the real problem, which does not lie in the 
artwork’s being removed from time but in its temporality’.119 Thus, the antithesis 
discussed serves to only pose the question again while this time foregrounding 
continuity, for ‘it is precisely continuity that every understanding of time has to 
achieve, even when it is a question of the temporality of a work of art’.120 
Return of the Festival 
As Gadamer stated earlier, play is dependent upon and inseparable from its 
presentation during which ‘the unity and identity of a structure emerge’.121 Thus it 
holds true that the entity which is presented as presentation and through presentation 
remains itself no matter how many changes it endures. It can be repeated numerous 
times and yet every repetition remains ‘as original as the work itself’.122 Therefore, the 
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character of the work of art exemplifies a different sort of temporality than is 
expounded philosophically with regard to people. We thus return to the illustration of 
the festival which maintains a unique identity and function despite its separate 
occurrences. Change is inherently part of the festival’s continuity with itself. As such, 
the festival exists as and exemplifies ‘an entity that exists only by always being 
something different [and] is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that 
belongs to history. It has its being only in becoming and return’.123 
This radically temporal event transforms the spectator as he or she becomes part of 
the presentation through his or her presence and participation. As he or she is both 
present as oneself and as part of the work that is the festival, being present ‘has the 
character of being outside oneself’.124 Gadamer makes this clear as he states: 
In fact, being outside oneself is the positive possibility of being wholly 
within something else. This kind of being present is a self-forgetfulness, 
and to be a spectator consists in giving oneself in self-forgetfulness to 
what one is watching. Here self-forgetfulness is anything but a private 
condition, for it arises from devoting one’s full attention to the matter 
at hand, and this is the spectator’s own positive accomplishment’.125 
It is the spectator who is fully present to the work and not to himself or herself who 
becomes part of the presentation. It is by way of this self-forgetfulness that 
comtemporaneity, to summarize Gadamer, is a task for consciousness and is not 
merely something which is presented or given to consciousness. The achievement of 
this task is demanded, and total presence replaces all mediation.126 
The Moment 
During self-forgetfulness, there exists a space or distance at which the spectator exists. 
This space prohibits practical participation in the task which is demanded of the 
spectator. However, this distance or space is ‘aesthetic distance in a true sense’ as it 
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thus allows the spectator a true vantage point for viewing. The moment for ‘a genuine 
and comprehensive participation’127 is now revealed. Gadamer describes this moment: 
What unfolds before us is so much lifted out of the ongoing course of 
the ordinary world and so much enclosed in its own autonomous circle 
of meaning that no one is prompted to seek some other future or reality 
behind it...A spectator’s ecstatic self- forgetfulness corresponds to his 
continuity with himself. Precisely that in which one loses oneself as a 
spectator demands that one grasp the continuity of meaning. For it is 
the truth of our own world... that is presented before us and in which 
we recognize ourselves.128 
This process which involves the creator, player, and spectator does not exist as apart 
from the real or outside world of this circle of meaning which is occurring. Instead, it is 
always grounded in the world of the player and spectator, and it is to this world that 
‘he comes to belong...more fully by recognizing himself more profoundly in it’.129 To 
lose oneself in something and come away with a different sense of self in the world is 
perhaps the point of connection for the ‘continuity of meaning which links the work of 
art with the existing world’130 and the one involved in the self-forgetfulness which 
enables a shared but divergent unity with the world by way of the work.  
The moment is thus the point of temporal synthesis between time which is everyday 
and time which is eternal. This moment of contemporaneity is the Kierkegaardian 
concept of Augenblick or ‘moment of vision’131 which both Heidegger and Gadamer 
adopt. For Heidegger, this ‘present’ moment is an authentic one which can’t be 
clarified in terms of the ‘now’ [dem Jetzt],132 as the ‘now’ exists within time and the 
moment exists above time. In the moment of vision ‘nothing can occur’, and in this 
way it ‘permits us to encounter for the first time what can be ‘in a time’ as ready-to-
hand or present-at-hand’.133 The moment ‘temporalizes itself...in terms of the 
authentic future’.134 We are thus able to undergo a temporal transformation because 
of this discontinuous moment which breaks with the past, orients us toward the 
future, but seems suspended above the present. Gadamer describes it as an 
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experience which ‘is not the ordinary, so-called glossing-over...but the raising of 
oneself above the historical stream of time which is constantly varying and washing 
away all fixed limitations and contours. That something suddenly stands still and 
remains standing still seems to help the truth to speak.’135 This is the point at which 
mediation is replaced with total presence and both temporal transformation and 
continuity are made contemporaneous.  
Conclusion 
As Eno rightly states, ‘When we know a moment is unique, we look at things 
differently’.136 But how is this uniqueness signalled to us? How do we know to stop in 
the moment, or indeed which moment to stop in? Perhaps this is best illustrated by 
Eno himself in a moment of distinct kairos, during which he conceived of his generative 
work 77 Million Paintings as an installation for the home. This moment occurred as he 
walked past ‘a rather posh house...with a great big huge screen on the wall and a 
dinner party going on’.137 Eno describes his revelation: 
Where there would have been a painting on the wall, there was this big, 
black screen and it looked kind of ugly and stupid. I could see exactly 
the problem: You're not going to have the TV on when you're having a 
dinner party. There's nothing on TV that you would want to have 
showing in a situation like that. ... I thought you need a painting there. 
But you need a painting that is of now, something that does have 
movement.138 
 The recognition of the potential ‘for having something really beautiful going on’139 
came to Eno as he stood at a distance. As such, he was already outside of the temporal 
flow of the dinner party guests, and this afforded him the moment of recognition. 
However, in order to both enter into their temporal consciousness and transform it, he 
would necessarily need to occupy the black screen; the movement must take on a 
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mediated character if it is to gain contemporaneity. While the idea occurred to Eno 
perhaps in a Heideggerian lightning flash, the transmission of it would require a more 
Gadamerian hermeneutic process of mediation.  
The generative work which was inspired by this moment reflects this mediating 
presence; it contains the potential to lift us out of our ‘everyday’ time and thus 
transform our experience and conception of the ‘now’. This transformation becomes 
evident while observing the audiences of 77 Million Paintings. As Eno describes: 
I would sneak in and see people sitting there and I would think what are 
we actually doing here? We’re not seeing a film. There’s no beginning, 
there’s no progression, there’s no end, there’s no narrative, there’s no 
drama. In fact everything is missing that would normally be called art or 
entertainment.... and yet people were always saying the same sorts of 
things, the same things that I felt. ‘It’s so nice to just sit still and not 
want to change anything. Not feel impatient. Not drumming your 
fingers.140 
The temporality of the audience had been re-attuned from the endless ‘bustle and 
boredom’141 of empty, calculative time to an autonomous time which fulfilled every 
moment of its own duration. The audience had begun tarrying; they ceased to be an 
audience and had instead been transformed into players.  
It is thus that Heidegger’s bells and Eno’s clock chimes have acted as mediators for our 
generative experience.  Heidegger’s bells became temporal mediators through which 
the townspeople’s days were transformed into discrete, meaningful occurrences which, 
like the festival, were both repeated and unique. They echoed the message of Eno’s 
clock chimes which stretched out our individual temporalities into a millennial 
communion with a futural civilization. Perhaps part of the unique transformative power 
of the bell tower and clock chimes lies in their resonating, to-and-fro movement, which 
raises the listener above time for a moment—just long enough to allow him or her to 
become conscious of the concurrent temporalization. This reverberation serves as a 
common point of departure from which we can represent that which we once were to 
the being which we are becoming.  
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As we have seen, this self-representation can only occur through a self-transcendence. 
Significantly, the very structure of generative music informs and completes this 
transformation as technology becomes the counter-move during our representational 
game. The generative phrases are themselves infinitely repeated while retaining their 
distinctive identities. In this way, a radically temporal event occurs which both embodies 
our identity as a temporalizing entity and places us over and above this process as it 
occurs. Thus, the sounding and resounding of the music generates a continuity of the 
work which is contemporaneous with the continuity of the self. In other words, the 
temporality of listener becomes externalized and is re-presented technologically. We, 
as this temporalizing ‘in between’, transcend ourselves and recognize within this 
transformation that which is true.  
It is perhaps not an accident that we have chosen a technologically-mediated means of 
producing art. As modern science has displaced our sense of truth which was previously 
obtained through artistic representation and the experience thereof, we have seemingly 
substituted a mimetic structure through which truth can once again be a revealing of 
poiesis whilst simultaneously being representational. I contend that the experience 
which we have transformed is that of our experience of truth; if we can represent to 
ourselves how this process occurs, we can re-legitimate this mode of knowing to 
ourselves. Thus, we understand Gadamer when he states that ‘[w]hat rends him from 
himself at the same time gives him back the whole of his being’.142 
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Levinas: Face to Interface 
In this third chapter, we look to Levinas and his philosophy of alterity in an attempt to 
understand how subjectivity and otherness relate, including the quasi-otherness of 
technology. In focusing on Levinas’s idea of the face-to-face encounter, we discover both 
how subjectivity is initially formed through an encounter with alterity and also how it 
can subsequently be transcended through a similar encounter such as that with 
generative music . We will thus examine terminology that resonates with the generative 
music listening experience after a brief exposition situating the ontological and 
phenomenological roots of Levinas’s philosophy. Finally, in order to explore Levinas’s 
face to face theory as it would apply to technology when considered as a quasi-other, we 
turn to Don Ihde’s spectrum of human-technology relations. This helps to demonstrate 
how our experience of otherness, and thus the face to face encounter, is readily 
transferrable to technology when coupled with Levinas’s focus on the mediating function 
of discourse. This process highlights a fundamental, radical passivity which is mirrored in 
Heidegger’s Gelassenheit and Eno’s surrender as well as Gadamer’s notion of play. 
Finally, some reflections on how we might use technology as a rehearsal for the 
perception of alterity prepare us for the forthcoming conclusion. 
 
One is scarcely able to know art, despite stripping it of its bygone aesthetic shackles of 
standards involving natural beauty and morality, unless one has endeavoured to reach 
beyond to that which lies on the hither or primordial side of art as being or existential 
reflection. While hermeneutics offers a description of how one might interpret art, and 
phenomenology presents the ways in which art might feel in a sensorial manner, the 
two philosophical approaches leave art ontologically wanting and therefore 
problematic as a source of truth(s). Furthermore, art presents beings with a unique 
form of ethical relations as people coexist with each other and the art which is created 
by another for another. It is consequently a responsibility to stand face to face with the 
art of the other and not merely side by side. Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics of 
responsibility illuminate what it means to be, to be amongst others, and the ways in 
which meaning is formed from these relations for which art may serve as a medium. 
Previous aesthetic considerations contained another limitation in their inherent 
inability to distinguish aesthetic encounters which were embodied technologically. The 
technological mediation of art, and subsequently that of being, raises questions of 
alterity; these questions are deeply embedded and read into technology in 
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fundamental ways. Does technology induce any form of otherness for us? How do we 
represent that which is, by definition, wholly other? Can we ask the question of 
technological art without presupposing its proximity to Being? Perhaps underlying and 
underpinning the formulation of these questions is an elementary desire for or 
towards the Other which always eludes both our cognition through its 
representational capacities and our consciousness as it expresses Being. Thus, we need 
a mediating concept which points toward the Other or indicates its presence while 
simultaneously acknowledging its fundamental alterity. 
Levinas presents precisely this as he introduces the idea that something has been left 
out or overlooked in Western metaphysics—the Other. It is thus that his philosophical 
approach both illuminates the existence of an Other and attempts to demonstrate its 
presence by creating a space for it conceptually. He allows for another perspective or 
vantage point on the body of thought which precedes him and through this gesture 
demonstrates how alterity not only confronts us existentially from the beginning but 
also how it paradoxically moves within us as manifested desire for the unknown and 
unknowable. The Other constitutes a foundational encounter during which our 
subjectivity is formed and our orientation toward ourselves as beings and the world is 
formulated. The restoration of this possibility or perspective of alterity opens up an 
entire body of thought in distinctive ways as it highlights the mediation process which 
is inherently necessary in relating to and with radical alterity I argue that the 
examination of our need for mediation and its subsequent development into 
technology as a creative mediator is crucial, as this situates our desire to move beyond 
ourselves and our being and reveals how we represent this desire to ourselves. As the 
original encounter with non-mediation continually summons us toward it while 
simultaneously withdrawing, we begin to think generatively. We continually move 
conceptually toward an unknown and unspecified point in ever changing 
configurations in an attempt to reach that which is ultimately the Being of our being, 
or our becoming. This is perhaps a technologically mediated fulfilment of Heidegger’s 
enigmatic prophecy that ‘Being is still waiting for the time when it will become 
thought-provoking to man’.1 
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Phenomenology Foundations: The Problem of Ego 
The central role of alterity in Levinas’s thought is perhaps best understood through 
investigating its movement and subsequent development through his initial 
phenomenological thought and then as it passed through the more specific ontological 
lens to its place in his ‘first philosophy’ of ethics. Phenomenology was initially both an 
extremely formative philosophical approach for Levinas and also comprised the 
substance of a significant contribution to French philosophy, as he translated Edmond 
Husserl’s work from German into French. This was the first introduction of 
phenomenological thought into France which in turn placed Levinas in a position to 
effectively and systematically critique it. He was profoundly influenced by this field 
which contained a heightened concern and radical distrust of anything which was 
considered inherently or naturally part of knowledge. This reflexive stance would serve 
as the foundation for Levinas’s view of the Other, which will be discussed further later. 
Phenomenology was initially meant to distinguish between content and consciousness, 
as an extension of Kantian thought, or between the nature and spirit notions of 
Descartes similarly. Edmund Husserl, who largely pioneered the field of 
phenomenology as an adaptation from Franz Brentano’s descriptive psychology, 
introduced and adapted a method whose infamous motto was ‘back to the things 
themselves’. This was achieved through Husserl’s methodology which included 
‘bracketing’ off everything which could not be known for certain, or apodictically, 
about the object under scrutiny. This presented problems for Levinas as he began to 
investigate these processes, as although Husserl had provided a method to essentially 
undo any presumptions and contingencies attached to ‘knowledge’, which was an 
approach Levinas viewed as essential, nothing was left after bracketing except for 
consciousness. In this way, the first phenomenon of which one can be certain through 
this process is the transcendental ego, upon which all else is founded. This placed 
consciousness and the ego firmly in the centre of Husserl’s methodology, which was 
both problematic in itself and also left out some crucial points for Levinas.  
Firstly, everything always already exists within time and temporality; Levinas felt that 
Husserl’s dehistoricization of both consciousness and the object of its perception was 
mistaken. A second critique of Husserl’s ideas which would become a central 
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component of Levinas’s thought for years to come was that of the bracketing off of the 
existence of other consciousnesses. There was not an inherent, apodictic way in which 
one could discover other consciousnesses through Husserl’s methodology. Although 
Husserl addressed this issue in later works, he essentially subsumed knowledge of the 
other under that of the same, or self; that is, we can know there are other 
consciousnesses based on the apodictic knowledge that we ourselves have one. For 
Levinas, this eradicates the inherent alterity of the Other. 
Perhaps the most problematic issue of Husserl’s phenomenological methodology for 
Levinas was its implications. If one can only be certain of one’s consciousness as a 
starting point, then it follows that one cannot learn anything about the object in 
question due to the bracketing off of everything which does not emanate from this 
source. Therefore, in a sense, one can only confer what one already knows of an object 
onto that object and the project of phenomenology in itself risks becoming nothing 
more than a solipsistic exercise. 
From Ontology to Alterity 
Levinas subsequently turned to Heidegger’s new perspective on phenomenology as 
published in Being and Time. The aim of the work as well as its approach was radically 
different than that of Husserl, as Heidegger sought to explore the very relationship 
between Being and temporality. As a result, Being became a process rather than a 
fixed state, consciousness was decentralized, and the concept of historicity was 
restored. Perhaps as important for Levinas as the decentralized consciousness was the 
ontological perspective with which Heidegger approached phenomenology.  
Heidegger’s Being and Time was ontologically significant for Levinas because it 
questioned the very presuppositions upon which Husserl built his phenomenological 
practices and left unexamined. In this way, Heidegger’s work became a practice in 
fundamental ontology, as it questioned the basis on which other studies of being were 
constructed. Therefore, Heidegger put to question the very entity which Husserl took 
for granted in phenomenology, namely Being itself. Husserl began with primarily 
epistemological questions regarding how Being comes to know what it knows  and the 
ways in which that knowledge is valid rather than what Being is in the first place, which 
Heidegger objected to as a reversal of the correct order of questioning.  
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Another significant point of departure from Husserl by Heidegger was his critique of 
intentionality. This conception, as adapted from Brentano’s work, was one which 
indicated consciousness as being consciousness of something; one could not think 
unless it was thinking of something. Therefore, intentionality for Husserl was both 
one’s primary mode of relating with the world, as nothing could exist for Husserl in the 
absence of consciousness, and also acted as a determination of how the world could 
be experienced. Heidegger maintained, in light of the solipsistic problems ensuing 
therein, that this mode of accessing the world was not in fact primary, but rather that 
concern [Sorge or das Besorgen] was being’s initial mode of relation with the world. 
This concept was an activity as opposed to a mental attitude which subsequently 
placed being within the world and involved with the objects which Husserl had 
separated from being in a rather Cartesian way. 
Although Heidegger’s Being performed actions of care and was thus situated within 
the world and therefore time as well, Levinas took issue with the idea that concern 
seemed to demonstrate interaction and control over the objects with which being 
came into contact. When this involved other consciousnesses, it therefore became 
problematic for Levinas, as Heidegger had essentially eradicated the possibility of 
encountering something truly other by concern’s very definition, which included 
‘having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and 
looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, 
undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, 
determining’.2 
For Levinas, intentionality therefore became an issue of Being’s relation with alterity, 
which was not sufficiently solved by Heidegger’s concept of the primary relationship of 
concern. Thus, as Heidegger’s fundamental ontological approach failed to allow room 
for a radically ‘other’ to remain as such through Being  just as Husserl’s system had 
through consciousness, Levinas ventured beyond ontology in order to acquire the 
means with which to express alterity without committing the same error of reducing 
the other to the same. This very expression of the Other even while trying to maintain 
                                                          
2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, J. Macquarrie and E.Robinson (trans.), (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 
83. 
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and express its alterity is problematic in that it is a form of reduction itself. This 
critique will be discussed further.  
While the former reflections on phenomenology and Levinas’s critiques thereof in no 
way exhaust the concepts inherent in either Husserl or Heidegger’s phenomenological 
methods, they do serve to illuminate both what was problematic for Levinas and also 
what is similarly problematic when phenomenology alone is utilized to assimilate 
music or visual art which is technologically embedded and therefore inherently laden 
with alterity considerations. As Levinas progressed away from ontology toward his 
‘first philosophy’ of ethics, he developed a foundational relation with alterity which 
will speak to Being and its proximal relation to technology. 
The Originary Encounter with Alterity: Face to Face 
Levinas introduces the idea that something has been left out or overlooked in Western 
metaphysics—the Other [autrui]. The Other has been systematically subsumed under 
concepts such as ‘being’ and ‘consciousness’ and this leads to his ultimate break with 
ontology as a potential space in which to consider alterity. He states that, ‘Western 
philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by 
interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being’.3 
He thus rejects knowledge of consciousness, the Ego, or even Being as the ultimate 
aim of philosophy and instead seeks to establish a basis for alterity, or the Other, 
which can introduce the concept in such a way that it demonstrates otherness and 
leaves it as such. 
He begins this pre-ontological task in his work Time and the Other through utilizing the 
concept of death. This is adapted and elaborated upon from Heidegger’s conception in 
which death and one’s anxious anticipation of it causes Being to consider its very being 
for the first time. Thus, death serves as the foundation of Being’s awareness of its own 
being. For Levinas, however, death is indicative not only of a point of existential 
awareness and mortality; it also founds a primal position or orientation of Being which 
is passivity. Death remains something about which one cannot do anything, and it 
                                                          
3 Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other: and Additional Essays, Richard A. Cohen (trans.), (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1990), 43. 
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marks the moment when ‘the subject loses its very mastery as a subject’.4 To lose 
mastery or control for Levinas is an important concept in alterity, as one lacks any 
control over the other in the face-to-face relation to be discussed later.  
In this moment when mastery by the subject is lost, which crucially involves mastery 
over oneself, Levinas explains that ‘[t]his approach of death indicates that we are in 
relation with something that is absolutely other, something bearing alterity not as a 
provisional determination we can assimilate through enjoyment, but as something 
whose very existence is made of alterity. My solitude is thus not confirmed by death 
but broken by it’.5 This statement is significant in that it both provides the foundation 
of alterity as something purely other and therefore impossible to integrate into any 
form of experiential cognition, and also introduces the destructibility of solitude. This 
notion that solitude can be broken leaves a conceptual space for the approach of an 
Other who can both coexist and remain radically other, which demonstrates that 
‘existence is pluralist’.6 
For Levinas, death is an event which is ungraspable to the subject, and this state is 
mirrored or paralleled in the encounter with the Other, which he terms the ‘face to 
face’. In this relationship: 
[T]he face-to-face with the Other, the encounter with a face that at 
once gives and conceals the Other, is the situation in which an event 
happens to a subject who does not assume it, who is utterly unable in 
its regard, but where nonetheless in a certain way it is in front of the 
subject. The other ‘assumed’ is the Other.7 
The Other, as irreducible to the self, is discussed by Levinas as a being posited through 
the face, but this is only an appearance of the Other as such and not Otherness itself. 
As such, it is not reducible to one part or image of the body at all, for this would be 
thematizing and thus reducing the Other to the same. The ‘face’ can therefore exist in 
or as ‘the whole body—a hand or a curve of the shoulder’8 for example. Thus for 
Levinas ‘[t]he Other does not only appear in his face, as a phenomenon subject to the 
                                                          
4 Levinas, Time, 74. 
5 Ibid., 74. 
6 Ibid., 75. 
7 Ibid., 78-79. 
8 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority, Alphonso Lingus (trans.), (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1994), 262. 
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action and domination of a freedom; infinitely distant from the very relation he enters, 
he presents himself there from the first absolute. The I disengages itself from the 
relationship, but does so within relationship with a being absolutely separated. The 
face with which the Other turns to me is not reabsorbed in a representation of the 
face’.9 
Levinas states above in reference to the Other that ‘he presents himself there from the 
first absolute’. This is an important concept for Levinas as it orders both divisions 
within philosophy and also certain formative aspects of being, such as subjectivity, 
consciousness, and exteriority, which shall be discussed in more detail later. Levinas 
does not delineate the face-to-face encounter in a chronological, time-based manner, 
but rather discusses it as occurring in a primordial time of sorts, prior to Being 
becoming fully so within itself. As one is always already in a situation of coexistence 
with others, the face-to-face encounter is meant to demonstrate that which initially 
occurs as the I is approached by an ‘other’ who essentially calls oneself to selfhood. 
Therefore, as the face-to-face encounter is the fundamental, originary encounter, the 
arising relation of ethics becomes a ‘first philosophy’ for Levinas, which comes prior to 
metaphysics and even ontology. 
The disengagement and absolute separation of the I which Levinas describes above is 
crucial as it is during this process that one is introduced to the notion that a point of 
view outside of the self exists. This new perspective is overlaid with the perspective of 
the self and an attempt is made to perceive the ‘objective’ world. This brings about a 
disengagement with the self’s perspective, as it constantly attempts to project beyond 
itself. The Other, however, remains infinitely distant and ‘absolutely separated’ or 
‘infinitely distant from the very relation he enters’;10 the two consciousnesses never 
merge. During this encounter, the Other’s perspective is never accessible except 
through linguistic mediation. It is also through this separation that one becomes 
‘subject to the action and domination of a freedom’,11 as one can now respond to 
another perspective which is not his own; possibilities are opened up as the I is called 
to selfhood. 
                                                          
9 Levinas, Totality, 215. (italics in original) 
10 Ibid., 215. 
11 Ibid., 215. 
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It is during this encounter, as a result of the separation and ensuing freedom, that the I 
is summoned by the Other. This summoning is expressed in a conceptually similar way 
to the non-thematization of the Other by the Face as it does not have to exist as a 
verbal command, but nonetheless calls upon the I before the I can respond or gather 
itself to do so. As Levinas continues, he states that ‘the face summons me to my 
obligations and judges me’ and describes the Other as one ‘to whom I am obligated’.12 
This summoning, therefore, is both simultaneously a commanding to which one must 
respond, even if to respond means a non-verbal action or a lack of response toward 
the Other, and also a formative event, as the I is transformed by this encounter with 
the wholly mysterious. For Levinas, this occurrence elicits the formation of 
consciousness, not as the embodiment of a cognitive practice of beginning to 
moderate existence to ourselves, but rather as a recognition of the Other, and hence 
its alterity which by nature overflows knowledge.   
This concept runs parallel to that of Levinas’s conception of the idea of infinity, which 
shall be discussed in more depth later, and his related notion of welcoming. As he 
states in Totality and Infinity, ‘The idea of infinity, the overflowing of finite thought by 
its content, effectuates the relation of thought with what exceeds its capacity, with 
what at each moment it learns without suffering shock. This is the situation we call 
welcome of the face’.13 In this instance, the very alterity of the Other is made possible 
by infinity, or that which overflows thought. It is by definition beyond that which the I 
can conceive, and for Levinas this is a positive notion. This positivity is unique, as 
Levinas contends that Western philosophy has consistently painted it in a negative 
light.  The I does not fight against that which it is unable to comprehend, and hence 
this produces a welcome, as ‘I respond to his expression, to his revelation’.14 
The idea of infinity is paramount in Levinas’s development of both the face-to-face 
encounter, during which the welcoming of the face occurs, and also the very formation 
of Being and subjectivity. Infinity, therefore, is foundational to understanding our 
relationship with art and technology, as I argue that these practices recreate 
interactions which replicate these formative occurrences. These concepts also serve to 
                                                          
12 Levinas, Totality, 215. 
13 Ibid., 197. 
14 Ibid., 197. 
118 
 
elucidate the ways in which the Other plays a formative role in the ways in which one 
deals not only with the Other’s inherent, radical alterity in general, but also specifically 
in the creative endeavours resulting therein. 
Infinity and Totality 
Infinity and totality comprise the theoretical framework for Levinas’s ‘first philosophy’ 
of ethics as explicated in his 1961 work Totality and Infinity. The two concepts named 
in the title both complement and oppose one another, as to simply view them as a 
binary opposition of sorts and to privilege infinity would be to subsume them both 
under the concept of totality. The subtitle of the work is ‘An Essay on Exteriority’, as 
this concept is one which also plays an essential role in the development of Levinas’s 
thought surrounding the event in which the I encounters the Other and the formative 
events which ensue as a result. As stated above, infinity is ‘the overflowing of finite 
thought by its content’,15 and it is ‘produced in the relationship of the same with the 
other’.16 As demonstrated in the face to face encounter, the I disengages from itself in 
an effort to assimilate the Other. The Other, however, is always exceeding his own 
presence as anything spoken in the process of mediation is constantly being added to 
both linguistically and by the presence itself. 
As infinity by definition overflows thought, Levinas is careful to distinguish 
conceptually between the idea of infinity as it is presented in language and actual 
infinity itself; the idea of infinity is not merely a cognitive tool for representing 
something exterior to Being. Rather, infinity is, like Heidegger’s Being, a process. 
Levinas explains: 
The idea of infinity is the mode of being, the infinition, of infinity. 
Infinity does not first exist, and then reveal itself. Its infinition is 
produced as revelation, as a positing of its idea in me. It is produced in 
the improbable feat whereby a separated being fixed in its identity, the 
same, the I, nonetheless contains in itself what it can neither contain 
nor receive solely by virtue of its own identity.17 
                                                          
15 Levinas, Totality, 197. 
16 Ibid., 26. 
17 Ibid., 26-27. (italics in original) 
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This phrase indicates the way in which the idea infinity comes to be both to being and 
also within being. Levinas first delineates the idea of infinity as existing as a mode of 
being which is completely separate from Being; he introduces the concept of 
revelation versus that of creation, with the former arising from outside of Being and 
the latter coming from within Being. Infinity thus is a revelation received from the 
radical alterity of the Other in its infinite Being.  
Another crucial notion in this passage is that of separation. Levinas states that ‘[t]he 
idea of Infinity implies the separation of the same with regard to the other’.18 
However, he characterizes this division as something other than a mere opposition. 
Separation between the Other and the I is the necessary condition for the I to receive 
the revelation of the idea of infinity, and in fact this very revelation of the idea of 
infinity is in itself a form of transcendence in relation to the Other.  Additionally, the 
same and the other both repel and call for one another as they form a totality. This 
totality, however, is relativized by the idea of infinity, and ‘[a]n absolute transcendence 
has to be produced as non-integratable’.19 This is to say that while the idea of totality 
attempts to integrate the same and the other into a totality, infinity, or the idea 
thereof, maintains the separation between the two, thus maintaining alterity and 
leading to the relation of exteriority.  
The concept of totality is described as ‘outwardly directed but self-centred totalistic 
thinking that organizes men and things into power systems, and gives us control over 
nature and other people. Hence it has dominated the course of human history’.20 To 
subsume the relationship of the self and the Other under totality is to suppress or even 
to a certain extent destroy the freedom, among other things, which arise from the 
concept of separation. Totality negates individualization and consequently the Other 
and thus infinity. It is thus that Levinas is critical of Heidegger’s ontology and Western 
philosophy in general, as it ‘subordinates the relationship with the Other to the 
relation with Being in general, remains under obedience to the anonymous, and leads 
inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny’.21 Individuals are 
                                                          
18 Levinas, Totality, 53. 
19 Ibid., 53. 
20 Ibid., 17. 
21 Ibid., 46-47. 
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reduced to generalities and concepts replace alterity, thus opening a relationship of 
potential control.  
The individual avoids being merged into a totality by way of his exteriority, which 
Levinas describes as ‘the essence of being’.22 This inability for the Other and the same 
to merge arises from the separation which initiates infinition; thus the idea of infinity is 
necessary for exteriority. Levinas states that ‘[t]o posit being as exteriority is to 
apperceive infinity as the Desire for infinity, and thus to understand that the 
production of infinity calls for separation, the production of the absolute arbitrariness 
of the I or of the origin’.23 Thus, to receive the revelatory idea of infinity reflects the 
way in which exteriority is initiated. Exteriority also presents a face, or the being’s 
existence, in the face-to-face encounter. Levinas explains that ‘exteriority defines the 
existent as existent, and the signification of the face is due to an essential coinciding of 
the existent and the signifier’.24 This does not mean that the face is responsible for the 
initiation of signs and thus signification, however. Levinas clarifies that ‘[s]ignification is 
not added to the existent. To signify is not equivalent to presenting oneself in person. 
The symbolism of the sign already presupposes the signification of expression, the 
face. In the face, the existent par excellence presents itself’.25 The way in which 
signification develops from the face-to-face encounter and exteriority will be discussed 
further. 
Exteriority inherently has an inward side which is that of interiority. This is expressed 
as ‘pure thought’,26 and lacks complete integration into a whole for Levinas, as it can 
never reach completion until death. It is ‘the very possibility of a birth and a death that 
do not derive their meaning from history. Interiority institutes an order different from 
historical time in which totality is constituted, an order where everything is pending, 
where what is no longer possible historically remains always possible’.27 Thus the 
interior of the self conversely creates exteriority and is self-referential as it exists as 
thought exclusively. It is significant in its self-reference because this relation in turn 
initiates subjectivity. It is subjectivity as founded ultimately by infinity which will bear 
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23 Ibid., 292. 
24 Ibid., 262. 
25 Ibid., 262. 
26 Ibid., 55. 
27 Ibid., 55. (italics in original) 
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directly although not exclusively on an existent’s experience of art, and more 
specifically that of technologically mediated art. 
When dealing with subjectivity, Levinas is careful to avoid reduction of the concept to 
its former state in the phenomenology of others from which he is seeking to break. He 
therefore states, when referring to Totality and Infinity, that ‘[t]his book then does 
present itself as a defence of subjectivity, but it will apprehend the subjectivity not at 
the level of its purely egoist protestation against totality, nor in its anguish before 
death, but as in the idea of infinity’.28 This statement is reminiscent of Heidegger’s 
concept of Being-towards-death which is Dasein’s most prominent source of anxiety. It 
also does not provide the purely phenomenological sense of resistance toward totality 
and hence stress the Ego as a transcendent over all.  
Instead, Levinas founds the subjectivity of self from the infinity which arises from the 
face-to-face encounter and separation with the Other. In this way, the summoning 
which occurs during this encounter is an initiating element, and thus the concept of 
alterity and its accompanying components are catalysts for subjectivity. That which 
accompanies the face-to-face encounter first and foremost is responsibility. As clarified 
in Levinas’s Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, ‘Responsibility is in fact a 
relationship with the other, in his very alterity. Then a relationship with alterity as such 
is constitutive of subjectivity’.29 Thus, subjectivity transcends a mere theoretical status 
and becomes always already ethical. It is this sense of responsibility, as founded by our 
encounter with alterity, which orients our subjectivity and not the ‘egoist’ aims which 
proceed from the phenomenologically isolated consciousness of self.  
Separation with the Other holds a special significance in Totality and Infinity, as it 
founds language within the face-to-face encounter. Levinas states that ‘[s]peech 
proceeds from absolute difference’,30 during which the ‘discourse relates with what 
remains essentially transcendent’.31 While one can and does thematize during speech 
with the Other, due to the presence of the Other, ‘[t]he fact that the face maintains a 
relation with me by discourse does not range him in the same; he remains absolute 
                                                          
28 Levinas, Totality, 26. 
29 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, Alphonso Lingis (trans.), (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1998), xix. 
30 Levinas, Totality, 194. 
31 Ibid., 195. 
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within the relation’.32 This is to say that the Other does not become ‘reabsorbed’ in the 
thematization process. For Levinas, ‘[t]he formal structure of language thereby 
announces the ethical inviolability of the Other’.33 
Additionally, during speech as it arises during the face-to-face encounter, alterity is 
maintained not only through the very presence of the Other, but also through 
exteriority as this is inherently tied to presence. Both beings in the encounter resist 
falling under a totality, as ‘the exteriority of discourse cannot be converted into 
interiority. The interlocutor can have no place in an inwardness; he is forever 
outside’.34 Levinas describes language and discursive exchange as an ‘unrelating 
relation’,35 not because he denies the possibility of the transfer of knowledge, but 
rather because expression, which is synonymous with the face and is the source of all 
signification, overflows exteriority.36 The formulation goes on to establish the 
possibility of truth formation through something which one is unable to derive from 
one’s own interior state, from a place outside of one’s own subjectivity. 
Truth 
Levinas continues on from Heidegger’s conception of truth and builds upon it, but 
elaborates on how truth, as a process, is bound up in our temporality. As Levinas states 
early on in the work, ‘Truth is something promised. Always promised, always future, 
always loved’.37 The precise linguistic construction of his sentences are significant 
throughout the text, as they mirror the content expressed therein. In this instance, 
truth is referred to in the present tense, but retains both a sense of the past in 
‘promised’ and echoes of the ‘future’. The fragmentary style serves to illustrate 
another element of truth, as Levinas states, ‘The search for truth has to draw being out 
of appearance...every manifestation is partial, and in that sense apparent, whereas 
truth cannot be fractioned without being altered. Consequently truth is a progression, 
and is exposed in several moments, remaining problematical in each’.38 This statement 
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34 Ibid., 295. 
35 Ibid., 295. 
36 Ibid., 297. 
37 Levinas, Otherwise, 29. 
38 Ibid., 24. 
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draws out the distinction between being and appearance, which clearly demarcates a 
perspective other than that of a strictly phenomenological one. It also demonstrates 
the way in which truth is bound by temporality in the same way in which beings are; 
truth is undiscoverable as a whole entity in static time, and therefore the progression 
of time which fractures its unity does not leave truth unaffected. In other words, truth 
never appears as a complete whole in our subjective apprehension of it; our 
experience of truth is always a striving to piece the fragments together. This striving 
continually delays our full comprehension to some future time which never arrives. 
Levinas explains this concept further as he describes truth from both a time-based and 
psychologically-oriented perspective: 
Truth is rediscovery, recall, reminiscence, reuniting under the unity of 
apperception...there is not a pure distancing from the present, but 
precisely re-presentation, that is, a distancing which the present of truth 
is already or still is; for a representation is a recommencement of the 
present which in its ‘first time’ is for the second time; it is a retention 
and a protention, between forgetting and expecting, between memory 
and project. Time is reminiscence and reminiscence is time, the unity of 
consciousness and essence.39 
Reflected in this statement is the discontinuous time or the apparent gap in which 
both a drawing back and concealing occurs. This is the time during which the 
manifestation of truth gets ‘out of phase’ with itself, hence its ability to appear for the 
first time while reappearing. The fragmentation referenced in the previous quote 
occurs in this intermittent time. Levinas points out that since totality includes 
everything, and becoming out of phase with itself it leaves nothing out as totality, then 
‘the transcendence of the totality thematized in truth is produced as a division of the 
totality into parts’.40 These parts become images, which are both sensible and present 
in the immediate, but are unable to reflect the whole of truth in their incomplete 
state, and thus Levinas states that this ‘is intentionally turned into a search for a more 
complete presence’.41 Thus, truth is always future; its completion lies in a constant and 
infinite state of deferral.  
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For Levinas, this demonstrates both the formation of truth and also that of the space 
in which truth can exist, or more accurately, the beyond-truth. ‘Truth’ has become 
thematized as demonstrated in the quote above, and themes exist as the products of 
rationality which attempt to understand and make intelligible the essence of things 
which inevitably become neutralized or incompletely signified.  Thus, we shall see how 
technological art is in a unique position to reveal and reflect truth which preserves its 
discontinuity and fragmentation as it mediates alterity. 
The Truth of Technology 
There exists a fundamental problem of representing otherness and this is a central 
question which is embodied and worked out through art. Additionally, this same 
question of representing otherness is played out technologically, and our very dilemma 
with alterity can cause us to either tend toward totality and overlook alterity or to 
favour infinition and lose the concreteness of the relation altogether. Perhaps the first 
point of clarification must exist linguistically, as this is our first point of mediation with 
technology. Thus far, ‘technology’ has largely been discussed in terms of ‘Technology’, 
or as a somewhat ambiguous metaphysical generality. While this has been useful to a 
point, as it has facilitated a discussion of what technology can mean in all of its 
manifestations, it also creates at least two difficulties which must be surmounted if 
further investigation is to occur into its fundamental nature. ‘Technology’ has served 
as a linguistic marker for a specific type of mediated experience or relation. But the 
first difficulty lies in the fact that technology is always already embedded, both in our 
daily praxis and within our culture; it is a metaphysical construct to discuss 
‘Technology’ as from an objective standpoint, whether that be as something we 
control or something which controls us. But the second difficulty lies in overly stressing 
the materiality or instrumentality of technology, as this hides the way in which the 
technology disappears within use and transforms us.  
Don Ihde offers a useful navigation through the various streams of 
technology/Technology, of which he describes three routes, which provide points of 
reference rather than absolutes, and which all coexist with each other in unique 
relations on various levels. Before differentiating between the three levels, however, 
he broadly situates technology. As technology is both culturally and historically 
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embedded throughout every civilization on some level, one could say that ‘material 
culture’ represents ‘technology in the very broadest sense’. To further delineate the 
field, Ihde uses the term ‘technics’ to denote ‘human action employing artifacts to 
attain some result within the environment’.42 In this way, he avoids some common 
pitfalls. This sense of technology retains its materiality, which is important for Ihde, 
who states that ‘the concreteness of such ‘hardware’ in the broadest sense connects 
with the equal concreteness of our bodily existence’.43  
His approach does not remain centred on the artifactual level, however; he adopts a 
phenomenological approach which centres on a relativistic account of a range of 
human-technology relations. He delineates three advantages to this approach. Firstly, 
technology won’t be ‘reified’ into ‘Technology’, or absorbed into a specific practice or 
technique that is so general that it fails to account for the rich diversity of particular 
instances of human-technology relations. Secondly, his approach negates the potential 
to view technology as neutral, which invariably arises from non-relativistic accounts. 
Thirdly, he retains a sense of action as is implied in both our being and our human 
praxis. Taken together, these three dimensions help temper what potentially exists as 
Heidegger’s ‘overly metaphysical claims’ and place us squarely in the realm of a 
relation without undue focus on either the human side or that of the artefact.44 
The three relations are discussed not as discrete instances but rather as points on a 
continuum of ‘human-technology-world relations’.45 They configure in varying ways as 
points with shifting ratios between material objectness and transparency. First, he 
discusses the ‘embodiment relation’, which he defines as taking technologies ‘into my 
experiencing in a particular way by way of perceiving through such technologies and 
through the reflexive transformation of my perceptual and body sense’.46 In this 
relation, the technology is ‘actually between the seer and the seen, in a position of 
mediation’.47 This is exemplified in Heidegger’s early example in Being and Time of the 
hammer as equipment, which disappears into absorption during use during ‘concernful 
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43 Ibid., 26. 
44 Ibid., 26. 
45 Ibid., 107. 
46 Ibid., 72. (italics in original) 
47 Ibid., 73. (italics in original) 
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dealings’,48 which Heidegger says ‘has its own kind of sight’49 and thus serves the 
function of discovery. We do not experience the hammer as an object during its use; 
rather, we experience the world through the hammer in a new way with our extended 
capabilities ensuing there from. The hammer does not return to its object status until 
it somehow malfunctions, or exhibits a damaged user-interface. This negative self-
revealing enables the discussion of embodiment, or absorption, but conceals the 
second level of relations.  
The second relation is the hermeneutic relation, during which the first point of contact 
is the technology, as perception is directed toward the instrumentation.50 As Ihde 
explains, ‘A hermeneutic relation mimics sensory perception insofar as it is also a kind 
of seeing as___; but it is a referential seeing, which has as its immediate perceptual 
focus seeing ... [instrument]’.51 An example of this occurs through writing, as the text 
becomes ‘an embodied hermeneutic technic’;52 the writing instrument disappears in 
use and becomes akin to a bodily extension (embodiment relation) and the world of 
text is perceived through the text (hermeneutic relation).  
The third relation of alterity is any relation ‘to or with a technology’53 and can be 
located at various points within both the embodiment and the hermeneutic relations. 
Ihde makes the point that technology can never be wholly other by definition as he 
states, ‘Were the technofact to be genuinely an other, it would both be and not be a 
technology. But even as a quasi-other, the technology falls short of such totalization. It 
retains its unique role in the human-technology continuum of relations as the medium 
of transformation, but as a recognizable medium’.54 As we have seen, Heidegger tends 
toward the totalization of technology negatively. Additionally, the alterity relation 
itself is cast in a negative light, as the hammer becomes useless as an ‘other’ which is 
not embodied. Thus, although alterity does not exist as a complete ‘other’ within 
technology, its quasi-otherness is sufficient to make it a ‘medium of transformation’. It 
is this point of relative alterity, as it potentially incorporates embodiment and 
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hermeneutic relations, and the ensuing transformative relationship which we shall 
consider in more depth. 
Desire and the Technological (quasi-) Other 
As Levinas has demonstrated in the face to face encounter with the Other, exteriority 
and its resulting separation ignites a desire for the infinite which is revealed from 
outside of Being and placed with Being. The exteriority of technology similarly 
produces or reactivates the infinition process within us, and this desire exists in the 
space between embodiment and alterity. Ihde articulates the existence of a desire 
with regard to technology which is both double and contradictory, as we wish for ‘total 
transparency’ or ‘total embodiment’ in which the technology truly ‘becomes me’.55 
The other side of this desire is to have the transformative effects which the technology 
enables, but to have my ‘naked capacities’ seamlessly enhanced without being 
encumbered by technological instrumentation.56 Ihde points out that ‘(w)ere this 
possible, it would be equivalent to there being no technology, for total transparency 
would be my body and senses; I desire the face-to-face that I would experience 
without the technology’.57  
In other words, we want access to the worlds and abilities which technology enables, 
but without the technology while simultaneously remaining unchanged as an 
individual. Significantly, Ihde states that we ‘desire the face-to-face’ of the non-
technological encounter. This, I suggest, indicates that which is truly at stake in these 
relations, either technological or otherwise; we desire unmediated experience of the 
Other while remaining wholly individual. While the non-technological encounter is still 
mediated through language, the originary one which occurs in Levinas’s face to face 
encounter is unmediated. In fact, it comprises the genesis of signification and 
representation which results from the pure difference.  
While this double/contradictory desire is ultimately ‘illusory’ due to the impossibility of 
its fulfilment, it nonetheless carries a danger as the desire shapes our pursuits.58 The 
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danger occurs within the embodiment portion of the desire. As Ihde explains, 
‘Embodiment relations simultaneously magnify and amplify and reduce or place aside 
what is experienced through them’.59 For example, a telescope magnifies the image of 
the moon but obscures its size and position in the sky.60 This would not be problematic 
were it not for the tendency to forget that which is reduced in favour of the 
comparatively exciting magnification.61 Ihde cites phenomenological theory which 
‘claims that for every change in what is seen (the object correlate), there is a 
noticeable change in how (the experiential correlate) the thing is seen’.62 This 
highlights the perils of mediation; technology may enhance our existential relation 
with the world at the expense of our relation with Being if the transformative effects 
are not properly oriented. 
The magnification and reduction ratio can be seen as we move between philosophical 
categories. Questions similar in nature are disseminated into different philosophical 
structures which determine order and levels of importance. In this process, it becomes 
the very difference that exists between the questions and that to which they refer that 
enables the meaning to arise. A natural order arises which suggests both a radical 
break with the previous thought’s trajectory and also, simultaneously and perhaps 
inevitably, being re-subsumed under the very category from which it seeks freedom. 
As Levinas moves from phenomenology to ontology to ethics, we see a literal 
demonstration of his statement that ‘ethics is an optics’;63 the ultimate question of 
what can be termed as wholly other provides a lens through which Being itself is 
viewed. Like technological embodiment, the Being of being is impossible to isolate, as 
Being is itself embodied. Thus, the mediating lens through which we operate must be 
acknowledged in order to reveal that which is reduced during the conceptual 
magnification. We seek to understand the Other in order to understand Being. 
With or without technological aid, alterity by definition remains as such, as does the 
desire to penetrate it. Thus, while we can’t fully know or assimilate the Other, we 
engage in modelling which represents the alterity we seek to understand. In Levinas’s 
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terminology, this would fall within the realm of interiority; it is instigated through our 
absolute separation which yields the interior thought which is interminably separate 
and without end or integration. Eno acknowledges this phenomenon and specifically 
links it to culture: 
This kind of playing with other worlds, this ability to move from the 
world in my head to the possible world in your head, and all the other 
millions of possible worlds that we can imagine, is something that 
humans do with such fluency, and such ease, that we don't notice 
 ourselves doing it...My argument is that what the constant engagement 
in culture does for us, is that it enables us to continually rehearse this 
ability we have--the use of this big part of our brain that is involved in 
postulating, imagining, exploring, extrapolating other worlds, either 
individually or cooperatively.64 
While he doesn’t specifically link the modelling of other minds with generative music, 
he does conflate artistic practices and culture. Ihde reminds us that ‘human activity 
from immemorial time and across the diversity of cultures has always been 
technologically embedded’.65 Thus, specific artistic expressions within the wider 
context of culture which employ technology are perhaps comparatively modern 
manifestations of the ‘worlding’ of the ‘other’.  
The rehearsal of alterity perception initially occurs internally through interiority. The 
need arises, however, to measure the accuracy of these mental models against the 
Other, and this necessarily involves mediation. As Ihde explains, ‘To make measure is 
to interpret. Humans are self-interpreters, but not necessarily in terms of a self-
enclosed self reference. They more often take their measurements in relation to other 
realms of being’.66 While the models can never be accurate as such, they can evolve 
and transform if they have standards of comparison. One way to enhance accuracy is 
to employ ‘other realms of being’ as a touchstone. As Eno rightly stated, culture is the 
arena in which this occurs, and through specifically, but not exclusively, artistic 
practices. These artistic practices gain a new level of accuracy when they can be 
embodied and projected hermeneutically; the world of the Other can be read through 
this artistic, technological mediation as it is overlaid with the world of the self.  
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However, as previously noted with regard to embodiment practices, this 
transformational experience comes at a price. Ihde reminds us that ‘for every revealing 
transformation there is a simultaneously concealing transformation of the world, which 
is given through a technological mediation. Technologies transform experience, 
however subtly, and that is one root of their non-neutrality’.67 I maintain that the 
generative innovation lies in the positivity of its non-neutrality; we aren’t magnifying 
elements of the other’s world at the expense of those of our own; we are being 
summoned to magnify our own world as Other. This summoning which is generated 
creatively is only possible through alterity relations. The quasi-other status of 
technology enables a situation to arise in which our imagination becomes embodied. 
As in Levinas’s face to face encounter, we are called to selfhood. The innovation here 
lies in the mediation; the technological summoning is both repeated and repetitive. 
We are called continually to the realization, during our engagement with embodied 
imagination, that it is not only the mental models which are refined during this 
process. Our own resulting transformation is revealed as our ultimate inability to 
remain the same is illuminated. 
This summoning, as a recreation of representation of that which occurs during the face 
to face encounter, is similarly a questioning. By questioning the Other we question 
ourselves as we move through endless configurations of totality and infinity, known 
and unknown, imagined and unknowable. This questioning is a transformative process, 
and one which Heidegger considered to be the ‘piety of thought’,68 for questioning is 
thinking on a path which retains a receptive orientation. The question for Heidegger 
which initiates all thought is that of Being, or more properly Being as question. As we 
attempt to think the essence of Being, it withdraws. Thus, thought which is properly 
oriented for Heidegger is a questioning which is engaged in turning away from 
ourselves toward the essence of Being, or attempting to radically think the difference 
between Being and being. The turning away from ourselves toward the essence of 
being is perhaps the same moment explicated by Levinas during the welcome of the 
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face. As questioning gives way to a listening in to being for Heidegger, it similarly gives 
way to a listening to the Other and for the Other.  
This listening suggests a fundamental, radical passivity which exists both in Heidegger’s 
Gelassenheit as well as Levinas’s summoning. It is the passivity which enables us to 
distinguish our own dissemination into being as distinct from Being as a whole. While 
the original summoning occurs as a result of the pure presence of the Other, and is 
thus unmediated, listening both precedes and follows from signification. During a 
technologically mediated summoning, a similar trace of radical passivity exists in the 
process as questioning itself is externalized and embodied in the generative process. 
Ihde describes the technological application of mathematics: 
 The visualization of topographies of such mathematical phenomena as 
fractals, chaos, and other random processes has just begun to show 
unsuspected phenomena. By turning number patterns into the gestalt 
instantaneity of perception, the patterning begins to suggest lines of 
overlap, application and development not previously suspected. Here, a 
basically hermeneutic process returns its results to perception.69 
While this process is described from the visual standpoint, it applies equally to the 
aural perspective. Thus, what we are listening to generatively is relative ‘chaos’ which 
is patterned, or questioned, and fed back to us perceptually. This is technologized 
infinition, which performs the inverse process to enframing; it generates ‘chaos’ or, 
more accurately, things which are as yet ‘undetermined’ to us. It is taking our 
command and randomizing the result, thus making the I arbitrary. Generativity, I 
suggest, is our representation of alterity to ourselves—there is a moment within it 
which exists as separation, cognitively, that both mimics our situation as and within 
Being and ignites our desire to enter into a more free relationship with infinity (and 
thus the Other). 
While Heidegger views alterity negatively with regard to instrumentation and 
embodiment, he does acknowledge the positive possibility of a saving power within 
technology which can save us from the totalizing power of enframing. Interestingly, 
Heidegger never states what this power is; rather, he demonstrates it through his 
essay ‘The Question Concerning Technology’. The saving power, which is disseminated 
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through the structure of the essay, demonstrates a subtle shift in perspective which 
reorients the reader toward the poeisis latent within the Greek techne. This is brought 
about through questioning, as he demonstrates, which directs the reader toward his 
ultimate goal of thinking, which is to think the Being of being. Levinas covers similar 
ground conceptually as he attempts to think the ‘otherwise than being’. Either way, 
that which is sought is a perspective from which Being can be glimpsed which is 
ultimately impossible.  
This reiterates the absolute arbitrariness of the I, which grants a certain freedom to 
our representations of the mind of the Other; accuracy in a calculative sense is 
unnecessary not only due to its impossibility, but also because of its very 
erroneousness. The Other, as absolute alterity, can only ever elicit responses which 
inherently speak to the Same. The challenge undergoes a subtle transformation as it 
shifts from questioning alterity to celebrating contingency. As generative music 
‘worlds’ worlds and summons us toward the unknown, I propose that we are 
externalizing this existential process to technology and re-presenting it to ourselves. 
Generative music, as naturally inquisitive, provides the constancy of surprise and 
predictability of wonder which we desire. Truth is re-presented for the first time, and 
our freedom is heard as a promise. 
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Conclusion: Being Generative, Becoming Music 
A New Beginning 
Generative music is inherently about music coming into being. It is music coming forth, 
unfolding, becoming present, and as such, it is not an entity which can be dissected, 
defined, and delineated. It is a process: it contains an origin (necessarily technological 
in nature) from out of which it unfolds and builds, possibly without end. Thus, in its 
infinite iterations it reveals and manifests itself. In this way, it is inherently experiential 
and temporal; that is, in order to understand its essence, we must engage with it as it 
unfolds in time. We accomplish this through listening. Listening, therefore, is the point 
at which music is embodied. It is the process of sonic embodiment, whereby it comes 
into being and to being, and thus serves as a juncture at which we can actually hear 
the generative process. Once we are engaged in this process, a path will be made 
toward a new listening, a listening in to being itself, which is a process Heidegger 
claims is lost in the modern technological age.  
The problem which subsequently arises in aesthetic discourse, which is perhaps one 
particular example of a general issue within language itself, is that it speaks 
categorically rather than specifically, and thus departs from the realm of embedded 
practice, or praxis. It speaks of the work of art, rather than of the work which art 
performs in us, within our being. Thus, in order to reach the origin of generative music, 
the typical hierarchical approach whereby music is defined in an objective sense must 
be abandoned in favour of one in which it is allowed to unfold or spread out into the 
open of its own accord, thus creating a path. This is what Heidegger would describe as 
‘coming into a ‘free relationship’1 with it. He states, ‘This relationship will be free if it 
opens our human existence to the essence of technology. When we can respond to 
this essence, we shall be able to experience the technological within its own bounds’.2 
This free relationship opens our existence which enables a response. Significantly, the 
order in which this process occurs is crucial; our existence is opened first, and the 
response proceeds from this. In this way, we attempt to evade the trap of subjectivity 
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in which the entity in question is reduced to some form of presence, which then 
becomes measurable, orderable, and, by extension, lacking a space for wonder and 
mystery to reside. Our existence is open, not our subjectivity. The shift is a subtle one, 
but one of the utmost importance. While it is difficult to define, it can be characterised 
as a shift from defining to one of questioning, or from decisiveness to inquisitiveness. 
Similarly, Eno discusses, and indeed embodies, this shift, as he discusses it as one ‘from 
‘architect’ to gardener’, where ‘architect’ stands for ‘someone who carries a full 
picture of the work before it is made’, to ‘gardener’ standing for ‘someone who plants 
seeds and waits to see exactly what will come up’.3 This is Eno’s exposition of 
Heidegger’s techne (architect) and poeisis (gardener), a relationship which he plays out 
musically just as Heidegger does textually. Thus, as we travel on this path toward 
generative music, or toward the origin of generative music, or toward generative 
music as origin (genesis), we return to nature, as in Eno’s metaphor. We encounter this 
movement or growth as it is embodied within these ‘plant seeds’, and the meaning 
grows through our relationship with its genesis process. Conversely, we do not 
encounter architectural constructs which already present a completed structure 
through which to move.  
These seeds, for our purpose, will necessarily be linguistic, as language mediates our 
being. Heidegger adopts and demonstrates this approach in his etymological 
explorations. He does not seek to idealize or idolize the ancient Greeks, as some have 
contended. Rather, he understands and seeks to demonstrate the fact that language is 
always embedded, and as such, it carries traces of meanings and usages which over 
time become obscured or forgotten. These meanings reflect specific experiences of the 
world from another time and place, and thus carry the latent power to speak to our 
present being. They can strike our ears in a new way, and thus enable or elicit a new 
listening. So in presenting words and exploring their origins and subsequent paths 
through time and embodied experience, we enter into the Open in which language 
informs, structures, and expresses being, and is able to do so in new and exciting ways. 
Language speaks being; however, this relationship is so intimate and close at hand that 
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we forget or are unable to witness this linguistic genesis which continually unfolds. 
However, we can perhaps catch a glimpse of it through retracing our steps.  
To Undergo an Experience 
In this way, the path toward the origin of generative music might begin with an 
examination of the ways in which it is defined. While we do not seek to define for the 
sake of ‘constructing a concept...just to be in possession of this concept’,4 an 
examination of these conceptual constructs can provide the possibility of ‘undergoing 
an experience with language’,5 which Heidegger describes: 
To undergo an experience with something—be it a thing, a person, or a 
god—means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, 
overwhelms and transforms us. When we talk of ‘undergoing’ an 
experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own 
making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as 
it strikes us and submit to it. It is this something itself that comes about, 
comes to pass, happens.6 
In other words, there exists a fundamental, radical passivity in experience; language 
speaks us, and we are subsequently revealed in this transformational process. 
Language carries the ability to ‘touch the innermost nexus of our existence’,7 which is 
perhaps another way of saying that our being resonates in and through language. The 
challenge becomes that of ridding ourselves of the habit of hearing ‘only what we 
already understand’,8 and hearing the process itself. This is the heart of generative 
listening; we listen to being as it unfolds. 
Music  
A linguistic exploration of generative music must first perhaps address that which is 
meant by ‘music’. Music as a concept is certainly not exempt from, and instead 
demonstrates, the alterations which language both undergoes and exerts. Thus, the 
history of music as conceptual construct demonstrates radical alterations and 
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revelations in the perceptions and receptions of music, but contains unifying elements.  
Most definitions involve some configuration of the three key elements of the process: 
the composer, the sounds, and the listener, and vary in their specifics according to 
social and cultural conceptions of the ensuing organization and subjective reception. 
For our purpose, computer music composer Eduardo Miranda’s definition is both 
concise and all-encompassing: ‘music is sounds organised in space and time’.9 
Significantly, if one substituted ‘Dasein’ for ‘music’ and ‘being’ for sounds’, we would 
effectively represent a shorthand or summary of Heidegger’s ontological project as 
articulated in Being and Time. I suggest that the validity of this substitutive formulation 
is indicative of the relationship between music and being which, in its specific 
embodiment and practice, suggests a manner of listening which exceeds and overflows 
subjective constructions.  
Generative Art  
While ‘music’, both as defined above and in practice, is necessarily a broad space 
within which to move, so too is ‘generative’. It typically references art, with music 
existing as a subset within generative art. Perhaps the most concise explication is that 
set forth by Philip Galanter, who states, ‘Generative Art refers to any art practice 
where the artist uses a system, such as a set of natural language rules, a computer 
program, a machine, or other procedural invention, which is then set into motion with 
some degree of autonomy to or resulting in a complex work of art’.10 This definition is 
significant for several reasons, the first of which is that it denotes a practice, which 
serves to dislodge notions of systems-based works as the abandonment of any creative 
intervention. Focusing on a practice also serves to ground the process within 
experience and proceed from it as origin, rather than occupying an abstract conceptual 
space which tries to map itself onto reality. Another key element is the autonomous 
(or semi-autonomous) motion which follows from the systemic or procedural 
inventions. This motion is genesis in the Greek sense, which will be discussed further. 
Finally, generative art is a practice which results in a complex work of art; the relative 
simplicity of the input is not reflected in the resulting complexity of the output. 
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Additionally, the materiality of the practice is less of a focal point in the sense of an 
end product; the results are continually in motion, and this generates complexity on a 
fundamental level, in addition to other complex sonic configurations which may be 
present in the work. 
Art  
Galanter’s definition, while concise, presupposes a conception of ‘art’. A concise 
definition which is congruous with that of music and generative music above is that of 
McCormack and Dorin, who state, ‘Fundamentally, art is understood as experience in 
context’.11 This perhaps brings us full circle, as this discussion seeks to explore a 
specific experience (embodied practice), in a specific context (space and time) and 
configuration (organized sound) which is, and embodies, motion which is to some 
degree self-perpetuating or generating.  
Despite the extremely broad field opened by the definitions above, not all music which 
is termed as ‘generative’ will be under discussion here. As the experience under 
exploration here is embedded in a practice which is both creative and receptive, some 
instances will inevitably by excluded, as we seek to explore a specific configuration of 
creativity and receptivity, or creative reception. Therefore, as practice is bound 
temporally and spatially to a context, we will seek not to define the practice or its 
results, but rather to create a conceptual space in which the appropriate elements can 
unfold, interact and resonate.  
The challenge thus becomes how to create a system textually which will elicit 
experiential resonance with the elements in question while not being overly 
constraining; the creative balance between specificity and ambiguity must allow for 
both freedom and distinction simultaneously. In this way, this discussion will serve as a 
textual analogue for generative music, as each conceptual step will serve to both 
ground and limit the present space while opening spaces for subsequent possibilities. 
In keeping with the bottom-up approach, the specific experience of creative reception 
will serve as a foundation from which to abstract the elements which are present 
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therein. The experience will find a textual expression through the resonance of its 
constituent elements rather than being linguistically compelled to appear in an 
imposed manner. The path is the process, and as we have seen in generative art, the 
process is essential. 
Algorithm  
We thus seek to abstract and formalize elements from a specific experience in order to 
recreate the conditions necessary for that experience to arise again. This is analogous 
to algorithmic composition, which is ‘composing by means of formalizable methods’.12 
While algorithmic composition is generally associated with computer composition, the 
formalizable methods, as embodied in the algorithms, are conceptual, and thus may or 
may not find technological application. As such, ‘algorithmic thinking processes’13 have 
been musically employed for centuries. An algorithm can be described as ‘any well-
defined computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as input and 
produces some value, or set of values, as output. An algorithm is thus a sequence of 
computational steps that transform the input into output.14 While the language seems 
exclusively computational, the crucial elements are not. At an ontological level, an 
algorithm is a series of steps which transform. The relationship between the initial 
element and the final element is one of both continuity and change, or that of 
becoming.  
Thus, the algorithm occupies a unique, if not problematic conceptual space, existing as 
both a highly specified tool and as an abstraction which can exist independently of 
implementation.15 Steve Goodman describes an algorithm as an ‘abstract machine’, 
which can exist ‘independently of their specific physical embodiments’.16 The 
algorithm’s formalization exists with the aim to ‘divorce (formal) expression from 
(material) content completely’.17 To remain focused on the abstraction, however, 
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would be to overlook the fact that ‘algorithms do things’,18 and this pragmatic link with 
material action ‘implies a confusion between the mathematics of algorithms and the 
physics of real processes’.19 This confusion results from overlooking the dynamic 
functioning of algorithms in context. As Goffey explains: 
[A]lgorithms work as part of a broader set of processes. Algorithms act, 
but they do so as part of an ill-defined network of actions upon actions, 
part of a complex of power-knowledge relations, in which unintended 
consequences, like the side effects of a program’s behaviour, can 
become critically important’.20 
Thus, an algorithm can be conceived as a perceptual pivot point between not only 
theory and praxis, but also between individual, constituent parts and systemic 
interactions.21 These simultaneously occupied territories suggest a liminality which 
place algorithms in a powerful position to negotiate conceptually and practically 
between and within the spaces of various states of being. 
Just as the algorithm can operate on a level which is both general and specific, where 
materiality and abstraction successively interact in increasingly complex formulations, 
so too is this liminal position similarly occupied by Brian Eno. He exists as a unique 
intersection between praxis and theory in a specific embodiment. His unique 
application of avant-garde compositional techniques in a popular music context 
coupled with his ability to articulate these processes and their significance place him in 
a unique position to mediate between the realms of philosophy and art as well as 
popular and avant- garde divides. His presence in these spaces allows for an organic 
unity to arise and move freely within our thought as it presents a general system of 
nodal points with which we can interact and explore cognitively. Perhaps most 
importantly, he exists as an absent presence in his own works by design, as he seeks to 
divorce identity and ego from his works. He seeks to open a sonic space of possibilities 
within which listening can unfold. Paradoxically, his works still exhibit an identity which 
is uniquely Eno’s, despite his deliberate surrender of creative control at crucial points. 
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It is this space of possibilities which will be abstracted and discussed—a space in which 
both mystery and familiarity coexist.  
In the Text and Texture 
How does one reach this space of possibilities, where materiality and abstraction co-
exist and co-mingle? The algorithm is again problematic, as the conception of it as an 
abstract machine presupposes its arrival into the originary space we seek to inhabit; to 
think of the algorithm in motion is to already think algorithmically. This issue 
effectively mirrors the situation in which Heidegger finds himself in thinking the 
question of being, as to think being is to immediately address ourselves as the 
question [Frage]. As Heidegger explains, ‘We ourselves are in the text and texture of 
the question…We ourselves are, in the strict sense of the word, put in question by the 
question’.22 In this way, we, as beings, do not ask questions; we live questions, or 
rather, our existence is an expression of and destined by questions. These questions 
are not, therefore, explicit formulations to which we seek answers but instead arise 
from our fundamental ontological situation and express themselves through our being 
as they enact successive transformations. In this way, I maintain that the question of 
the algorithm represents a fundamental pivot point at which we can identify ourselves 
as embodied questions.  
Although we can see our querical ontological reflection in the algorithm’s liminal 
positioning, this complicates rather than clarifies the issue, as the question exerts a 
force. It does not exist merely in the ether of thought; instead, it orients and expresses 
our being at a fundamental level. This means that as we live the question, the question 
lives us, and thus the question exerts a reciprocal influence on our being. As we live 
the question, we become the question, and thus our experience is both guided by and 
transformed by the question. Thus, thinking and questioning are inherently related just 
as thinking and being are, and when thinking, we ‘undergo an experience’ which is 
both formative and iterative. Heidegger describes thinking not as a ‘means to gain 
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knowledge’, but instead as something which ‘cuts furrows into the soil of Being’.23 I 
propose that these furrows naturally suggest a concrete expression in the algorithm.  
The problem for thinking, as Heidegger sees it, comes about when the shift occurred 
from thinking being to thinking about being, which inserted a space between the 
questioning and the beings it asked about. It shifted from ‘What is being?’ to ‘What is a 
being?’, which inextricably led to demarcations within the realm of being. This 
ultimately led metaphysics down the furrowed path toward an all-encompassing 
subjectivity which instead of attempting to view Being as a whole, as Aristotle’s project 
set forth, fragmented existence into subject-object relationships. As aesthetics 
receives its source from this same path, it becomes necessary to once again approach 
being as a whole as the fundamental, guiding orientation of thought. The unity in the 
work of art must correspond to a unity of and within Being first and foremost. Thus, a 
new movement must be adopted which springs from the originary question of Being as 
an embodied action. The question thus becomes, as it operates within us and through 
us as listeners, what started being on this path of the question? Or as Heidegger 
articulates it, ‘What is it that calls on us to think?’24 
The exploration of thinking is inherently self-referential, which presents the difficulty 
of arriving at an objective view of how to reach the un-thought. Heidegger’s 
conception of this dilemma is encapsulated by the fragment of Parmenides to which 
he refers, which states, ‘Thinking and the thought ‘it is’ are the same. For without the 
being in relation to which it is uttered you cannot find thinking’.25 Does this not 
presuppose an inherent subjectivity in the very act of thought? If thought depends 
upon and proceeds from being, is it not destined to be infinitely self-referential? This is 
the crux of the matter for Heidegger in his quest to both think being as a whole and to 
end the divisive metaphysical tradition: we must think being as a unity. In this way, the 
unity is expressed in the oneness of the ‘I think’, rather than the modern conception of 
the ‘I think’ creating a false unity, or totality, conceptually or representationally from 
subjectively demarcated realms of being. It is thus that in the situation of the 
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algorithm, we are not seeking to learn about being, but rather listen in to being as it 
unfolds. We seek a transformation from input to output in a series of steps which 
retains the unity of its being within its becoming: the algorithmic thinking process as a 
method retains the essential element which binds this unity: movement. 
Movement 
As with every linguistic construct, ‘movement’ as a concept has undergone significant 
alterations over time since Aristotle articulated his notion of metabolē. The path of 
changes between Aristotle and Newton’s conceptions of movement demonstrates the 
emergence of the subject-object split within Western thought. Motion26 in the widest 
Aristotelian sense is ‘the alteration of something into something else’ ,27 which 
includes as one category the transportation of a body from one location to another. 
This sense of motion is kinēsis, a type of metabolē, and finds its basis in the body itself. 
Movement arises from out of the body, and thus each body has a motion proper to it, 
as Heidegger summarises: ‘Each body has its place according to its kind, and it strives 
toward that place’. 28 In other words, a body moves in a certain way according to its 
embodiment and embeddedness, with being itself serving as the basis or ground for 
comparison.29 
 By way of contrast, the Newtonian sense of motion is calculated with respect to space 
and location, and is conceived as a state into which one enters. It is thus perpetual and 
presupposed. All types of being can enter into motion, and this conception disregards 
being as such; the circular motions of the planets and the linear movements of earthly 
bodies no longer constitute two types being and thus two types of motion. Their 
unique respective properties are subsumed under the law of motion. As Heidegger 
paraphrases Newton: ‘Every body left to itself moves uniformly in a straight line’.30 
Motion goes from being a unique property arising within beings to something which 
levels the differences among beings: beings don’t move in unique ways according to 
their individual essences and placements. Instead, beings enter into a unified state 
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which is governed by a law. For Heidegger, the issue is not the validity or utility of the 
techno-scientific formulation; rather, it is the replacement of one type of thinking with 
another. As modern Westerners, we find it difficult or even simplistic to attempt to 
view being as a whole, and thus to conceive of motion as something which arises from 
within being. Motion, for us, is a state entered into, during which each of us becomes 
subsumed under Newton’s ‘every body’. Motion has become disembodied.  
As the algorithm, as a series of transformational steps, carries within itself an implicit 
motion, its position between abstraction and materiality find the Newtonian laws of 
motion lacking in explanatory power. Thus, as the input is transformed into output, we 
find a particular resonance with Aristotle’s sense of metabolē, as the altering of 
something into something else. While the algorithm must be executed in relation to a 
pre-existing data structure, the distinction between the two is a formal one.31 In the 
process of computational application, the two are inseparable. The algorithm carries 
an impetus toward transformative motion which exists within its structure but which is 
set in motion through being ‘fed’ into a computer. The motion arises from the 
interaction or implementation, but comes about as the unity of form and material. 
Change is generated. This is the opposite process of formalization of languages, as 
Goffey explains, ‘formalization comes afterwards with natural languages, with 
algorithms, formalization comes first, the express aim being to divorce (formal) 
expression from (material) content completely. 32 In this way, the applied algorithm 
embodies a specific transformative motion in an abstracted way. Aristotle would find 
this strangely familiar.  
Genesis 
Just as the algorithm embodies change or movement in an initially abstract way, so too 
does being. The human being does not merely move around from one location to 
another. It also embodies a more fundamental movement in its coming to be, or 
genesis. As a movement from non-being into being, genesis occupies a unique position 
on the cusp of materiality and abstraction, presence and absence. As Aristotle states in 
Physics, ‘Change from not-being-there to being-there, the relationship being that of 
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contradiction, is genesis’.33 Thus, at the heart of genesis is contradiction,34 and genesis 
holds together and embodies this contradiction. In this sense, genesis is not a 
movement as such, but rather is a way of movement. Genesis manifests itself as a 
continual transformation during which becoming as a process is rendered as presence. 
As Brogan summarizes, ‘In genesis, a being sustains itself in its being as long as it is. 
The becoming is not such that it comes to be only when it reaches its end. In its coming 
to be, it already is’.35 Genesis is ontological movement, a way which unifies being and 
becoming.36 
As a unifying movement, genesis not only brings beings to presence, but also becomes 
manifest itself within and as the presencing process. This presents the difficulty of 
which Heidegger speaks in forgetting the being of Being; we are so close to the process 
as beings and it is so self-evident that we begin to overlook it completely. Aristotle 
addresses this quandary, stating the ‘ridiculousness’ of proving something which 
‘appears of and by itself’ and which manifests ‘everywhere among beings’.37 He admits 
the possibility that someone would be unable to make the distinction between that 
which is ‘familiar to all knowledge' and that which is not.38 By way of comparison, he 
explains that ‘[s]omeone born blind might try through a sequence of reflections, to 
acquire some knowledge about colors. Of necessity in this case, such people arrive at 
an assertion about the nominal meanings of the words for colors, but by these means 
they never perceive the least thing about colors themselves’.39 This comparison 
encapsulates the sense of that which is occurring for Heidegger in modern techno-
scientific thought which finds its origin in enframing; the danger exists in a way of 
seeing, or rather in a way of not seeing that which one is already viewing. The sense of 
unity which appears antecedently dissipates through enframing, and thus Heidegger 
laments that ’what already stands in view is seen with the greatest difficulty, is grasped 
very seldomly, is almost always falsified into a mere addendum, and for these reasons 
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simply overlooked’. 40 Genesis, therefore, inherently makes itself known while 
simultaneously withdrawing from sight.  
Physis 
It is thus that being is made manifest through genesis; it is a way of movement that is 
proper to a natural being which has the capacity to ‘arise...from out of itself’.41 Genesis 
is therefore the essence of physis,42 which is the cause, or originary ordering, of natural 
beings. Physis is described by Aristotle as ‘a lying-forth from out of itself’,43 and 
constituted for the Greeks their notion of nature. This has undergone radical 
alterations, as nature now indicates a separate realm of being which is calculated and 
controlled by man. Nature and being were originally one, as Heidegger explains: 
In the age of the first and definitive unfolding of Western philosophy 
among the Greeks, when questioning about beings as such and as a 
whole received its true inception, beings were called phusis. This 
fundamental Greek word for beings is usually translated ‘nature’. We 
use the Latin translation natura which really means ‘to be born’, ‘birth’. 
But with this Latin translation, the originary content of the Greek 
word phusis is already thrust aside, the authentic philosophical naming 
force of the Greek word is destroyed... Now, what does the 
word phusis say? It says what emerges from itself (for example, the 
emergence, the blossoming, of a rose), the unfolding that opens itself 
up, the coming-into-appearance in such unfolding and holding itself and 
persisting in appearance--in short, the emerging-abiding 
sway... phuein [the noun form of phusis] means to grow, to make 
grow.44 
As the ‘emerging-abiding sway’, phusis exerts a twofold movement. It is the coming 
into appearance (emerging) and thus the appearance itself (abiding sway) of beings;45 
it is both an emerging forth and an enduring.46 ‘Sway’ indicates the essence of the 
movement, the genesis which moves between two contradictory states and unites 
them. Thus, physis names the being of beings which is the crux of Heidegger’s 
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ontological project. It is in the forgetting of the togetherness of the twofold movement 
that the presence of being overtakes the coming into presence of being within 
thought. As Brogan explains, ‘The originary questioning of phusis inserts itself at the 
place of the difference between being and beings and thus sees how the unity of a 
being in its being occurs’.47 It is important to note that unity for Aristotle does not 
suggest a reduction to a single, common element. Rather, it is a belonging together. 
This belonging or self-sameness is not a static element, but instead ‘originates from a 
oneness that constantly gathers the many ways of being into a unity and a whole’.48 
We see this gathering process unfold in genesis, which is the essence of phusis, and 
thus the essence of being. 
Genesis, as emergence, is a crucial concept as it both manifests and traces the path for 
modern thinking back to a remembering or essential thinking of the being of Being. It 
can elicit this new way of ‘seeing’ in its sway between presencing and presence, thus 
allowing a shift in perspective to unfold. It is thus that as the question arises within the 
sway, we are able to enter into it. This is what it means to be in the text (presence) and 
texture (presencing) of the question; we enter into an encounter or event of presence 
with Being through engaging with genesis.  
From Genesis to Generative  
Generative music, I argue, exists as a technological manifestation of genesis; having its 
roots in genesis, it unfolds along path in such a manner that it occupies a liminal space 
between techne and phusis, between Eno’s architect and gardener. As algorithmic 
thinking, irrespective of technological application, is the dunamis (potentiality or force) 
of generative music, we are able to listen in to this type of thinking as it is embodied in 
generative music. In this way, I suggest that generative music enables a unique 
opportunity to rethink an encounter with the twofoldness of Being. As this generative 
encounter is embedded simultaneously in the work of art and technology, its essence 
manifests a twofoldness which mirrors that within the being of Being.  
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This generative position perhaps provides a path toward disentangling the inherent 
paradox in Heidegger’s thinking which ultimately exists between history and nature, 
knowledge and praxis. Through Heidegger’s illumination of everyday, engaged activity 
which enables an originary encounter with being and thus truth, we are always already 
immersed in technique. Arguably, technique reduces meaning to function, but this 
fundamentally reductive dichotomy itself exists only in the retrospective sense. 
Indeed, the pinnacle of the paradox of Heidegger’s technological critique is similarly 
retrospective, as Feenberg explains, ‘Only in the age of technology is it possible to 
adopt a synoptic view of the history of being such as Heidegger’s’.49 That is to say that 
only via technological means are we able to both view being and separate being as 
such from cultural and practical embeddedness; that which enables the way of seeing 
is paradoxically problematized as a reductive form of vision which tends toward 
exclusion. Heidegger has seen the history of being unfold technologically. Does this not 
naturally suggest that the return to thinking the being of Being will unfold from a 
similarly technological perspective? 
A Listening Nexus 
Technology is reductive not in its materiality, but rather as a way of revealing which 
has its roots in telos: that which is brought forth is ‘gathered together in advance...with 
a view to the finished thing envisaged as completed’.50 There exists a fundamental 
closing off of possibilities which might unfold from out of itself in the sense of phusis. 
The issue thus becomes the freedom of the generative motion. As techne is first a way 
of knowing, an epistēme, techne thus manifests itself in thought, and man becomes 
‘destined’ down a path shaped from the resulting possibility spaces created. We 
undergo an experience with techne, which is inherently predetermining. Within the 
predetermination exists the danger, as the presencing process is reified into presence. 
Significantly, Heidegger envisages the shift from the thinking along a predetermined 
path to that of one which proceeds from the natural unity of being as a shift involving 
not sight, but sound. He locates the nexus of freedom in the relationship of destining 
and listening, as he states: ‘For man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to 
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the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens, though not one who simply 
obeys’.51 In this way, I maintain that listening exists as a natural site or point of 
relations between passivity and action, freedom and determination, creation and 
reception.  
Passivity and Action 
In this rich nexus of relations which constitutes listening, a difficulty thus arises in the 
tension between the level of active engagement and passive embodiment. This tension 
first manifests temporally.  In Being and Time, Dasein lives inauthentically in 
‘everydayness’ in an indifferent and habitual existence. But one could claim the same 
habitual indifference which manifests with regard to the tool’s ready-to-hand status; 
the tool withdraws during use as the world made possible through use of the tool 
opens up before us. If the tool does not presumably withdraw into everydayness, it 
certainly demonstrates the notion of distance to which Heidegger refers when 
discussing thinking and listening in relation to Being. As he states, ‘What is ontically 
closest and most familiar is what is ontologically furthest, unknown and constantly 
overlooked in its ontological meaning’.52 Thus, our level of engagement and 
embeddedness is the proper condition under which truth can be revealed, and it is 
also the very condition which most conceals it. This concealment does not take place in 
our line of vision; rather, it takes place in our thoughts. As such, this relationship of 
distance develops between thinking and listening, as they are inherently linked: ‘to 
think is before all else to listen’.53 Thinking is first and foremost always already a 
‘listening into’ [Hineinhoren],54 for being itself is what gives us the grant which calls on 
us to think. But the link becomes one which gets overlooked, and as the source 
recedes from the horizon, thinking is abstracted from its source of origin. We no longer 
hear that we are hearing, and thus risk abandoning our creative capacity which is 
granted us in the reception process.   
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The seemingly infinite and problematic distance between engagement and 
embodiment is demonstrated by Heidegger himself with regard to thought, as he 
states, ‘Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not 
thinking’.55 The provocation occurs not so much in his assertion, but in the meta-level 
from which it necessarily proceeds; we are not thinking, and this presumably includes 
both the author of the text and the reader. So how does thought know that it is not yet 
thinking? Engagement tells us, as ‘we come to know what it means to think when we 
ourselves are thinking’.56 As we encounter limitations, we then become ready to ‘learn 
thinking’, at which point we have admitted that ‘we are not yet capable of thinking’.57 
The lack in ability is ascertained from praxis, as once again the negativity of the ‘broken 
tool’ speaks louder than the tool which acts as an extension of our hand, or in this 
instance, the mind. The distance is revealed in the space of limitation, which becomes 
abstracted from practice as a space of possibilities not yet realized. Thus for Heidegger, 
the seamless character of embodiment makes for good tool utilization, but is less 
conducive to authentic temporal engagement and its accompanying awareness. 
Freedom and Determination 
The space encountered by thought as it attempts to traverse between engagement 
and embodiment is analogous to the space between thinking and being; it is both 
infinite and infinitesimal. As thinking is the ‘structural relationship between man and 
Being’,58 the liminal position of the algorithm is called to mind. In both Being and the 
algorithm, presence is constituted structurally both by means of and in spite of the 
abstracted motion of coming to presence. The relationship of the individual being as a 
specific, material embodiment (presence) is both enabled and navigated by the 
abstracted motion of coming to presence as Being. Thus, a feedback loop is generated, 
as ‘[t]hought, to the extent that it proceeds from man, is in reciprocal relation to 
thought as it proceeds from Being’.59 It is only by way of thought that we can access 
the Being of being, and this thought is ‘called’ into motion by Being itself. 
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Consequently, one side of thought is always already approaching its destination as this 
is the same as its origin, while the other side must traverse back over its own path and 
is thus always slightly out of sync with itself, thus altering the way it must walk toward 
its origin. This loop of dependent movement between whole and constituent parts is 
otherwise known as the hermeneutic circle, which is dependent on both its own origin 
and fragmentation for the creation of meaning, or fulfilment of itself.  
As we are ‘called’ to a thinking which is a listening, this circle or loop exists not only as 
a path; it is also a resonance. One could say that in the swaying, contradictory 
movement between coming into presence and withdrawing, the ‘call’ sounds. This is 
the sound to which we are listening. This sound is not merely sensual; rather, it 
precedes the sensual plain, as the senses presuppose a temporal gathering in order to 
make sense of the perceptions. Instead, this sound would seem to both precede and 
instigate hearing, both in the perceptual and conceptual sense. It is orientational. In 
this way, thinking is a listening in to the process of becoming as we are unfolding now 
as it relates to Being, or present existence, as a whole. Thus, although Heidegger never 
states it as such, thinking is always aiming toward the unity of genesis, while hearing 
the contradiction produced through its strife. We aim to hear ourselves as complete, 
but can only recreate completion or unity antecedently.  
Listening, therefore, is the thinking called into being by Being through its very 
withdrawal. As such, man becomes, or embodies, a point of both abstraction and 
materiality, passivity and action as he becomes the very path between that which 
withdraws and that which presences. As Heidegger states, ‘[M]an is the pointer. Man 
here is not first of all man, and then also occasionally someone who points. No. Drawn 
into what withdraws, drawn toward it and thus pointing into the withdrawal, man first 
is man. His essential being lies in being such a pointer’.60 Man’s active pointing, which 
manifests as the questioning thought, coexists with his passive embodiment as 
‘pointer’, as one ‘caught in the draft of what draws, attracts us by its withdrawal...our 
essential being already bears the stamp of that “draft”’.61 
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As we are ‘drafted’ into thinking, and this process both marks and gives shape to our 
being, listening is revealed as a complex nexus of orientations. These orientations do 
not originate from us, rather, they result from the process of destining, which is ‘to 
send’ or ‘to start upon a way’.62 Heidegger calls it a ‘sending that gathers 
[versammelnde Schicken]’.63 In this way, that which is to be thought is granted 
[gewähren].64 While this does not mean that our thoughts are predetermined, the very 
act of thinking is a listening orientation, a listening in to an origin, which we neither 
initiate nor determine its realm of possibilities. The creative aspect of thought, 
however, exists in marking out the paths which thought will take. Thus, thinking is not 
an activity performed to reach some end. Rather, it proceeds from out of being itself. 
Its instigation is a reflection of the passive state of thrownness in which Dasein finds 
itself. As such, its freedom arises from its determined origin in the twofoldness of 
being and its inherent and subsequent movement. Thus, thinking as listening, as the 
orientation toward creative reception, is not so much an act which is performed as it is 
a process which is in perpetual development. To use Eno’s language, it grows in a 
bottom-up manner. Eno’s gardener, then, is one who safeguards and tends the seeds 
of thought which are sown in the event of the withdrawal of being. Thinking, and thus 
listening, is a non-hierarchical, bottom-up process which proceeds from an origin into 
distinct possibility spaces in which it can unfold. 
The point at which the soil furrows in its gathering and sending is the same point at 
which the gardener is implicated in the creative process. He or she can plow linear 
rows projected from the coordinate location of the initial bud, or he or she can allow 
the plant of origin to create its own path through spreading its seed in the ‘draft’ of the 
wind’s withdrawal. Both processes result in the organization of the plants, but each 
organizes the actions of the gardener in unique ways. Additionally, each process 
reveals distinct features of the plants themselves, as one indicates plant behaviour 
under highly ordered circumstances, and one under variable conditions which allows 
for more variation in response reciprocally. Thus, although these two possibilities are 
not mutually exclusive and can exist on a continuum, they demonstrate the basic 
mechanism of destining: our thoughts will organize (gather and send) our engagement 
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with our environment, and in this way the freedom of man is determined within the 
‘realm of destining’, with the ‘one who listens’ maximizing freedom over own ‘who 
simply obeys’.65 
As the gardener turns composer, we hear echoes of a destining, or ‘sending that 
gathers’, in the algorithm. The ‘sending’ would correspond to the originary movement 
of genesis holding sway within the formal, abstracted algorithmic structure, while the 
gathering occurs as the transformative steps meet their applied data structure. Thus, 
the algorithm can generate and organize our experiences with sound which will ring 
both in our level of everyday experience and also echo our thinking origin as a listening 
in to the grant. Therefore I argue that we are thus engaged in a twofold listening, a 
double listening, one on an ontological level as we listen in to being, and one on a 
perceptual, cognitive level as we engage with music in the context of the art 
experience. As the sonically applied algorithm makes its way along a path from 
abstract thought to material implementation, its ‘gathering’ capacity exceeds that of 
external data; it gathers experience and thinking into listening and music, thus acting 
as a possible bridge between the ontic reception of sound with the ontological hearing 
of being. 
Algorithmic Essence 
Thus far, the term ‘algorithm’ has been considered in its most general, abstracted 
sense. The term is derived from both the Greek word for number [arithmos] as well as 
from name of the Persian mathematician Abu Jafar Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi 
(780-850 A.D.).66 Al-Khwarizmi’s  treatise on calculation was translated into Latin in 
1150 A.D., along with a Latinized variation of his name (Algorismus), and served as an 
introduction of the Indian numerical system to the Western world. The combinatory 
nature of the term’s etymology as well as the translational transformation of his name 
almost suggest the function it has come to denote.  
Certainly very specific, computational definitions exist, as computer scientist Donald 
Knuth explores in his article ‘Algorithmic Thinking and Mathematical Thinking’, which 
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seeks to uncover ‘the actual role of the algorithm in mathematical sciences’ while 
maintaining a relatively broad algorithmic definition himself.67As he explains, ‘I tend to 
think of algorithms as encompassing the whole range of concepts dealing with well-
defined processes, including the structure of data that is being acted upon as well as 
the structure of the sequence of operations being performed; some other people think 
of algorithms merely as miscellaneous methods for the solution of particular problems, 
analogous to individual theorems in mathematics’.68 Thus, while not every practitioner 
uses the term ‘algorithm’ in the same way, the definitions which tend toward 
abstraction can be found among computer scientists and not just composers and 
philosophers. However, as we wish to situate the algorithm via its action and 
mediating function on an ontological level, and specifically as this applies to a music 
composition process which may or may not involve computational procedures as such, 
the definition previously adopted is both appropriate and suitable for these purposes. 
This is not to preclude more delineated definitions, but rather examine the algorithm 
in relation to being in its generative application. 
As a series of transformative steps, the algorithm of our delineation is situated toward 
the general end of a continuum ranging from universal to highly specified definitions. 
However, both the steps and the transformation which comprise this definition 
suggest an ontically organizing capability or function, whereby a field is both created 
and delineated and the ensuing possibilities of variety manifested. In this way, I argue 
that the algorithm as a practice both of thought and as compositional tool occupies a 
crucial place between techne and phusis, destining and enframing. While Heidegger 
would immediately situate it on the side of technological enframing, our usage 
demonstrates an inherent movement which exists on a level which precedes that of 
technological determinism. While this does not preclude the algorithm from being 
utilized as such, or present the argument that all algorithms in practice behave in one 
way, it does allow for an algorithmic essence to arise which opens up the problematic 
area of technological genesis.  
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Heidegger’s argument toward algorithmic enframing would likely, had he ever 
specified one, be situated in terms of moving in the ‘wrong’ direction from concrete to 
abstract, which inherently suggests an aspect of manipulability and control. The 
directionality of movement, however, is not only reversed in the implementation 
process (moving abstracted steps into concrete transformations), but ignores the 
fundamental characteristic currently at stake: the algorithm acts, and in its 
transformative action, it contains the possibility of remaining sensitive to the present 
variables in each successive step along the way. If so composed, the algorithm can be 
self-reacting, and thus the level of control exerted from this motion  would only be 
ascertainable by considering both its compositional structure as well as the data 
structure on which it is implemented, which necessarily involves a complex web of 
environmental interrelationships.  
Perhaps the unique feature of The Question Concerning Technology lies in the fact that 
Heidegger does not examine technology from a material standpoint. Instead, he 
locates the origin of technology in thought itself, with technological application and 
the material manifestation of instrumentation following secondarily. In this way, it is 
not only historically accurate but also consistent with Heidegger to locate the essence 
of the algorithm similarly within thought. Indeed, the development of the algorithm as 
such required developments in thought which trace all the way back to the origin of 
counting and the creation of related symbolic, and thus abstracted, systems. Another 
landmark along the developmental path of the algorithm is made by Aristotle himself 
in the further development and formalization of logic. Nierhaus locates this as the 
beginning of the ‘formalization of thinking processes’, as it presupposes a unifying 
regularity in thought. As he explains, ‘The basis for logical reasoning is thinking, which 
is assumed to be in principle consistent’.69 While Heidegger sees ontology as prior to 
logic and in fact distrusts formal logic, he nonetheless affirms the fundamental 
assumption that thinking presents unified features. If this were not the case, 
enframing would not be a concern, as enframing itself would presumably find a unique 
application within each thought process it encountered, thus disarming itself of any 
certain danger posed.  
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Aristotle not only provides the point of origin for the development of logic into a 
closed sytsem, as explicated in the Organon and in Metaphysics (Nierhaus points out 
that these titles mean ‘tool’ or ‘method’ and ‘after physics’ respectively),70 but also 
founds the very genesis of Heidegger’s own line of philosophical questioning regarding 
being. In his letter to William Richardson, Heidegger explains that the first 
philosophical work which he examined was Franz Bentano’s dissertation, entitled ‘On 
the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle’. In this work, he encountered a phrase by 
Aristotle which translates: ‘A being becomes manifest (sc. with regard to its Being) in 
many ways’.71 This phrase would prove to be the most influential on Heidegger, as he 
explains: 
Latent in this phrase is the question that determined the way of my 
thought: what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of being 
that permeates all of its multiple meanings: This question raised others: 
What, then, does Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does the 
Being of beings unfold in the four modes which Aristotle constantly 
affirms, but whose common origin he leaves undetermined? One need 
but run over the names assigned to them in the language of the 
philosophical tradition to be struck by the fact that they seem, at first, 
irreconcilable: Being as property, Being as possibility and actuality, Being 
as truth, Being as schema of the categories. What sense of Being comes 
to expression in these four headings? How can they be brought into 
comprehensible accord?72 
Heidegger then retraces the subsequent path his thought has taken through time in an 
attempt to answer this question, as ‘a great deal of swerving and straying’ through 
Western philosophy occurred.73 The path was not random, however, as it was always 
guided by this original question of the Being of beings which thus required Being to 
remain the ‘first and last thing-itself of thought’.74 In this way, the question provided 
an initial input which, through a series of philosophical steps by way of 
phenomenology and Greek thought, came through the transformation process as the 
output contained in Being and Time, continuing on in a slightly modified form 
thereafter. While the order of the steps only became apparent to Heidegger in 
retrospect, one could almost compose an algorithmic path to ascertain the value of the 
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Being of being, starting from the question as origin toward subsequent steps in which 
their respective conditions contain being as both an initial state and end state to the 
final ontological formulation as explicated in Being and Time.  
The suggestion of an algorithmic thinking process latent in Heidegger’s philosophical 
journey is not meant to be reductive; rather, it is an attempt to draw out the rich 
variety generated from the combination of an initial four relatively simple elements, as 
evidenced in what is regarded as one of the most seminal philosophical works of the 
century. The underlying relationship after which Heidegger sought generated a 
complexity which was virtually unintuitable from the original elements or seeds.  While 
the process is obviously not strictly algorithmic in nature, the presence of elements 
common to algorithmic thinking as a process might be made further apparent through 
the examination of a musical application of algorithmic thinking.   
Examples of algorithmic composition can be traced back to the Middle Ages, in which 
the abstracted mapping systems such as that of Guido of Arezzo gave rise to the 
automatization of melody generation .75 But a more recent relative of present day 
generative music is that of Arnold Schoenberg’s twelve-tone technique. By treating the 
twelve tones of the chromatic scale as equally important in relation to one another, 
the organization of notes was liberated from the traditional hierarchy of tonality. This 
new organization based on the twelve tone set initially involved algorithmic thinking as 
tool to generate material which was subsequently modified during the composition 
process. As Miranda summarises, ‘a twelve-tone piece can be thought of as a 
perceptual variation on the series using a few prescribed transformational 
mechanisms’.76 He offers an algorithmic transposition of an array of numbers 
representing the twelve semitones: 
BEGIN transpose(A[n], amount) 
     B[n] = create_empty_array(12) 
     FOR x = 1 TO 12 
          DO B[x] = A[x] + amount 
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157 
 
     END transpose(B[X])77 
He describes the formula, stating: 
The input for the algorithm is an array A(n) containing the twelve notes, 
and the amount to be transposed in terms of semitones. Firstly, the 
algorithm calls a subroutine to create an empty array B(n) of a size equal 
to 12; this array will contain the transposed notes. Then, the elements 
of the array A(n) are retrieved one at a time, transposed and placed in 
array B(n). Once the loop terminates, the algorithm returns the array 
B(n) containing the transposed notes. For example, if one calls 
transpose([62, 70, 68, 66, 65, 60, 58, 72,  70, 62, 70, 72], 5), then the 
result will be [67, 75, 73, 71, 70, 65, 63, 77, 75, 67, 75, 77].78 
The process for retrograde, inversion, and retrograde inversion all involve variations on 
the ordering and manipulation of the empty array. While the algorithm cited above is a 
concrete formulation of an algorithmic thinking process, it is in its most abstracted 
form. A series of steps could be written out to manually test the functioning of each 
line. In this sense, the algorithm is not strictly computational, as its materially 
embedded existence historically preceded its computational derivation.  
Parataxis 
As the twelve-tone technique intrinsically involves the computation of numbers, the 
comparison with Heidegger’s inherently linguistic thought process might still seem 
elusive. The fundamental connection, however, lies less in the structure of the process 
and more in its implementation. That is to say that we do not hear the freedom of the 
dissonance ring in the creation of the algorithm’s subroutines; rather, we hear a new 
organization emerge as sounds are juxtaposed and patterned in ways which become 
apparent by way of their relative positioning. Similarly, the common denominator of 
Aristotle’s four manifestations of Being emerges paratactically; an array is created and 
transposed within thought of being’s four manifestations, with each step delimiting 
potential values of a common denominator through the movement between elements. 
Thus, a new harmony results in both Heidegger’s being and Schoenberg’s song, as the 
structure of this harmony is not predetermined by the listener and mapped onto the 
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listening process. Instead, it evolves through the placement and subsequent 
interactions of the constituent elements.  
This paratactic method of placement became one of increasing significance for 
Heidegger, as he continually sought to move both within and beyond the 
transcendental language of his earlier works, attempting an approach toward the 
horizon in which continuity and transcendence intersect. This double desire for both 
continuity and transcendence is at the very least congruous with the abstraction and 
materialization tension present in the algorithm’s essence, and is virtually identical to 
the double, contradictory desire present in the human-technology relationship(s) 
which Don Ihde describes. Thus, in both technological and linguistic praxes, we often 
desire the transformative results of the ensuing relationship while simultaneously 
desiring that the transformation still embody the initial state in its original form. We 
want to transform through mediation without being mediated ourselves.                 
The manifestation of this double desire and its attempted resolution through parataxis 
can be seen in Heidegger’s introduction and increasing evocation of poetry, 
particularly that of Hölderlin. It is within poetry that Heidegger locates the site of ‘the 
poetic experience with the word’79 and this poetic experience is inherently musical. 
Heidegger most often evokes the notion of music through repeated references to 
‘singing’ and ‘song’: ‘[p]oetry is song’.80 Poetry thus becomes a way to draw attention 
to the sonic attributes of the process of signification as it occurs during reception 
rather than through its subsequent conferment, as Heidegger states, ‘The song is sung, 
not after it has come to be, but rather: in the singing the song begins to be a song’.81 
Thus, in poetry one can hear the words sound, and this sound contains the echo of 
Dasein’s appropriation into the very process which enables meaning to arise. As 
Adorno states, ‘The transformation of language into a concatenation, the elements of 
which combine in a manner different from that of judgment, is a musical one’.82 In this 
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way, I maintain that the importance of the poetic experience with the word lies in its 
ability to invoke a way of reception which bypasses understanding and the 
preconceptions which it carries with it. To undergo this experience is to reattune to the 
origin of being, and this transformation is a musical one.  
Heidegger’s utilization of Hölderlin’s poetry seeks to subvert the ontological distance 
which arises between our everyday language usage and our awareness of being 
involved in the meaning-conferring process. Our ears become so accustomed to 
language that we can no longer hear either what it says or how it sounds. Heidegger 
explains: 
It is just as much a property of language to sound and ring and vibrate, 
to hover and to tremble, as it is for the spoken words of language to 
carry a meaning. But our experience of this property is still exceedingly 
clumsy, because the metaphysical-technological explanation gets 
everywhere in the way, and keeps us from considering the matter 
properly.83 
Thus, the way in which poetry is organized as well as its musical indication of sonic 
properties is pre-predicative resonance; the sound exists on a level which both 
precedes and grounds the possibility of meaning creation. In this way, poetry becomes 
a tool by which Heidegger attempts to mediate the experience of the pre-predicative, 
or ‘pre-logical manifestness’84 level of meaning. As Dasein comes to embody the song 
whose instrumental properties withdraw during use like the hammer, poetry becomes 
the ‘pointer’ toward a musicality which is in constant withdrawal. 
The poetic (musical) experience with language reveals a nexus in which sound, 
organization and signification meet in the locus of Dasein. As Dasein is both the 
common origin and the point of convergence for these ontic manifestations, the 
experience of this point intrinsically implicates a systemic abstraction which in turn 
‘calls’ the implementation of a technique (techne) into play. Dasein’s hammer which 
withdraws into the background and advances into the foreground is thus not an 
instrumental novelty; it is an external manifestation of this internal nexus. There exists 
no quantitative difference and yet every qualitative difference between the world of 
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the functioning, withdrawn hammer and the world of the broken, protruding hammer.  
The poetic experience, the musical experience, and indeed the experience of the work 
of art embodies this strife and calls attention to the extant simultaneities therein, thus 
facilitating our movement between them. This poetic, musical, artistic experience is 
thus a transformation not of the world, but of Dasein, and thus of the world.  
While poetry, music, art and language occupy various positions on this experiential 
continuum, it is important to remember that the concepts as such are subjective 
constructs which perhaps create divisions between ontic distances which are at best 
minute. This is not to conflate signification and interpretation, nor form and substance, 
but rather to suggest that on the ontological level, being first receives a call which 
founds, orients, and patterns all subsequent ‘aesthetic’ responses. Thus, while it falls 
outside the present scope to discuss the exact nature of the relationship between 
music and language in terms of signification, the sonorous properties (sound organized 
in space and time) serve as foundation both ontologically and for our purposes 
textually. Furthermore, music shares language’s propensity for accustomization, and as 
such occupies a similar situation to that of technology; it contains the essence of the 
sonorous saving power which is in danger of fading from earshot when objectified. We 
seek, after Heidegger, a transformation which has the power to disaccustom Dasein to 
a way or manner of being which forgets or overlooks its origin from being itself. We 
seek a transformation which will mediate between ways of thought. As this 
transformation is always already latent within our thinking experience, we do not seek 
to simply replace one thinking experience with another. Rather, we seek what 
Heidegger calls ‘the echo of a thinking experience, the possibility of which we are 
trying to bring before us’.85 
The possibility of this transformative experience must occur at this nexus of relations 
which comprises listening as creative-receptive origin. Thus, if we trace listening on its 
ontological path from Being to Dasein as a receptive, background relation to the 
creation of a foregrounded, abstracted system of play, we arrive at the point of techne 
which mediates between the internal, embodied call from being and the external echo 
of this experience as it is heard in the musical experience. As our technology is the 
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instrumental manifestation of techne in its essence, I suggest that the human-
technology relationship is the interface at which Dasein can undergo this listening 
transformation. Thus, Ihde’s four human – technology relationships are exactly such 
points where such a shift may be performed. Due to the ontological closeness of our 
engagement with technology, language, and even music, we are unable to see or hear 
the subtle transformations which occur at the point of ontic involvement.  
Thus, in attempting to express this quandary about language through the use of 
language, Heidegger employed two mechanisms by which attention could be drawn to 
the point at which signification is both received, as in the ringing of the word, and 
created, as in the song of the ringing. One main feature was the use of paratactic 
constructions such as those embodied in poetry. Another mechanism, which both 
necessitated and enabled the implementation of the first, was a reversal, or turn 
[Kehre], during which the direction of his thought changed. This perhaps first 
manifested in the divisions within Being and Time, which began in that order and 
progressed to Time and Being. His initial ‘array’ consisting of the ontological structures 
which constitute being was now set into a Schoenbergian retrograde, as the claim and 
call made to Dasein as being became the focal point. He sought to clarify the bond 
between Dasein and Being, or the being of Being, by approaching it from the opposite 
direction. Thus, Heidegger’s thought did not change as such; the seeds for the reversal 
were present both in his thinking and in the nature of the subject of thought prior to 
his arrival at the turn. Additionally, the reversal requires the presence and continuity of 
its inverse in the same way in which Schoenberg’s derivative sets depend upon the 
ordering of the initial set.  
The reversal, or turn, in Heidegger’s thought exists on several levels, and has been 
interpreted and misinterpreted in numerous ways. Perhaps the key to understanding 
the turn is that Heidegger received this reversal from the subject matter of his 
thought. As he explains, ‘The reversal is in play within the matter itself. Neither did I 
invent it nor does it affect merely my thought’.86 Thus, I suggest that the 
transformative space which we seek to inhabit exists in the experience of the reversal; 
Heidegger locates the possibility of the poetic experience with language within ‘the 
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being of language—the language of being’.87 To hear that we hear and how we hear is 
to hear both our own implication in and necessity to the process of meaning, the truth 
of being. Our own appropriation into this process itself necessarily means that any 
transformation within the process is a transformation of ourselves as being. Heidegger 
states: 
What is at stake is a transformation in man’s Being itself. This 
transformation is not demanded by new psychological or biological 
insights. Man here is not the object of any anthropology whatever. Man 
comes into question here in the deepest and broadest, in the genuinely 
fundamental, perspective: man in his relation to Being—sc. in the 
reversal: Beon and its truth in relation to man.88 
Thus, the question of the truth of being becomes a listening in to the call, to the sound 
of destining which appropriates and requires man for its being. Man is an expression of 
and response to this call first and foremost on the most fundamental level, and the 
movement inherent in the reversal is not observable as such, but rather is only able to 
be experienced.  
Aesthetic Reversal: Reversing Aesthetics 
In the text and texture of the question thus lies man. He has gotten lost in the text into 
which he is always being written, and the texture has become obscured. He can no 
longer hear the ways in which he speaks the text, nor the ways it speaks him. To 
overcome this infinite distance of that which is closest at hand requires a series of 
steps, a transformative experience with listening, in order to reach our own becoming. 
To ‘become what we are’, we must ‘hear’ ‘how’ we are. This is a process rather than an 
event, and its unfolding implicates an essential music.  The challenge thus lies in the 
creation and reception of a music which presents us with hearing, which makes 
hearing itself present. We must listen past the text, the patterns of melody and 
rhythm, even past the unity of form and function. We must enter the texture, the 
unity. Thus, a new listening encounter with the essence of music as a unity requires a 
new aesthetics.  
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A new aesthetics cannot be created; it has to come to us, arrive at our being from the 
horizon of thought. We have to be attuned to it; we must listen in for it. It must be 
positioned both toward and away from us as beings in order to capture the sway of 
genesis in movement. Its path will not be linear, but circular, as it moves between 
being and becoming toward genesis. It must approach truth on its operative level, the 
one which both founds and enables our subsequent subjective constructions of 
correspondence and reference.  To reach this fundamental level is to reveal that truth 
is not constructed; rather, it grows. It is an invisible garden which surrounds us 
everywhere, and the only thing required to catch sight of it, or enter into it, or even to 
hear it, is a subtle shift that occupies the moment between creativity and reception. To 
approach the movement of this moment requires the creation of a space in which an 
echo of our presencing can reverberate and call us forward toward presence. This is 
the infinite unity of music, the sound of which we both hear constantly and listen to 
seldom. The call is in the endless iterations of infinite generations of sound, sound 
which rises up only to unite being and Being again.  
To move toward a new listening and a new aesthetics, we recall both the reciprocal 
ontological positioning between being and music and also the reversal which leads 
beyond subjectivity. We thus turn back to Heidegger’s question regarding Aristotle to 
formulate our guiding questions. It stands thus modified:  
What is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of (music) being 
that permeates all of its multiple meanings...What, then, does (music) 
Being mean? How can they be brought into comprehensible accord 
(heard)?89 
We must read the space between music and Being as one of listening. This is the space 
of possibilities in which we could hear music not as the sonic correspondence to a 
recording or performance but rather as a single being which repeatedly raises its head 
above the sonic horizon in an infinite horizon of space and time. If we could glimpse 
this unity, a corresponding aesthetic might manifest alongside it. In doing so, we could 
free more than the dissonance; we could liberate the entire palate of our listening. The 
binding ties between subject and object would dissolve, as the movement between 
music and being generate their own rhythmic bond. We could embody music, to 
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indicate it or ‘point’ to it with and through our being, and dissipate the ‘who’ of our 
being into its ‘how’. We could rest in the absent presence of its ambiance, knowing 
that we do not have to infinitely recreate it; we need only call it forth. 
We thus seek a reversal of our own. While the unity of both music and the aesthetic 
evaluation thereof exists as an aspiration, this aspiration arises from the unity present 
in our most fundamental orientation to being, in our truth of being. Thus, it is only in 
the thinking of the aspiration that one might undergo the shift, as the path is the 
process. As Heiddeger insisted, ‘the thinking of a reversal is a change in my thought’;90 
his thought did not change independently of its path. Therefore, we recall his 
admonition that ‘Instead of the groundless, endless prattle about the ‘reversal’, it 
would be more advisable and fruitful if people would simply engage themselves in the 
matter mentioned’.91 Thus, we move from being and music to music and being.  
An Ambient Origin 
We thus arrive back at the beginning, a new transformed beginning that carries with it 
the retraced steps between its being and becoming. This new origin, or original 
happening, thus traces and retraces the steps of our cyclical path, encircling the space 
in which a transformation can occur. Our steps draw around this transformative space 
in which the call to thinking is drawn out of the echo of listening. We are in the 
ambience of the origin, which, as ambient origin, provides further linguistic direction 
on our path. As Adelio Fusè explains in his essay ‘Ambient Music’:  
Eric Tamm... rightly notes that the word ‘ambient’ derives from the Latin 
ambiens, present pariticple of the verb ambire, meaning ‘to go around’. 
Tamm also notes that ‘the prefix amb—is used in words like 
‘ambiguous’, ambidextrous’ and – a word Eno might particularly relish – 
ambitendency, ‘the state of having along with each tendency a 
countertendency’.92 
This duality of tendencies, as it manifests in ambiguity, echoes Heidegger’s 
‘ambitendency’ latent within technology between the danger and the saving power. 
This places us within a shifting space of decision between two possible paths of 
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thought, a space between possibilities and actualities. In this way, I suggest that 
Heidegger’s almost complete silence with regard to music presents a fertile space in 
which to examine Brian Eno’s generative music, as the lack of preconceived ideas 
about music allows new notions to arise which may otherwise have been blocked. We 
have travelled along a path which found its origin in Heidegger’s expressions and 
expounding of ontological parameters which both place us as beings into the picture 
and also implicate us as co-creators of the picture.  
Thus, we find ourselves, at least certain moments in which we confront ourselves, as 
living manifestations of the Borgesian Conundrum, which questions whether the writer 
creates the text or the text creates the writer. And so it is with music. Perhaps this is 
the most succinct positing of the topic at hand in Heidegger’s ‘Origin of the Work of 
Art’. The work of art both proceeds from the artist and finds expression through the 
artist, thus creating the artist as such in the process. But the space in between, in 
which the hermeneutic circle circles and certainty and ambiguity are concentric 
neighbours, is the space in which the possibility of the art working, working on us and 
in us, occurs. This space is one which Heidegger describes as a sort of infinite, intimate 
battlefield of revealing and concealing, hiding and appearing, which has annexed its 
territory of battle within our minds. Our engaged experience with the work of art, 
indeed with generative music here and now, will determine that which we deem real, 
that which we see as possible, and that which we create from the two. The space is 
one which exists in our thoughts. The music, thus, arrives toward our thoughts; we 
receive it. In this way, the essence of music remains concealed. We cannot arrive at it 
through analysis or dissection. Philosophy, on its best day, can remind us of those 
moments of reception in which absolute presence and clarity arrived and our thoughts 
were for a moment organized accordingly, as if from an outside force which came both 
from without and within simultaneously and removed us from ourselves for a 
moment. Metaphorically speaking, it is like that which Eno compares to the experience 
of a child walking in a forest, an experience which he tries to capture or recreate in his 
ambient compositions: 
The idea is to create the feeling of being in a landscape...It’s as though 
there would be this chaos of events going on , and suddenly they would 
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knot together and compose themselves in a beautiful way. Something 
ecstatic happens, and then it all drifts apart again.93 
This is how the shift feels. This is a feeling of being slightly out of control. The more it 
persists, the more we ourselves are lost in the distinction between creator and 
receiver, as possibilities latent within and echoing through infinite manifestations of 
sound and phrase and turn of pitches seem to resonate in a prism-like fashion in our 
minds, uncovering furrows in thought which we could not achieve in and of ourselves 
alone. This is the space, of generative listening, the moment in which we can hear 
echoes of freedom. This is Eno’s message, and it pervades his music, his creative 
practice, and his aesthetic thought. This message, however, is potentially lost on an 
audience that remains trapped in the confines of the frivolity of the subjective art 
experience, failing to realize both the true liberation at stake and also what is at stake 
in this freedom. Thus, I suggest that Heidegger has paved a befitting path which, as it 
meanders through and encompasses Gadamer and Levinas, situates a unique space in 
which modern day art practices can settle and unlock its subsequent progression. We 
thus have the message. We have the messengers. What we lack here and now is the 
music. 
The Aesthetic Event 
Any person, whether musician, philosopher, or both, who embarks upon the 
formidable task of writing about music will encounter the inherent impossibility of 
writing about it and encountering it at the same time. We are always just before it, or 
just after it. We chase its traces and spectres. Perhaps the problem confounds itself in 
the case of generative music, as this by definition unfolds autonomously in real time. 
We seek here to textually explore an experience, and furthermore wish to transcend 
the subjective nature of this from within. We thus arrive in a space which is perhaps 
best describable through analogy. Jorge Louis Borges, as one who repeatedly wrote 
texts about writing itself and embedded traces of other stories toward which he hinted 
but never arrived, can place us within the area which we need to be. He describes this 
moment, the ‘aesthetic experience’ thus: 
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Music, feelings of happiness, mythology, faces worn by time, certain 
twilights and certain places, want to tell us something, or they told us 
something that we should not have missed, or they are about to tell us 
something; this imminence of a revelation that is not produced is, 
perhaps, 'the aesthetic event'.94 
Borges not only sets the tone here, but also the time—in his typically non-linear 
striving for something always future, or always past, or even both, we are placed on 
the cusp a cyclical time when we await. This awaiting is both initiated by and 
culminated in the ‘aesthetic event’, of which music heads the procession.  It is within 
the imminence of a revelation that doesn’t arrive in which Heidegger and Eno 
converge from opposite ends of the same moment to reveal an Opening or space in 
which the trace of this experience can come forth.  
Like the stories Borges references within his own but never quite recounts, so we are 
with the generative music moment. As our eyes move over the text on the page, we 
read our future possibilities of this moment into the present actualities of Heidegger’s 
textual world. This hermeneutic reading, during which we read a new world into and 
through the unfolding of the language, is part of the moment to which we seek to 
draw attention. The inherent self-referentiality of any mediating presence is part of 
our experience in this moment, and one that is often glossed over in the process of 
judgment or rational thinking toward some end. One function of a certain art, as 
Heidegger found in poetry and likewise Eno in music, lies in both drawing attention to 
this process and celebrating it. This is the creative part of the process, during which we 
receive our own capacity to shape worlds and appropriate meaning. This is part of 
Borges’ elusive revelation.  
Eno’s approach to text as it appears lyrically reflects a keen awareness of both 
language’s pragmatic and sensorial side; he works both with how it sounds and what it 
does. As he tells us in 1975’s Another Green World  on ‘Sky Saw’: 
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All the clouds turn to words 
All the words float in sequence 
No one knows what they mean 
Everyone just ignores them95 
As if to demonstrate his assertion, he overlays another verse of nonsensically strung 
together words and we hear both verses simultaneously. While Eno seldom employed 
lyrics after his initial four solo albums, as further evidenced within his generative 
output, his utilization of words is often organized around sound, as if to use them as 
another instrument, though witty combinations often appear. Thus, the vapour-like 
essence of words and their meanings unfold in relative obscurity to everyone’s 
awareness of this process; as Heidegger similarly laments, ‘Most thought-provoking in 
our thought provoking time is that we are still not thinking’.96 
Thus on this path, Eno has placed us in the moment and has set a work in motion—set 
truth to work—in and through his artwork. He has provided the work occasion for the 
shift. Heidegger, Gadamer and Levinas have been present too, leading up to this 
moment, each in his own way and capacity. Heidegger has prepared the ground, the 
origin, from which we will make the leap of and into the moment. He has delineated 
the parameters of our existence and possibilities for experience of being and with 
being. Gadamer then steps in to set the process in motion—we enter into the moment 
and this is the hermeneutic encounter. Levinas follows along immediately behind, just 
like the knowledge which results from the hermeneutic encounter, to describe and 
open up the spaces on either side of the moment, between being and becoming 
(genesis).  
We have thus been given [granted] a map toward an experience, a schematic which 
can signpost our journey. The pieces won’t be forced into a [Gestell] grid; rather, they 
themselves will shift and sift and collide and drift into their respective places within 
this encounter. We seek only to follow the lead of the swaying movement which runs 
through all the pieces—listener, music, technology, art—and this will trace out and 
track the path which arises in its wake—the one which we now walk. We now attempt 
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a shift from walking to hearing, from thinking to being. This is the path of generative 
listening. 
Shift 
The Ambient Moment 
We arrive first at an injured Eno’s bedside for our first moment, revisiting a moment 
previously recounted. The scene is thus: 
Lying immobile in bed, grateful for the enforced sabbatical, [Eno] would 
listen to records played by visiting friends. One day it was harp music, 
with the volume turned so low that the plucked strings were almost 
inaudible. ‘At first I thought, ‘Oh God, I wish I could turn it up,’ Eno 
remembers. ‘But then I started to think how beautiful it was. It was 
raining heavily outside and I could just hear the loudest notes of the 
harp coming above the level of the rain’. As he listened, Eno decided 
that this ‘melted-into-the-environment quality’ was what he wanted in 
his music and his life.97 
This was Eno’s broken hammer moment in reverse. He is able to turn the obtruding 
malfunction into an embodied tool of utility. While the site of transformation is clearly 
internal within his thought process (‘but then I started to think’), the focal point of the 
shift is directed toward external relationships between background and foreground. 
This is a key point both for the shift and for the future beginning of his generative 
music—the background is the territory which becomes aesthetically occupied.  
It is important to note that the breakdown occurs technologically, thus enabling a 
pragmatic adjustment which necessitates a shift along the continuum of human-
technology relations. The stereo and harp music recording occupy varying positions 
within thought, as the initial hermeneutic listening is interrupted as the technology 
malfunctions into alterity, followed by an adjusted hermeneutic-background relation. 
The movement between relations highlights that the shift occurs within the focus of 
perception, suggesting that the real broken hammer in this moment was only that of 
Eno’s own immobility; obstructed intentions bred invention.  
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Eno’s musical shift toward environmental embodiment through music was thus 
instigated by a technological encounter. The technology not only inspired but also 
enabled the shift, as the musical result of implemented processes required 
technological apparatus capable of semi-autonomous activity. In this way, Eno has 
played out his role as ‘non-musician’ through composing almost exclusively through 
technological instrumentation. As William Duckworth summarizes Eno’s technological 
relationship:  
As we consider Eno’s complete body of work, we find that a sizeable 
portion of it was written not only with machines but by them. In fact, his 
method of composing is dependent on machines, first the reel-to-reel 
tape recorder of the 1960s (he owned thirty-one at one time and claims 
to have over one and one-half million feet of recorded tape), then the 
synthesizer of the 1970s and 1980s (he was partial to the older, less 
stable ones because they sometimes acted unexpectedly, and because 
he thinks ‘accidents’ are often more interesting than the things he does 
intentionally), and now the computer. Furthermore...he has been one of 
a rare breed of musicians who considers the recording studio to be his 
primary musical instrument’.98 
Thus, the seeds of his computer-generated music via Koan Pro were sown decades 
earlier, and often involved not only technology but the breakdown thereof. His 
penchant for using technology in a limiting rather than expanding function was present 
from the revelatory moment in bed to the ‘happy accidents’ of unstable synthesizers  
up through the algorithmic rules which shape his Koan creations.  
Eno’s ambient music and generative music are thus not distinct categories. His 
computer-based generative works are first ambient in both compositional style (as 
listenable as they are ignorable) and temporal quality; the non-terminating, non-
repeating generative works preclude their reception of sustained, exclusive attention. 
Our moment, then, is accordingly ambient. This ambient quality presents the 
possibility of a shift in and between background and foreground attention. As the 
music moves between states of perception, Heidegger’s ready-to-hand and present-to-
hand find alternating resonance. Just as the hammer carries the potential to yield both 
experiences, so too does the ambient-generative listening experience. The shift, 
therefore, is centred in perception rather than in the instrument or environment. It is a 
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shift in our habitual dealings with our tools and not of the tools themselves. Eno 
compares this habituated behaviour of the listening brain to that of a frog’s eye, which 
remains fixed on an environment and focuses in on only that which moves. Similarly, 
when the human stares at something for an extended period of time, the ‘common 
information gets cancelled out’ and ‘we begin only to notice the differences’.99 The 
listening brain thus mediates between two states or levels of engagement which not 
only calls to mind Heidegger’s hammer, but also the split attention levels necessary to 
ascertain the saving power and danger which coexist within the essence of technology.  
The Transformative Moment 
As we leave Eno’s moment of convalescence, we depart with a potentially 
transformed, aestheticized background which needs only a change in focus to access. 
This focal shift between background and foreground does not play out immediately, 
however; like the injured Eno’s accustomed listening and the frog’s fixated eye, we 
must grow into the shift over time. This temporal unfolding ultimately occupies a 
space which encompasses both focal levels as well as a moment of in-between or 
suspension. The next revelatory moment, then, is chronologically a previous one, 
during which Eno suffers the accident which would later see him bedbound. The date 
is January 18, 1975: 
Brian Eno was walking home... just after producing a pop single at a 
London recording studio, when the moment of revelation occurred. ‘If 
that song were the last thing I ever recorded, would I mind having that 
as my final piece of work?’ he asked himself. ‘Probably not’. Then he 
slipped on the rain-slick pavement, into the path of a speeding taxi. ‘At 
that instant my mind was operating incredibly fast,’ he recalls, ‘On one 
channel, I thought, ‘So that may be the last thing I do’. Then I thought, 
‘If I’m going to survive this, I’ve got to get up as soon as it hits me’, 
because I could see another car following the taxi that would surely 
swerve around and run over my head. The third thing I thought was, 
‘Who is going to get in touch with my girlfriend?’ And the fourth thing 
was, ‘Isn’t the brain an incredible thing? It’s like a 24-track tape with all 
these things going on at once’. It sounds ridiculous, but in that moment I 
developed a theory about how my brain worked. Then I got hit.100 
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This moment reveals a glimpse into the temporalizing process inherent within the 
structure(s) of our thought. In a single moment, Eno demonstrated numerous sections 
of Being and Time in a single, musical stroke. Eno’s being-toward-death brought about 
a ‘unity of ecstasies’101 between past (‘So that may be the last thing I do’), present 
(‘I’ve got to get up’) and future (‘Who is going to get in touch with my girlfriend?’) in an 
authentic way toward the present. This unity enabled an authentic attunement which 
manifested as a suspended ‘now’ or present moment (‘Isn’t the brain an incredible 
thing?’). These thoughts, though distinct, coexist as layers which both comprise the 
overall mood [Stimmung] of the thought process and suggest a musical composition 
amenable to the 24-track tape recorder.  
The taxi-induced temporal transformation situates a shift from everydayness to 
resoluteness [Entschlossenheit]. In the aesthetic encounter of generative listening, this 
resolve is not a byproduct of the ‘merely aestheticizing connoisseurship’102 of the 
work’s formal qualities; rather it is an experiential knowing that means ‘standing 
within the strife that the work has fitted into the rift’. Part of this rift is comprised 
between background and foreground focal points, which correspond to our experience 
of earth and world respectively. Resoluteness itself embodies a shift as Heidegger 
plays on the prefix [Ent-] to denote a ‘kind of keeping un-closed’ rather than the 
assumed denotation of a wilful closing off of other possibilities.103 We see this open 
resoluteness play out in the continual opportunities presented to perform the focal 
shift as generative music holds the invitation open. 
Whether one is ‘standing in the strife’ of the work or standing in the speeding taxi’s 
path, in both moments one is about to get ‘hit’. The impact is one of displacement and 
discontinuity. This is the ‘thrust’ of the work in which the ordinary is thrust down and 
the extraordinary is thrust up to the surface.104 The high-end harp notes in Eno’s 
bedroom usher in a reversal of ground [Kehre], one in which the continuity of the 
foreground is disrupted by the emerging discontinuity of the background. This thrust, 
like the taxi, is a means of transport—transport into the openness of beings. As 
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Heidegger tells us, this space is already open, a ’self-opening openness’.105 We are 
already there, we need only arrive, and it is by means of the thrust that we may do so. 
The work thus transports us ‘out of the realm of the ordinary’106 and into this 
openness. Like Eno’s sustained injuries, we too are merely receptive to the process. To 
undergo the transformation, we need only submit: 
To submit to this displacement means to transform our accustomed ties 
to world and earth and henceforth to restrain all usual doing and 
prizing, knowing and looking, in order to stay within the truth that is 
happening in the work.107 
Within this description of submission lies a map for the moment: we transform, 
restrain and stay. On either side of this process lies displacement in the front, or 
foreground, and truth happening on the way toward the end, or background. That this 
map should overlay Eno’s ambient revelation so perfectly is perhaps appropriate in 
that his music bears the rift design of the moment out of which it was born.  
The Open Installation 
We thus begin to suspect that we continually arrive at the same moment through this 
process, as if each moment bears a unique rift design which corresponds to or attracts 
the matching counterpart within the work. The 1975 raindrops and seventeenth 
century harp music still intermingle and resound in our present generative listening 
moment. How can this be? This temporal trick of long-separated yet contemporaneous 
moments is not merely an appearance; it is an actual happening—a happening of 
unconcealment. The work of art, the generative music of the moment, thrusts forth an 
awareness that the ‘unconcealment of a being has happened here, and that as this 
happening it happens here for the first time’.108 That which has already happened is 
happening anew. In our present generative moment, we hear echoes of the ‘has 
happened’ and ‘happens...for the first time’ in every algorithmic iteration; as each 
unique sonic cluster is born, so too is the generative sway between being and 
becoming. 
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Interestingly, our generative moment is itself contemporaneous with those of 
Heidegger’s privileged art works, as these tend to maximize the presentation of a 
space between the creator and creation. The more ‘solitary the work’ or ‘fixed in the 
figure’, the more ‘cleanly it seems to cut all ties to human beings’, and this results in a 
more powerful thrust that the work is, that it exists it all.109 This is echoed in his temple 
ruins and empty peasant shoes as well as in his semi-abstract painting preferences; the 
less the presence of the creator, the less likely we are to overlook the original 
happening in the work. The genesis of the work is crucial, as ‘[p]recisely where the 
artist and the process and the circumstances of the genesis of the work remain 
unknown, this thrust, this “that it is” of createdness, emerges into view most purely 
from the work’.110 As the work projects or brings forth an Opening which the creator 
did not create, it was set to work in the work through being provided a place in which 
to happen. The creator is merely ‘a passageway that destroys itself in the creative 
process for the work to emerge’.111 Eno would see a perfect mirror image in this 
statement. He provides our means of transport to the moment in which the musical 
genesis unfolds. 
Not only do Heidegger and Eno share an envisaged ‘emergence’, they both locate this 
happening as an installation. As Heidegger states, ‘truth essentially unfolds only by 
installing itself within a particular being’.112 Eno’s aesthetic approach echoes this 
assertion in his treatment of music as a living, growing entity, a music which has been 
described as ‘music that thinks for itself’.113 He likens the animate qualities in music to 
that of an externalized thought: as in Heidegger’s projective saying of language, one 
immediately see facets and implications which remained unclear when strictly internal. 
Through sounding a life is born. Eno explains, ‘It’s exactly the same way with music. 
You work on a piece of music, you put in certain ingredients, and suddenly they react 
in a way you hadn’t predicted. If you’re alert to that reaction, that’s what you work 
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from. If you’re stupid, you try to cancel that reaction out’.114 Thus, the actual site of 
the installation is not in the art gallery, computer or even recording itself; it lies in the 
force born of an earth-world collision which settles in the listener. The earth of the 
internal thought ignites with the external world and possibilities unfold of their own 
accord. 
This actuating force, as embodied in generative music, thus invites us into the moment 
of the shift. Its invitation arrives ambiently, ‘encompassing one on all sides, instead of 
coming at the listener’.115 Once the invitation is accepted, the experience comes to and 
takes over the listener with its own unique essence. This is Gadamer’s ‘play’, the mode 
of operation of the transformation.  It emerges when given a medium through which 
to act. Eno describes this process generatively: 
You put the seeds into the system and then it starts growing music for 
you. And it might make something quite beyond what you had 
imagined, something you didn't expect and couldn't predict, in fact 
something that you could never be around long enough to listen to in its 
entirety. This thrilled me, that you could make music that would have a 
life of its own.116 
This living music has its own fundamental nature contained in the play of its self-
renewing movement. Once it has been instigated, it grows of its own algorithmic 
accord and contains futural unfoldings whose entirety we will never hear. It truly has ‘a 
life of its own’. Like our own being, its parameters limit and define it, giving it its own 
unique identity and ontological space of possibilities.  
As the generative play is ‘installed’ in our being through listening, its constant ‘to-and-
fro movement’117 patterns our awareness. We perceptually swing forward and 
backward, between foreground and background, between actualities of the present 
moment and possibilities which are carried within and suggested by the movement 
itself. Our present, engaged, everyday activities which accompany the listening 
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comprise Gadamer’s game; they are raised up to ‘ideality’118 in the foreground through 
the transformation of the background. We, as listeners, are transformed through the 
embodiment of the play’s generative motion, and our ‘reality’ is reconstituted. As we 
become absorbed in the listening ‘game’, we are taken over. Thus, we are freed in the 
moment from our ‘usual doing and prizing, knowing and looking’119 and ‘the world of 
play lets down one of its walls’.120 Through listening, are able to discover a window 
within the wall of subjectivity.  
This window, as a space in which and through which the shift occurs, is our entry to 
the Open. While the generative listening moment affords unique, repeated 
opportunities for its discovery, the aesthetic path toward the Open itself has a history. 
The precursors to Eno’s creative approach lie in his often cited encounter with Steve 
Reich’s ‘It’s Gonna Rain’, as well as Cornelius Cardew’s ‘Paragraph Number 5’. Fabio 
Martini describes the evolution of this listening experience as he locates its 
predecessors both historically and geographically: 
The Americans, who are people of frontier, have opened our eyes, 
returned music to the senses, and led us by the hand into other worlds. 
The Americans, and not only Cage but also Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, 
Coltrane, Elliott Carter, Noncarrow [sic] and many others, have ‘opened 
windows’; they have taught us to listen to the world, and to consider 
the artwork not as something inevitably self-contained but as a constant 
‘opportunity’ to meet that which the habits and superstructures of the 
world we are squeezed into do not allow us to see.121 
The ‘opened windows’ are situated between earth and world, between ‘habits and 
superstructures’ and that which these ‘do not allow us to see’. Each successive 
revealing and concealing pattern through the aesthetic history of the being of music 
has allowed glimpses of different parts of the same ground, or origin, which comprises 
the earth. One could summarize Heidegger’s immanent technological danger as the 
closing of the window; without access to these glimpses outside of the room of the 
artwork, we lose our escape route from subjectivity.  
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The Step Back 
The generative listening encounter thus leads us not only ‘by the hand into other 
worlds’, but also by the ear. These ‘other worlds’ correspond with what Eno might call 
‘possible musics’;122 the music is not a merely a sonic stream of intervallic relationships 
captured on a recording device. Rather, the recording device, and thus technology, is 
freeing the sound which then sways in its patterning play into music. It grows and 
evolves in its own way with each new birth, and we listen in to its infinite origins. In so 
doing, we become aware of the fact that we are listening; through a lack of pre-
determined musical structure, we realize the structuring inherent in our perceptions. 
We become aware not only of what we are hearing, but also that we are hearing and 
how we are hearing.  
While Heidegger’s neglect of music leaves him seemingly unable to hear this process, 
he does see it visually unfold. Perhaps this is best evidenced in his love for and 
identification with Cezanne through the medium of paint. He likens Cezanne’s path in 
painting to his own in thought, stating that it is ‘the path to which, from beginning to 
end, my own path as a thinking responds (corresponds) in its own way’.123 This is 
followed by a lament: ‘If only one could think as directly as Cezanne painted’.124 This 
moment of response and correspondence is born from a seemingly paradoxical quality 
in both Heidegger’s thought and Cezanne’s painting between thinking more ‘directly’ 
and taking a ‘step back’.   It is this movement between two seemingly opposite 
directions, background and foreground, in which the in-between is highlighted. Julian 
Young cites Cezanne’s portrait of a gardener and also his ‘Mont Sainte-Victorie’ as 
instances of his progressive ‘dematerialization of objects’.125 This moment of viewing is 
thus described:  
For a moment, the work confronts us as an entirely abstract, two-
dimensional space. But then—miraculously—the objects reconstitute 
themselves and reappear. Their tenure remains, however, a fragile (and 
for that reason all the more precious) one: they threaten, always, to 
disappear again.126 
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This ‘flickering alteration’ between abstraction and meaning occurs in ‘a moment’ and 
embodies a transformation. Young states that the crucial point lies in the transition 
between states, as this is where we experience ‘the happening, the Ereignis or 
“worlding”’ of world’.127 Thus, as we ‘step back’ from the abstraction, we are able to 
see directly the projected character of the reconstitutions. We see the being of Being 
as Cezanne ‘thematizes’ both ‘presence’ and ‘what presences’.128 This is the visual 
window through which we can glimpse the generative listening process, for if one 
substituted ‘resound’ for ‘reappear’, the description would remain apt.  
The reciprocity between the seemingly discrete ‘moments’ of visual and auditory 
encounters of this kind suggests a unity which remains concealed when one views 
different artistic mediums as ontologically distinct. Significantly, Eno approaches music 
as a painting with sound, adding and subtracting layers and textures as one would with 
paint. Similarly, 77 Million Paintings exists ‘somewhere between music and painting’, 
combining ‘constantly evolving’129 images and his painterly ‘soundscapes’. Without 
glossing over unique capabilities of various mediums, or venturing into synaesthesia 
territory, I suggest that the unity which is reflected in Eno’s creative practice is a result 
of the unifying ground, or earth, toward which the works strive and in which they find 
their ground. The mountain emerging from abstraction and the notes resounding just 
above the neighbouring environmental sounds equally raise a question in their state of 
semi-ambiguity regarding the infinite number of other possibilities which might form 
similarly in that moment. During this instant of Kierkegaard’s Augenblick, the perceiver 
undergoes a shift; the earth is glimpsed as continuous, while the perceiver recognizes a 
discontinuity in his or her perception. As continuity and discontinuity trade places, we 
apprehend our appropriation into the process of bestowing meaning and its relative 
contingency. We receive our creative capacities as a grant. 
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Alterity and Freedom 
As the listener moves in a technologically induced sway between materialisation and 
abstraction, between being and becoming, he or she similarly moves between levels of 
engagement. These levels inherently involve differing points of engagement with 
subjectivity, and this process is that which enables novelty to manifest; music and its 
ensuing aesthetics can appear as new only when subjectivity is approached and 
acknowledged rather than automatically assumed and embodied. On one level, the 
listener is fully engaged with the immediate perception of the sound which is present 
in the moment. On a second level, the listener hears possibilities; as the organising 
principle of generative music lies in its process which does not manifest as an aurally 
discernable organisation, the listener hears the present note as one possibility leading 
to another rather than as part of a linear, predetermined structure. Similarly, as the 
pace of note generation is slow, as is consistent with ambient music, the resulting 
spaces between notes evoke places in which this second engagement level thrives. 
One has entered a way of listening which both receptive of the momentary sound and 
creative in the perceptual organization between the notes and the Open from which 
they emerge.  
The ensuing novelty and creative aspects of the listening process necessarily invoke 
issues of alterity, as this process must contain a way for thought to transcend its own 
limitations. This dilemma is elucidated by Heidegger who demarcates an 
environmental space ontologically in which the unknown moves and operates, in 
which it encounters and shapes our world and our thoughts. Gadamer locates the 
unknown within the transformative relationship as mediated by play as it takes over 
the perceiver of the work of art. As such, the environment and the relationship 
between the work of art and the perceiver have an inherent incorporation of earth, in 
which the unknown lies and exerts its influence. Levinas, however, continues this 
dynamic while adding a third and crucial piece to the puzzle; the unknown, or infinite, 
lies within us as a component of the formation of being itself. Thus, as it is the 
unknown within us that initiates the formation of subjectivity, it must be subjectivity 
that subsequently must shift to allow a reconnection with the unknown that exists 
exteriorly.  
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In this way, the shift is ultimately one with occurs subjectively, and this is no easy task. 
As Levinas previously described, it is the ‘improbable feat’ of infinition to produce a 
revelation of alterity within a ‘separated being fixed in its identity’.130 Perhaps the 
improbability itself lies in the fact that subjectivity attempts to block its entrance by 
filtering and subsuming all that is unknown under its own categories of cognition. 
Thus, the mechanism through which revelation gains entrance initially must be 
repeated in this shift, and this occurs through radical passivity. This occurs in 
Heidegger’s Gelassenheit and likewise in Eno’s surrender, which can be read as an 
expansion of the moment of the originary face to face encounter.  
Within the generative music listening encounter, a technologically manifested quasi-
alterity issues a summons which signals the presence of the quasi-Other, the unknown. 
This summoning is a visual one for Levinas and arises with the presence of the face but 
to which it is also not reduced as such. For Heidegger, it is a sonic call to which one is 
‘listening into’131 as it issues from Being to being and initiates thinking. Eno initiates the 
summoning call aurally in his generative music and both visually and aurally in 77 
Million Paintings. As he does so, he both initiates a quasi-face to face encounter via 
technology and invites the form of surrender which transcends subjectivity as it moves 
beyond the realm of activity and passivity; the realm of the will is left altogether.  
Thus, the experience of the people previously described in the audience of 77 Million 
Paintings is situated ontologically as it is read through Heidegger, Gadamer and 
Levinas. They are undergoing an experience, and as such, they comprise our 
representative moment of generative listening and the shift which ensues; as they 
listen to and watch constantly evolving sounds and shapes, they are both fully in the 
moment of the encounter as they are taken over by the play of the work and also 
mentally rehearsing alterity perception by means of play. As this process of cognitive 
representation still lies within the realm of the will, and thus subjectivity, this is not yet 
fully Gelassenheit. Rather, as they enter the second level of engagement in which they 
are experiencing possibilities, they have taken the necessary step back in which they 
are allowing what is present in the moment to come to them and suggest the 
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subsequent path for thought. In other words, as the perceiver engages with the sonic 
and visual configuration present in the moment, he or she then looks toward the 
horizon to which the configuration contributes.  
The receptive approach to the horizon, one in which the will is not exercised, 
necessarily transforms not only the experience of the work, but also the one who 
experiences. In leaving the realm of the will and looking toward the horizon, the 
perceiver in the audience is looking away from himself or herself. Thus, when attention 
is subsequently redirected toward self, he or she is arriving in a new place, one which 
has been transformed by way of the experience. In the process, not only the 
perceptual structures which confer patterns of meaning onto the un-patterned sounds 
and images become visible but also the subjective structures which give rise to the 
identity and will of the perceiver. The contingency of the present configuration of 
being is only revealed when one looks away from it toward other possible 
configurations; similarly, it is only by not exercising the will that the ways in which it 
shapes the perceiver and thus thinking and experience is revealed. Thus, I argue that 
within the moment of surrender lies the key to the revealing ontological structures 
which determine our ways of being, and in doing so it confers the possibility of re-
navigating and reconfiguring them; this is the key the freedom which transcends the 
danger of technology, the limitations of subjectivity, and points us toward the Being of 
being.  
Moment of Truth 
Eno’s creative practice has been influenced by this process of surrender, as it is an 
experience which he enjoys and seeks to re-invoke through further creations. As such, 
the inspiration for the album Another Green World was inspired by a science fiction 
story whose plot summarizes this shift in subjectivity: 
I was thinking about escaping…I read a science fiction story a long time 
ago where these people are exploring space and they finally find this 
habitable planet—and it turns out to be identical to Earth in every 
detail. And I thought that was the supreme irony: that they’d originally 
left to find something better and arrived in the end—which was actually 
the same place. Which is how I feel about myself. I’m always trying to 
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project myself at a tangent and always seem eventually to arrive back at 
the same place. It’s a loop…You actually can’t escape.132 
The space exploration resonates with both Heidegger’s earth which grounds the world 
and Levinas’s face-to-face encounter, in which our subjectivity is called into formation 
by way of the exterior presence of a radically other presence. As the planet (the Other) 
is reached which is preferable in its conditions to the present one, it ironically ends up 
to be the same. This can be read as either that the exploration enabled a new look at 
the present conditions which in turn appeared better through having been on the 
journey, or that we will only ever be able to encounter the same conditions because 
we are the ones who help determine their nature; we are the common denominators 
as such. As such, the Other was never effectively reached. In either interpretation, the 
journey is the necessary part in which one receives a new perspective on his or her 
present state of being; one had to leave Earth and re-encounter it anew in order to 
experience it as was. This is Levinas’ separation between the same and the Other via 
space travel; the two Earths never merge, but the original Earth alters as it effectively 
becomes Other in a sense.  
Like this journey to another world, every journey inevitably leads back to its origin in 
one form or another. This is reflective of the nature of truth, that which is set to work 
within us by the generative music of the present encounter. Thus, we come to 
understand Levinas’ characterization of truth as ‘rediscovery, recall, reminiscence, 
reuniting under the unity of apperception’.133 It is reoccurring for the first time as it is 
re-presented in the present for both a first and second time. As the temporal shift 
enabled by the work and the surrender evoked enable the listener to enter into the 
swaying movement of genesis, the partial manifestation of truth present in each 
moment is recognized as such; the fragmented nature of truth is revealed and in the 
process we are reminded that we are not only being, we are becoming. As such, the 
truth lies in the process, a sonic process, and this is one in which we become co-
creators once we recognize that we exist within the process rather than over it; within 
this process lies freedom. 
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The Beginning of the End 
So at the end of our path, we encounter a new space of possibilities, one in which the 
immanence of a revelation can conceal itself for safe keeping. The hiding is not new; it 
has been within being since origin and throughout its genesis. Only the hiding place is 
new. It is now cleverly concealed within technology. This technology has the power to 
pattern and subjugate our perceptions of truth, of reality, and the futural possibilities 
embedded in the present moment. Latent within its power is also the ability to reveal 
its own secrets.  
Eno uses technology not to order or enframe, but to disorder, to suspend, limit, and 
thematize the very elements of being which it would seek to subdue. He coaxes it into 
mistakes and malfunctions, disperses its digital unity and abrupt certainty into a 
fragmentary flow of questioning. From this process, we can begin to track and trace 
the force of genesis again, the force which runs through our being, our world, and our 
ground, which ties it all together into ever-shifting, unique configurations. These 
configurations comprise the unity of being, the presencing and presence, of all that we 
hear, of all that we are, and all that we can hear that we are. As this unity fragments 
and rejoins, reveals and hides, it resounds. It never sounds exactly the same twice. As 
such, we mistakenly seek to preserve isolated fragments of it as objects of a subjective 
truth. In doing so, we preserve a reflection of that whose essence escapes us. 
In some moments, however, we gain access to a shift, when we can see a crack in the 
mirror of our technological reflection which reveals the scaffolding of our present 
reality. We see in this framework monuments built to solidify time and our 
reconstructions of the faces of others. In the mirror, we see our own eyes watching 
infinite reflections of ourselves alone, our unity fragmented and distorted without 
another point of reference. During this shift, we hear the sound of the scaffolding 
falling away; this is the sound of music’s genesis, of its origin. As we listen to the origin, 
we can hear echoes of the secret, a listening revelation. It manifests in our thoughts 
and attunes our world, earth, and being in and as music. As our existence stretches out 
in waiting toward this secret sound, we begin to suspect that our double desire for 
transformation and continuity is fulfilled in this one thing: that the saving power is not 
a separate entity which descends on us and saves, but rather exists within the growth 
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itself. Genesis. The end is thus the same as the beginning, but with a new sound. It 
sounds like the music of now.  
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